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ABSTRACT 
 
Audit Committees (ACs) have become more important and prevalent since the initial 
corporate governance reforms of the mid-2000s. Initially, ACs were made responsible for 
overseeing and monitoring the company’s financial reporting. However, due to the evolving 
business environment and international auditing standards, ACs are now responsible for other 
audit and assurance activities that are not directly related to financial reporting. In their 
expanded roles, ACs have become a key player in their entity’s suite of corporate governance 
mechanisms which are intended to protect the interest of the shareholders and reduce the 
shareholder-manager agency conflicts in a company. The concept of AC effectiveness can be 
benchmarked against the widely-recognised contemporary roles of an AC.  Effectiveness of 
ACs in fulfilling their roles is expected to be conditional upon their own structures and 
members’ characteristics.  
 
The aim of this study is to examine the role effectiveness of ACs’ governance characteristics 
in achieving desired levels of quality and independence for the internal and external auditing 
functions of listed companies in Australia. However, achieving this role effectiveness of ACs 
will require agency costs. So this study also investigates whether higher audit-related agency 
monitoring costs (i.e., external audit fees, internal audit function budget and AC fees) result 
in higher returns to shareholders. The motivations for this study are to contribute to existing 
AC literature, to develop a comprehensive empirical design, and to provide new evidence 
from Australia using the ASX CGC revised 2007 edition best practice recommendations on 
governance.  
 
Five sets of hypotheses are generated from focal literature. Hypothesis one (a) and one (b) 
test the association between AC’s mechanisms for role effectiveness, based on its AC’s 
governance characteristics (i.e., chair independence, financial and industry expertise, size, 
frequency of meetings and charter) and financial resources (budget and labour hours) devoted 
to the internal audit function. Hypothesis two (a) and two (b) test the association between 
AC’s mechanisms for role effectiveness and the independence of the internal audit function. 
Hypothesis three tests the association between AC’s mechanism for role effectiveness and the 
quality of the external audit while hypothesis four tests the association between AC’s 
mechanisms for role effectiveness and the independence of the external auditors. Lastly, 
xiv 
 
hypothesis five tests the relationship between audit-related agency monitoring costs and total 
shareholders return. This study uses cross-sectional data and mainly applies multiple 
regressions to test the hypotheses. 
 
The sampling frame for this study is top 300 companies listed on the Australian Stock 
Exchange (ASX) for the financial year ending in 2010. A total of 255 companies are drawn 
from the sampling frame on an elimination basis. Mixed methods are used to gather both 
primary and secondary data. There are two stages of data collection employed. In the first 
phase, questionnaires have been developed and administered to the Chief Internal Auditors 
(CIA) of the sampled companies. Financial accounting and market data and the text in the 
annual reports are obtained from Connect 4, Aspect-Huntley’s FinAnalysis and 
Morningstar’s DatAnalysis databases.  
 
There are several findings from this study. First, in terms of AC’s governance characteristics 
and the role of AC overseeing the quality of the internal audit function, hypothesis one (a) 
reveals that only AC size is significantly positively associated with financial resources 
devoted to the internal audit function while hypothesis one (b) shows that both AC expertise 
and AC size are significantly related to internal audit function’s labour hours. Second, in 
terms of AC’s governance characteristics and the AC’s role of ensuring the independence of 
the internal audit function, tests of hypotheses two (a) and (b) find that no attributes of AC’s 
governance characteristics have a significant impact on the effectiveness of ACs in their role 
of ensuring the internal audit function independence.  
 
Third, in terms of AC’s governance characteristics and the role of AC facilitating the quality 
of the external audit, the tests of hypothesis three find that AC size and AC frequency of 
meetings are significantly related to external audit fees (a proxy for external audit quality). 
Fourth, in terms of AC’s governance characteristics and the role of AC ensuring the 
independence of external auditors, the test of hypothesis four reveals that both AC size and 
frequency of meetings are significantly negatively related to non-audit fees (a proxy for 
external auditors’ independence). Finally, in terms of audit-related agency monitoring costs 
and total shareholders return, results concerning hypothesis five reveal that total AC fees, but 
not internal or external auditor costs, are significantly related to total shareholders return. 
xv 
 
To provide a more in-depth analysis of the key AC’s governance characteristics that are 
found in the regression analysis to be significant, a comparative case study between two 
different companies in the financials and materials industry is performed. The results are 
generally supportive where AC size and frequency of meetings play a significant role in 
relation to the effectiveness of ACs in performing their roles, especially in the internal audit 
function (consistent with results of the regression models). 
 
In conclusion, the various findings of this study have important implications for regulators of 
corporate governance, professional accounting/auditing bodies, shareholders, board of 
directors and scholarly researchers. This study highlights the significant relationship between 
an AC’s governance characteristics and its effectiveness in fulfilling its roles in overseeing 
the quality of the internal audit function and also external auditing, as well as ensuring the 
independence of the internal and external auditors. Finally, this study contributes to current 
auditing-related governance literature by introducing a comprehensive empirical model along 
with statistical measure for AC’s governance characteristics. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background to the Study and Research Issues 
Up until about a decade ago, ACs were commonly viewed as a monitoring mechanism that 
enhances the audit attestation function of financial reporting by establishing a formal 
communication link between the board of directors, internal audit function and external 
auditors (Blue Ribbon Committee, 1999). In the past, financial reporting, accounting systems 
and internal controls were the main focuses of the ACs’ role. Today, ACs are given a broad 
mandate that covers a wide range of responsibilities such as risk management, financial and 
non-financial compliance requirements and other audit and assurance activities that are not 
directly related to the company’s financial reporting (AUASB, AICD and IIA, 2008). It is 
contended that these more extensive responsibilities of ACs can protect the interests of the 
shareholders and reduce shareholder-manager agency conflicts in the company. 
 
High profile corporate collapses in the previous decade such as Enron and WorldCom in the 
United States and OneTel, Harris Scarfe and HIH Insurance in Australia have caused 
corporate regulators and investors to query the effectiveness of ACs in effectively applying a 
monitoring and compliance role (Dellaportas et al., 2012). Hence, the United States, Australia 
and many other countries have introduced corporate governance law reforms such as new 
codes and guidelines to restore investors’ confidence in the financial reporting system. The 
gradual strengthening of corporate governance structures has impacted on the formation and 
operation of ACs which provides the setting for this study.  
 
Previous studies in Australia (Cooper, 1993; Goodwin, 2003; Goodwin and Kent, 2006; 
Singh and Newby, 2010) are conducted on data from the years before the implementation of 
the Australian Stock Exchange Corporate Governance Council (ASX CGC) revised 2007 
edition code. Thus, this study seeks to fill a gap in the corporate governance literature which 
lacks evidence on the effectiveness of governance characteristics of ACs in fulfilling their 
multiple roles under the current revised code (ASX CGC, 2007) of good corporate 
governance in Australia. 
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In this study, the concept of AC effectiveness is benchmarked against the many roles and 
responsibilities of an AC. The effectiveness of an AC is expected to be influenced by its 
structure and its members’ governance characteristics such as independence, financial and 
industry expertise, frequency of meetings, size of the committee, and the existence of an AC 
charter. Past studies addressing AC effectiveness are wide-ranging and have identified 
several factors that impact on the effectiveness of an AC. (Kalbers and Fogarty, 1993; 
Goodwin and Yeo, 2001; DeZoort et al., 2002; Carcello et al., 2002; Abbott et al., 2003; 
Carcello et al., 2005).  
 
According to Kalbers and Forgarty (1993), the structure of an AC and characteristics of its 
members are considered as a determinant of AC effectiveness. Also, DeZoort and Salterio 
(2001) argued that the effectiveness of an AC is likely to be affected by its members’ 
collective characteristics of being competent, inquisitive and decisive. However, most of 
these prior studies only address partial aspects in the design of AC structures and 
characteristics in terms of AC effectiveness. Hence, this study seeks to provide an up-to-date 
and comprehensive modelling of the effectiveness of the governance characteristics of 
Australian ACs in fulfilling their auditing-related roles.  
 
1.2 Overview of AC Regulations in Australia 
Previously, regulators in Australia had adopted a simple disclosure-based approach to the 
establishment of ACs where companies were not required to comply with any rules or best 
practices. Nevertheless, over the past years, there have been a number of formal 
recommendations from the regulators, government and professional accounting/auditing 
bodies seeking to mandate the establishment of ACs in listed companies in Australia. 
According to Munro and Buckby (2008), the development of AC regulations in Australia can 
be categorized into three distinct periods: Period 1 (from 1976 to 1 July 1993) – voluntary 
AC formation and non-disclosure, Period 2 (from 1
 
July 1993 to 1
 
January 2003) – voluntary 
AC formation and public disclosure and Period 3 (from 1 January 2003 to present) – 
mandatory AC formation and public disclosure. 
 
Period 1 (from 1976 to 1 July 1993) is the period where listed companies in Australia are not 
required to establish an AC and are not required to disclose publicly in their annual reports 
whether they had an AC. Period 2 (from 1 July 1993 to 1
 
January 2003) represents the period 
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where listed companies in Australia are still not required to establish an AC but they are 
required by the ASX to publicly disclose in their annual reports whether they had an AC. 
Period 3 (from 1 January 2003 to present) is the period where top 300 listed companies in 
Australia are required by the ASX to have an AC and must disclose further information about 
the composition and operation of their AC (Munro and Buckby, 2008; ASX, 2001; ASX, 
2006). 
  
With the increase of financial reporting frauds and high profile corporate scandals, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was enacted in the United States (January 2002) to establish new 
corporate governance standards for the board of directors and the ACs. The SOX legislation 
was enacted mainly due to the collapse of Enron and implemented rules and regulations that 
required all listed companies in the United States to establish an AC. Following the issue of 
SOX in the United States and the collapse of big corporations in Australia, the Corporate Law 
Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform & Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004, also known as 
CLERP 9, was introduced by the Australian government. This Act was largely implemented 
by modifications to the Corporations Act 2001. CLERP 9 was designed to strengthen the 
regulatory framework in the key areas of corporate accountability and governance, 
continuous disclosure, and the protection of the interests of the shareholders.  
 
At present, the ASX CGC’s best practice recommendations and ASX’s listing rules govern 
the foundation, policy and procedures of ACs in Australia. In March 2003, ASX CGC issued 
the Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practices Recommendations 
Guidelines: ASX CGC 2003. ASX CGC (2003) was implemented to improve the efficiency, 
quality and integrity of corporate governance practices and presentation of a listed company’s 
financial position (Murno et al., 2008). Due to the evolving nature of corporate governance, 
in 2 August 2007, ASX CGC undertook an extensive review and issued a revised edition of 
the Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practices Recommendations 
Guidelines: ASX CGC 2007.  
 
This document was very similar to the 2003 release. The key changes between the ASX CGC 
2003 edition and the ASX CGC 2007 edition are the removal of best practice from the title 
and further guidance on the list of relationship affecting board members independence status 
which will assist boards to determine the independence of a director for AC purposes (ASX 
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CGC, 2007). The ASX CGC 2003 and ASX CGC 2007 are the key points of reference for the 
ACs on their roles and responsibilities. The recommendations of the ASX CGC for ACs 
focuses on ACs’ characteristics such as independence, financial and industry expertise, size, 
frequency of meetings and the existence of a formal charter.  
 
On the other hand, the operation and composition of ACs in Australia are governed by the 
ASX listing rules. The ASX listing rules have statutory backing under the Corporations Act 
2001. In 2003, ASX Listing Rule 12.7 was issued, where from 1 January 2003 onwards, top 
500 companies listed on the ASX at the beginning of the financial year are required to 
establish an AC and must comply with ASX CGC’s AC recommendations. However, in 2004, 
the ASX Listing Rule 12.7 was amended such that only top 300 listed companies are required 
to establish an AC. The rules also require the top 300 listed companies to comply with 
recommendations of the ASX CGC’s principles and recommendations on the composition, 
operation and responsibility of an AC (AUASB, AICD and IIA, 2008). The next 200 listed 
companies are also require to establish an AC but not necessarily to follow ASX CGC’s AC 
recommendations whereas, the remaining smaller listed companies are only require to 
indicate in their annual reports whether an AC had been created.  
 
In summary, Australia has moved forward from a simple disclosure-based approach to an 
established comprehensive framework of corporate governance through amendments to the 
Corporations Act (2001), the implementation of CLERP 9 and the active involvement by the 
ASX, which has issued corporate governance listing rules and best practice recommendations 
(ASX CGC, 2003, ASX CGC, 2007; Munro and Buckby, 2008). Hence, this study aims to 
test whether AC regulations and guidelines on corporate governance structures and practices 
have been effective in improving the role fulfilment of ACs within the top 300 ASX listed 
companies. 
 
1.3 Roles and Responsibilities of ACs in Australia 
An AC is a subcommittee of the board of directors responsible for overseeing the company’s 
financial reporting and disclosure, overseeing risk management and internal controls and 
acting as a communication link between the board, management, external auditors and 
internal auditors. An effective AC represents a good corporate governance mechanism that 
reduces potential agency conflicts arising due to the separation of corporate control and 
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ownership between the management and the shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Abbott and Parker, 2000; Lary and Taylor, 2011). The scope of roles and responsibilities of 
an AC will rely, to some extent, upon the individual needs and characteristics of a company. 
It can be seen that, some Australian companies have established one committee (Audit and 
Risk Committee) with broad responsibility such as risk management and assurance matters 
while other companies choose to establish a traditional AC (Audit Committee) and a separate 
risk management committee (Risk and Compliance Committee). 
 
The ASX CGC (2007) provides recommendations and guidelines to improve the efficiency 
and quality of ACs in Australia. ASX CGC puts forward a limited focus on the AC and the 
companies can choose to increase and expand the role of the AC to take on a wider multitude 
of other responsibilities. Moreover, the roles and responsibilities, powers and rights, 
membership requirements, structure and procedures for conducting AC meetings are also 
clearly described in the AC charter. It can be argued that an AC must exhibit at least five 
characteristics (has independent members, has financial and industry expert members, has 
sufficient members, has frequent meetings and has a formal charter) to enable it to effectively 
discharge its roles. 
 
An AC is considered to have oversight roles in three core areas: 1) financial statement 
reporting; 2) internal audit functioning and 3) external audit services. The main function of an 
AC in the financial reporting area is to help the board of directors of the company to carry out 
its supervision responsibilities such as reviewing the financial information and overseeing the 
company’s accounting and financial reporting processes. An AC is also responsible for 
ensuring the credibility and reliability of the financial reports (e.g., reduce earnings 
management) by reviewing the appropriateness of accounting policies and disclosures to the 
presentation of a true and fair view.  
 
Additionally, in the external audit area, an AC is responsible for facilitating the quality of the 
external audit and ensuring the independence of the external auditors. In this respect, an AC 
is required to make recommendations to the board on the appointment, removal and 
remuneration of the external auditors. Also, the AC is expected to invite the external auditors 
to attend AC meetings to discuss matters about the external audit plan including proposed 
audit strategies and programs.  
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For internal audit function, the main role for an AC is to oversee the internal audit function 
and ensure the independence of the internal auditors. An AC is responsible to make 
recommendations to the board of the company on the appointment, remuneration and 
dismissal of Chief Internal Auditor (CIA). An AC is also responsible for reviewing the 
internal audit function’s plan, internal controls, risk management, resources and budget such 
that the internal audit function is effective and independent from the management. In 
summary, this study benchmarks AC effectiveness against aspects of two of the AC’s core 
roles: 1) overseeing the quality and ensuring the independence of the internal audit function 
and 2) facilitating the quality and ensuring the independence of the external auditors. 
 
1.4 Composition of ACs in Australia 
The composition of ACs in Australia is expected to consist of members with a high quality of 
independence and objectivity, demonstrated financial literacy, and a balance of professional 
skills and technical experiences and also the AC should be of sufficient size to carry out its 
responsibilities effectively (ASX CGC, 2007).  According to the ASX Listing Rule 12.7, top 
300 listed companies are required to establish an AC. The rule also requires the top 300 listed 
companies to comply with recommendations of the ASX CGC’s principles and 
recommendations on the composition, operation and responsibility of an AC (AUASB, AICD 
and IIA, 2008). ASX CGC’s Recommendation 4.1 suggests that the board of a company 
should establish an AC. Moreover, ASX CGC’s Recommendations 4.2 and 4.3 recommend 
that the AC should be structured so that it consists of independent non-executive directors, is 
chaired by an independent chair, has at least three members and has a charter.  
 
The ability to make objective and independent decisions by the AC is important. The AC 
should consist of independent directors who are free from day to day management and other 
relationships that can interfere with the AC’s decisions to act in the best interest of the 
shareholders. The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) 
should not be a member of the AC. Sometimes, the board might choose to appoint a member 
in the AC that has an indirect relationship with the company because of the member’s 
expertise. Thus, ASX CGC recommends that the board should disclose the existence of any 
such relationship and state the reason for choosing a member of the AC. Also, the chair of the 
AC plays an important role in ensuring the effectiveness of the AC’s operation in a company.  
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According to ASX CGC, the chair of the AC should not be the chair of the board, but should 
have financial expertise and be knowledgeable about the company’s business, financial 
reporting and auditing requirements. To perform their roles and responsibilities effectively, it 
is important to have AC members who are financially literate and, preferably, have an 
accounting/financial qualification. According to ASX CGC, an AC should have members 
who are able to understand financial statements, should have at least one member who has 
relevant qualifications and experience and should have some members with an understanding 
of the industry in which the company operates (at least 10 years relevant industry experience). 
 
An AC’s objectives are expected to be achieved through regular conduct of meetings. ASX 
CGC does not provide recommendations on the number of meetings that an AC should have 
each year as the required number of meetings may differ. The number of AC meetings held 
each year should depend on the size and complexity of the business. It is common for the 
CEO and CFO of the company to attend AC meetings to discuss and resolve issues in a 
timely manner. AC members also have the right to meet without the presence of the 
management in order to maintain its independence and objectivity. 
 
AC size is also seen to be important to the overall strength of the AC. According to ASX 
CGC, an AC should be structured so that it has at least three members to carry out the wide 
responsibilities and the complex nature of accounting and financial matters. However, ASX 
CGC does not place an upper limit on the number of members in a committee and there is an 
issue whether or not larger AC size would lead to more effective monitoring. A final 
characteristic is an AC charter. This is viewed as important because it makes explicit the 
scope of an AC’s responsibilities, rights (which give it authority) and the procedures for 
conducting meetings. ASX CGC requires an AC to have a formal charter. To sum it up, in 
this study, the concept of AC effectiveness is benchmarked against AC members’ governance 
characteristics. 
 
1.5 Objectives of the Study 
This study aims to investigate the effectiveness of ACs in performing their roles and, 
supplementary to this aim, to also examine the relationship between the audit-related agency 
monitoring costs and total shareholders return as an intended central part of good corporate 
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governance in the post-reform era in Australia. The four specific objectives are detailed as 
follows: 
1. To identify the prevalence of ‘good governance’ characteristics of ACs in Australian 
listed companies, in terms of AC chair independence, members’ financial and 
industry expertise, size of committee, meeting frequency and formal charter. 
2. To explain the extent to which ACs’ governance characteristics impact on ACs’ roles 
of overseeing the quality of the internal audit function and ensuring the independence 
of the internal audit function. 
3. To explain the extent to which ACs’ governance characteristics impact on ACs’ roles 
of facilitating the quality of external audit and ensuring the independence of external 
auditors.  
4. To determine whether higher audit-related agency monitoring costs (i.e., external 
audit fees, internal audit function budget and AC fees) result in higher returns to 
shareholders (i.e., higher total shareholders return). 
 
From the findings of this study, conclusions will be reached on which AC’s governance 
characteristics are more effective in fulfilling the AC’s roles especially in the internal audit 
function and the external audit engagement. 
 
1.6 Motivation and Significance of the Study 
This study is motivated to contribute to existing literature on AC effectiveness and its ‘good 
governance’ determinants. Previous corporate governance studies have been limited in 
modelling the effectiveness of ACs. Even though the effectiveness of ACs are investigated in 
the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia, no empirical evidence are provided 
from the viewpoint of testing the effectiveness of AC’s governance characteristics in 
fulfilling their dual roles of overseeing the internal audit function and also the external audit 
engagement. Most studies focused solely on either internal or external audit. Thus, the 
incremental contribution of this study is to provide findings on the effectiveness of Australian 
ACs in performing these dual audit-related roles in the context of top 300 companies listed on 
the ASX. By providing a comprehensive and integrated understanding of the operations and 
responsibilities of ACs, this study has practical interest for regulators, corporate boards and 
auditors.  
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The Australian context lends itself to research as recent regulatory changes (ASX CGC, 
2007) relating to ACs, enables the findings of this study to provide a review for regulators on 
whether regulatory changes have improved the ACs’ roles of large listed companies. Previous 
studies in Australia focused on the effectiveness of ACs in terms of audit fees or earnings 
management in the years before the implementation of the ASX CGC 2007 revised edition 
code. Moreover, this study is significant because it refines and extends the methodology of 
prior accounting research. The methodology of prior research, which has provided the 
foundation of this study is refined and extended in a number of important directions, as will 
be detailed in Chapter 4.  
 
As well, a distinctive aspect of this study which has not been addressed in previous papers 
concerns the issue of agency costs and benefits. Separation of ownership and control between 
the shareholders and management provides incentives for managers to act in their own best 
interest. Hence, the strengthening of the corporation’s auditing and internal control functions 
(i.e., the functions of the AC, external auditors and internal auditors) can reduce this problem. 
It can be argued that higher audit-related agency monitoring costs (AC fees, external audit 
fees and internal audit budget) should bring about greater protection of the interest of the 
shareholders.  
 
Higher audit-related agency monitoring costs should produce a stronger monitoring 
mechanism and improve corporate governance quality of the company in terms of reducing 
agent conflict between the shareholders and the managers. But does such shareholder 
protection expected from incurring higher audit-related agency costs lead to increased 
financial returns to shareholders? To this extent, there is no study testing this question. Hence, 
this study is the first to examine whether aggregate audit-related agency monitoring costs is 
positively related to total shareholders return.  
 
1.7 Organisation of the Study 
This study has seven chapters. Chapter 1 presents an overview, motivation, significance and 
expected contribution of the study. The remaining chapters are organized as follows: 
 
Chapter 2 reviews related prior studies and provides a summary of literature used. Chapter 3 
explains the theoretical foundation of agency theory and states the hypotheses forming the 
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basis of this study. Chapter 4 describes the questionnaire data research methodology and 
secondary data research methodology used to test the underlying assumptions of the 
hypotheses of this study. This includes data source, data collection, basis of measurements 
and definitions, model development and conceptual model. Chapter 5 reports the analysis, 
results and discussion corresponding to the related hypotheses and models.  
 
Chapter 6 undertakes two comparative case study analyses. Due to the issue of confidentiality, 
the four companies will not be named. The companies will be called Company A, Company 
B, Company C and Company D instead. Company A and Company B are in the financials 
industry while Company C and Company D are in the materials industry. The companies are 
selected based on the findings from the preceding chapter (Chapter 5). Lastly, Chapter 7 
summarises the whole thesis and discusses the implications based on major findings. In 
addition, limitations and directions for future research are considered. 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews prior literature relevant to the components of this study. Firstly, the term 
“AC effectiveness” is discussed. Next, the chapter surveys literature that addresses five 
factors that impact on the effectiveness of an AC. To facilitate comparison and analysis of the 
past studies reviewed, the studies are categorised into five major groups: 1) AC overseeing 
the quality of the internal audit function, 2) AC ensuring the independence of the internal 
audit function, 3) AC facilitating the quality of audit of the external audit, 4) AC ensuring the 
independence of the external auditors and 5) governance-related agency costs and their value 
to shareholders. For each of these five major groups a detailed discussion is provided in the 
form of an introduction, an outline of the extant studies, a comparative assessment and 
annotated tabulation tables of these studies. 
 
2.2 AC Effectiveness  
The Oxford Online Dictionary defines effectiveness as follows: “the degree to which 
something is successful in producing a desired result”. The desired results or effects of an AC 
in a company consist of providing good corporate governance by ensuring quality financial 
reporting and strengthening investors’ confidence in the financial reporting. The effectiveness 
of Australian ACs can be benchmarked against their many roles and responsibilities as 
required by the ASX CGC particularly in the internal audit function and external audit. The 
subjectivity of the notion of AC effectiveness and the availability of public data that can be 
obtained make the construct of AC effectiveness complex to model for empirical testing.  
 
Drawing upon the recommendations in the ASX CGC (2007), it can be argued that for an AC 
to be effective, it must exhibit at least five characteristics. First, the AC is chaired by an 
independent chair, which is not the chair of the board. Second, the AC should include 
members who are all financially literate; at least one member should have relevant 
qualifications and experience (that is, should be a qualified accountant or other finance 
professional with experience in financial and accounting matters); also some members should 
have an understanding of the industry in which the company operates. Third, a minimum size 
of three AC members is required for the AC to function effectively. Fourth, ASX CGC does 
not provide recommendations on the number of meetings that an AC should have each year 
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but given the various roles and responsibilities allocated to the AC, it needs to hold sufficient 
meetings (at least three times a year) to undertake its obligation effectively. Lastly, the AC 
should have a formal charter. 
 
Previous literature adopted different proxies to determine the effectiveness of ACs in their 
monitoring roles. DeZoort et al. (2002) characterised the effectiveness of AC as having 
qualified members with the authority and resources to protect stakeholders’ interests by 
ensuring reliable financial reporting, internal controls, and risk management through its 
diligent oversight efforts. Similarly, Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) defined AC effectiveness as 
the competency of the AC to undertake specified oversight responsibilities in the company.  
 
On the other hand, Carcello et al. (2005) conceived AC effectiveness as an ability to oversee 
the internal audit function activities which are measured by total internal audit budget 
devoted to the internal audit function. Alternatively, Goodwin and Yeo (2001) assessed the 
effectiveness of an AC as an ability to maintain internal audit function independence whether 
in appearance or fact. From yet another perspective, Carcello et al. (2002) defined the 
effectiveness of an AC as an ability to protect the interests of the shareholders by purchasing 
higher quality audit services, where the quality of audit service is represented in higher audit 
fees. Likewise, Abbott et al. (2003) assessed the AC effectiveness as an ability to maintain 
the independence of external auditor which is measured by the ratio of non-audit fees to audit 
service fees.  
 
Literature addressing AC effectiveness is wide-ranging and has identified several factors that 
impact on the effectiveness of an AC. Drawing on this literature, the five factors used in this 
study are independence of AC chair, financial and industry expertise of AC members, 
frequency of meetings of AC, size of AC and formal charter of AC (subject of ASX CGC’s 
2007 recommendations). These five factors would act as a suitable construct in testing the 
effect of the role of AC effectiveness on the internal and external audit in this study. 
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2.3 Characteristics that Reflect AC Effectiveness   
Based on past literature, this study has identified five factors that can reflect the role 
effectiveness of an AC: 
1. Independence of AC chair 
2. Financial and industry expertise of AC members 
3. Frequency of meetings of AC 
4. Size of AC 
5. Formal charter of AC 
 
2.3.1 Independence of AC Chair 
The independence of AC members and chair are deemed to be important characteristics 
enabling AC effectiveness. Fama and Jensen (1983) argued that independent AC members as 
outside directors may view the directorate as a means of enhancing their reputations as being 
an expert in decision control. According to ASX CGC (2007) Recommendations 4.2, the AC 
should be structured so that it comprises only of non-executive directors, consists of a 
majority of independent directors and is chaired by an independent chair that is not the chair 
of the board. These recommendations are supported by the findings of previous studies which 
established that AC independence impacts on the committee’s effectiveness (Abbott et al., 
2000; Beasley et al., 2000; Carcello and Neal, 2000; Goodwin and Yeo, 2001; Klein, 2002; 
Abbott et al., 2004).  
 
Past literature also proposes that AC independence can strengthen the quality of financial 
reporting. Beasley et al. (2000) argued that fraudulent reporting firms are less likely to occur 
when firms have an AC that is active and independent. Also, Abbott and Parker (2000) found 
that ACs that consist of independent directors and meet at least twice per year are less likely 
to be sanctioned for fraudulent or misleading reporting. In a later study by Abbott et al. 
(2004), the authors found that AC independence is significantly and negatively related to the 
occurrence of earnings management.  
 
Similar findings also emerged from Klein (2002) and Carcello and Neal (2000) where ACs 
comprised of independent members are more effective in monitoring the corporate financial 
accounting process. In summary, previous studies found that ACs independent from 
management are likely to demand a greater level of audit assurance and ensure reliable 
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financial reporting. Conversely, other studies found no evidence between the independence of 
AC members and discretionary accruals (Xie et al., 2003), or the occurrence of earnings 
restatements (Lin et al., 2006), or quarterly earnings management (Yang and Krishnan, 2005). 
 
2.3.2 Financial and Industry Expertise of AC Members 
In addition to independence, AC expertise is considered important governance characteristic 
for the effectiveness of ACs in fulfilling their oversight role and protecting the interests of 
shareholders. It is essential for all the members in the AC to have a financial or/and 
accounting background in order to assist the committee to understand and report on the 
financial information of the organisation and also some members need to have industry 
experience relevant to the organisation (Munro and Buckby, 2008).  
 
It has been proposed in ASX CGC (2007) Recommendations 4.3 that AC should include 
members who are all financially competent, at least one member should have relevant 
qualifications and experience and some members should have an understanding of the 
industry in which the entity operates. ASX CGC defines financial expertise as the ability to 
read and understand financial statements. The financial qualifications and experience of the 
AC members can be demonstrated by previous or current employment in finance or 
accounting firms and the membership of a professional financial/accounting body. 
 
Findings from earlier studies have shown that financial expertise is essential for AC members 
to perform their role well (Raghunandan et al., 2001; DeZoort and Salterio, 2001; Abbott et 
al., 2003; Goodwin, 2003; Xie et al., 2003; Abbott et al., 2004; Davidson et al., 2004). 
Raghunandan et al. (2001) and Goodwin (2003) posited that an AC with financial expertise 
has greater interaction and communication with the internal auditors. This implies that AC 
members with financial reporting knowledge are more likely to understand the extent of the 
internal controls and work performed by the internal audit function. Moreover, DeZoort and 
Salterio (2001) argued that AC members with more experience and financial knowledge are 
more likely to comprehend the risk the external auditors face and provide additional support 
for the external auditors when discussing issues and disagreements with the management. 
 
Also, organisations with an AC that has financial expertise and industry experience are more 
likely to produce higher quality financial reports. Davidson et al. (2004) argued that the 
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market reacts positively to the appointment of an AC with financial expertise. This is because 
AC members with corporate or financial background would be able to better understand 
earnings management and take action to prevent managers engaging in earnings management. 
Abbott et al. (2003) and Abbott et al. (2004) also found that there is a negative relationship 
between financial fraud and AC financial expertise.  
 
2.3.3 Frequency of Meetings of AC 
ASX CGC does not provide recommendations on the number of meetings that an AC should 
have each year. The number of AC meetings held each year may differ and should depend on 
the size and the risk of the business. 
 
Empirical evidence supports the importance of AC meeting (Beasley et al., 2000; Xie et al., 
2003; Abbott et al., 2004). Beasley et al. (2000) found that the frequent AC meetings are 
associated with less fraud. Moreover, Xie et al. (2003) found that AC meetings are associated 
with reduced levels of discretionary current accruals and the authors concluded that AC 
activity may be an important factor in constraining the propensity of managers to engage in 
earnings management. Consistent with both studies, Abbott et al. (2004) found that ACs that 
meet at least four times annually are less likely to restate their annual reports. These results 
indicated that ACs that meet frequently are more likely to be up to date about the current 
auditing issues faced by the company and are more attentive in discharging their 
responsibilities. 
 
However, other papers are unsuccessful in finding a significant association between the AC 
meetings and fraud (Abbott et al., 2004) or earnings management (Yang and Krishnan, 2005). 
Also, Davidson et al. (2005) found no evidence of a significant relation between the number 
of AC meetings and earnings management. 
 
2.3.4 Size of AC 
AC size is also seen to be crucial to the overall strength of the AC. ASX CGC (2007) 
Recommendation 4.2 asserts that the AC should be structured so that it has at least three 
members to carry out their wide responsibilities and the complex nature of accounting and 
financial matters. However, ASX CGC does not place an upper limit on the number of 
16 
 
member in the committee and there is an issue whether larger AC size would lead to more 
effective monitoring. 
 
Felo et al. (2003) posited that a larger AC increases financial reporting quality as such an AC 
is more likely to discover and solve potential risks in the financial reporting process. This 
may be possible if the resources available to the AC are increased to improve the oversight of 
financial reporting. Furthermore, Lin et al. (2003) found that companies with ACs comprising 
of at least four members are less likely to experience earnings restatements. Dalton et al. 
(1999) also found a positive association between AC size and the monitoring function of the 
board. Further, Psaros (2009) argued that an AC needs to have sufficient members such that 
different and informed views can be canvassed, and it is not dominated by one individual. 
However, Xie et al. (2003) found a weak association between AC size and earnings 
management and Abbott et al. (2004) also found no evidence of a relationship between AC 
size and earnings restatement.  
 
Based on the results from previous studies it can be argued that a larger AC is necessary for 
effective monitoring. Although ASX CGC (2007) recommends that AC should have at least 
three members, companies may choose to have more than three members. Thus, this study 
uses the same argument that a larger size AC would have more diverse skills and knowledge 
to enhance monitoring.  
 
2.3.5 Formal Charter of AC 
An AC charter is important in an organisation as it clearly sets out the AC’s roles and 
responsibilities, powers and rights, membership requirements, structure and the procedures 
for conducting AC meetings. The charter is probably the most important basis for achieving 
an effective AC. According to ASX CGC (2007) Recommendation 4.3, an AC should have a 
formal charter. The ASX CGC’s recommendation for an AC charter sets forward the 
minimum expectations. As such, an AC responsibility will be very much a function of the 
company and the industry in which it operates (Psaros, 2009).  
 
To this date, not many studies have examined the AC charter. Rezaee et al. (2003) 
investigated the subject matter of the AC charters of Fortune 100 companies and found that 
over nine percent of charters state the composition, independence, qualifications and financial 
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expertise of their AC members. Moreover, Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) argued that the 
existence of a clear AC charter provides power for authoritative decision making and thus, 
the AC can achieve its oversight role more effectively. 
 
2.4 AC Overseeing the Quality of the Internal Audit Function 
2.4.1 Introduction 
One of the responsibilities of AC in Australia is oversight of the internal audit function’s 
policies and procedures. The relationship between internal audit function and the AC is, 
however, much greater than that of overseen and overseer (Goodwin and Yeo, 2001). To 
maintain good corporate governance, communication between the employees responsible for 
the internal audit function and the AC is vital (Scarbrough et al., 1998; IIA 2002a, 2002b, 
2003b). 
 
According to Gwilliam and Kilcommins (1998), the presence of an AC creates a perception 
of enhanced independence of internal audit function and more reliable financial reporting 
among financial statement users. This point of view is also supported by Krishnan (2005) 
where the AC’s position is enhanced because it can depend on the work of the internal audit 
function. Internal audit function in a company can also help to reduce problems related to 
agency theory and information asymmetry because an AC does not have direct access to the 
same level of information as the management (Raghunandan et al., 2001). Rezaee and Lander 
(1993) argued that the working relationship between the internal audit function and AC must 
be year round and an open relationship in order to be most effective. Moreover, Zaman and 
Sarens (2013) found that AC and internal audit function engaging in informal interactions in 
addition to formal prescheduled regular meetings represent additional opportunities for AC to 
monitor the internal audit function. 
 
The sub-sections below present and discuss literature that examined the relationship between 
the AC and the internal audit function and a summary table of annotated literature review is 
also presented. 
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2.4.2 Extant Studies 
Scarborough et al. (1998) investigated the association between AC composition and their 
interaction with the internal audit function. The authors surveyed CIAs of Canadian 
manufacturing companies with sales greater than $50 million. The results indicated that there 
are no significant differences with respect to involvement in decisions to dismiss the CIA. 
Also, ACs consisting solely of non-employee directors are more likely to have frequent 
meetings with the CIA and review the internal auditing program. 
 
Furthermore, Raghunandan et al. (1998) presented empirical evidence about the perceived 
level of knowledge of ACs based on a survey of 72 CIAs. The main findings showed that 
ACs that granted private access to their CIA and reviewed both the plans and results of 
internal auditing are more likely to be perceived as knowledgeable by their CIA. In more 
recent years, Raghunandan et al. (2001) performed a similar study to Scarbrough et al. (1998) 
by using responses from CIAs of 114 United States manufacturing companies. Consistent 
with Scarbrough et al. (1998), they found that ACs consisting solely of independent directors 
and with at least one member having an accounting or finance background are more likely to 
have longer meetings with CIA, provide private access to CIA and review internal audit 
proposals and results of internal auditing. 
 
On a similar theme, Goodwin (2003) examined the separate influence of independence and 
financial expertise on AC relations with the internal audit function. Using data from Australia 
and New Zealand, the study focused on ACs and internal audit functions in both private and 
public sector. They found that independence and accounting experience have a 
complementary impact on AC relations with the internal audit function. The author argued 
that independence is more associated with the issue of process while accounting experience is 
associated with the extent that the AC reviews the work of the internal audit function. 
 
Carcello et al. (2005) examined factors associated with United States public investment 
companies in internal auditing. Data from surveys sent to CIA of mid-sized public companies 
are combined with publicly available data. The authors found that internal audit budget is 
positively related to AC review of the budget. In the United States, Abbott et al. (2010) 
investigated the association between the AC’s oversight of the internal audit function and the 
nature of internal audit function activities by surveying 134 CIAs from Fortune 1000. They 
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documented a strong, positive association between the AC oversight variable and the amount 
of internal audit function budget allocated to internal-controls-based activities. 
 
Taking a qualitative approach, Cooper’s (1993) study discussed the formation and 
membership of an AC and the relationship of the AC and internal audit in Australia. The 
author argued that an effective and harmonious relationship between the AC and internal 
audit can have a profound beneficial effect on corporate management and control. A final 
study in this review is Abbott et al.’s (2003) examination of the association between AC 
effectiveness and internal audit outsourcing. Data are obtained from a survey of 219 CIAs 
and from relevant proxy statements filed in 2001. The findings indicated that companies with 
effective ACs are less likely to outsource internal auditing to the external auditor. Effective 
ACs that also have authority over the CIAs’ dismissals will have an incrementally negative 
relation with the extent of outsourcing. 
 
2.4.3 Comparative Assessment 
Overall, previous studies have concluded that an effective AC can heighten the status of the 
internal audit function and at the same time, the internal audit function helps the AC in its 
oversight role (Cooper, 1993; Scarbrough et al., 1998; Raghunandan et al., 1998; 
Raghunandan et al., 2001; Goodwin, 2003; Abbott et al., 2003; Carcello et al., 2005; Abbott 
et al., 2010).  
 
In addressing the relationship of the AC to the internal audit function, studies such as 
Scarbrough et al. (1998) and Raghunandan et al. (2001) examined the association between 
AC composition and the committee’s interaction with internal auditing. Both studies used the 
same method by sending surveys to CIAs in publicly held manufacturing companies. 
Scarbrough et al.’s (1998) study is performed in Canada using a larger sample size while 
Raghunandan et al.’s (2001), a more recent United States study used a smaller sample size 
consisted of 114 public companies. Both consistently found that ACs consisting of solely 
non-employee directors are more likely to have frequent meetings with the CIA and review 
the internal auditing program.  
 
Moreover, Goodwin (2003) performed a similar study to Scarbrough et al. (1998) and 
Raghunandan et al. (2001) in Australia and New Zealand where the author separated the 
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influence of independence and financial expertise on AC relations with the internal audit 
function. They found that independence and accounting experience have a complementary 
impact on AC relations with internal audit. On the other hand, in terms of analysing the 
perception and the perceived level of knowledge of ACs, Raghunandan et al. (1998) found 
that ACs that granted private access to their CIAs and reviewed both the plans and results of 
internal auditing are more likely to be perceived as knowledgeable. It could be argued that 
ACs performing their role as an internal control oversight can have a strong beneficial effect 
on corporate management. These results provided empirical support for the recommendations 
of a private sector commission which has called for increased interaction between ACs and 
internal auditing. 
 
In a different context, Abbott et al. (2010) used the AC’s oversight of the internal audit 
function as a direct measure in their study. Like all other studies, the authors survey 134 CIAs 
from Fortune 1000. They found that ACs with greater internal audit function oversight are 
associated with a larger percentage of internal audit function hours being allocated towards 
internal control activities. It infers that ACs demanding for better internal controls may cause 
higher internal audit function focus on internal controls. 
 
2.4.4 Tabulated Annotations 
The annotated literature review on AC overseeing the quality of the internal audit function is 
presented in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Annotated Literature Review on AC Overseeing the Quality of the Internal Audit Function 
Author(s) 
Year(s) 
Purpose/ Objective Sample & Data 
Collection 
Methods Main Findings Limitations & Future 
Research  
Scarbrough, 
P., Rama, 
D.V., & 
Raghunandan, 
K. (1998) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Examine the association 
between AC composition 
and the committee's 
interaction with internal 
auditing, as measured by 
(1) involvement of the 
AC in decisions to 
dismiss the CIA (2) 
meetings between the AC 
and the CIA, and (3) AC 
review of the internal 
auditing program and 
results of the internal 
auditing. 
398 companies are 
mailed the 
questionnaire.  
 
Receive 58 responses 
from large companies 
(>$50million sales) and 
50 responses from small 
companies. 
Survey CIAs of 
Canadian 
manufacturing 
companies with 
sales greater than 
$50million. 
No significant differences 
with respect to involvement 
in decisions to dismiss the 
CIA. 
 
ACs consisting of solely non-
employee directors are more 
likely than AC consisting of 
one or more insiders to have 
(1) frequent meetings with 
the CIA and (2) review the 
internal auditing program and 
the results of internal 
auditing. 
Internal auditors' 
interactions may be 
influenced by other factors. 
 
Study focus is narrow; 
only examine those issues 
which have been discussed 
in the reports of various 
private sector 
commissions. 
 
Do not examine issues in 
greater depth. 
 
Future research: (1) 
Examine AC interactions 
with internal auditors in 
other countries and 
compare the results. (2) 
Examine issues related to 
AC interactions with 
internal auditors in greater 
depth by focusing on the 
quality of the interaction. 
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Table 1 (Continued): Annotated Literature Review on AC Overseeing the Quality of the Internal Audit Function 
Author(s) 
(Year) 
Purpose/ Objective Sample & Data 
Collection 
Methods Main Findings Limitations & Future 
Research 
Raghunandan, 
K., Rama, 
D.V., & 
Scarbrough, 
D. (1998) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extend current literature 
related to AC by 
providing evidence about 
the perceived level of 
knowledge of Canadian 
ACs with respect to 
accounting and auditing 
issues and the impact of 
the nature of interaction 
between the AC and 
internal auditing on such 
perceived level of 
knowledge. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indentify names and 
address all publicly held 
Canadian manufacturing 
companies with sale 
greater than $50million. 
 
Mail questionnaire to 
the CIA of 398 
companies. 
Perform additional 
analysis by 
including company 
size and the 
proportion of 
internal auditing 
time spent on 
financial auditing. 
Find an association between 
AC interaction with internal 
auditing and the perceived 
knowledge level of AC. 
 
ACs that grant private access 
to the CIA and reviewed both 
the plans and results of 
internal auditing are more 
likely to be perceived as 
knowledgeable by CIAs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Possibility of non-response 
bias. 
 
Survey asks respondents’ 
perceptions about the 
knowledge level of AC. 
Perceptions may differ 
from reality and may be 
subject to bias based on 
individual experiences. 
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Table 1 (Continued): Annotated Literature Review on AC Overseeing the Quality of the Internal Audit Function 
Author(s) 
(Year) 
Purpose/ Objective Sample & Data 
Collection 
Methods Main Findings Limitations & Future 
Research 
Raghunandan, 
K., Read, 
W.J., & Rama, 
D.V. (2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Examine the association 
between AC composition 
and the committee’s 
interaction with internal 
auditing. 
Obtain the names and 
addresses of all publicly 
held United States 
manufacturing 
companies with sales 
greater than $250 
million from CD-SEC 
database. 
 
Mail to 400 randomly 
selected companies of 
CIA. Receive 129 
responses. 
 
Final sample consists of 
114 usable responses. 
Examine 5 research 
questions with five 
multivariate 
regression analyses. 
ACs comprise solely of 
independent directors and 
with at least one member 
having an accounting or 
finance background are more 
likely to: (1) have longer 
meetings with the CIA (2) 
provide private access to the 
CIA and (3) review internal 
audit proposals and results of 
internal auditing.  
Future research: (1) Should 
examine the nature of the 
relationship between ACs 
and internal auditing by 
delving into issues such as 
personality, attitude and 
character brought into the 
relationship by the AC 
members. (2) Examine 
how the composition of 
ACs without inside or gray 
directors varies across 
countries. (3) Compare AC 
interaction with internal 
auditing in various 
countries. 
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Table 1 (Continued): Annotated Literature Review on AC Overseeing the Quality of the Internal Audit Function 
Author(s) 
(Year) 
Purpose/ Objective Sample & Data 
Collection 
Methods Main Findings Limitations & Future 
Research 
Goodwin-
Stewart, J. 
(2003) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Examine the separate 
influence of 
independence and 
financial experience on 
AC relations with the 
internal audit function. 
Use data from Australia 
and New Zealand, the 
study focuses on ACs 
and internal audit in 
both private and public 
sector. 
 
Data are collected by 
means of a 
questionnaire sent to 
CIAs. 
 
IIA processes the 
mailing of 
questionnaires with 
responses being mailed 
directly to the 
researcher. 
 
Final sample consists of 
120 responses. 
 
Identify differences 
in responses based 
on the composition 
of AC, country and 
sector in which the 
entity operates. 
Find that independence and 
accounting experience have a 
complementary impact on AC 
relations with internal audit. 
 
Independence is more 
associated with the issue of 
process while accounting 
experience is associated with 
the extent that the AC 
reviews the work of the 
internal audit function. 
Small sample size may 
have influenced the results. 
 
Generalisability of the 
results to other 
jurisdictions may be 
limited. 
 
Future research: (1) 
Studies could explore the 
nature and level of 
accounting expertise that 
best equip AC members. 
(2) The nature of AC 
meetings with the CIA 
could be investigated to 
identify the extent of AC 
reliance on the work of 
internal audit. 
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Table 1 (Continued): Annotated Literature Review on AC Overseeing the Quality of the Internal Audit Function 
Author(s) 
(Year) 
Purpose/ Objective Sample & Data 
Collection 
Methods Main Findings Limitations & Future 
Research 
Carcello, J.V., 
Hermanson, 
D.R., & 
Raghunandan, 
K. (2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Investigate three factors 
associated with United 
States public companies’ 
investment in internal 
auditing. 
 
Expect the internal audit 
budget to be higher when 
the AC reviews the 
internal audit budget. 
 
Examine whether the 
total investment in 
internal audit is 
associated with the 
percentage of company’s 
internal auditing that is 
outsourced. 
 
Address the relation 
between external audit 
fees and internal audit 
budgets. 
 
 
 
 
 
Data from a survey 
administer to CIA of 
mid-sized United States 
public companies are 
supplemented with 
publicly available data. 
 
Final sample consists of 
217 companies. 
Use OLS regression 
models in the 
analysis. 
 
 
Internal audit budgets are 
positively related to company 
size, leverage, financial 
service and utility industries, 
relative amount of inventory, 
operating cash flows and AC 
review of the internal audit 
budget. 
 
Total internal audit budget 
are negatively related to the 
percentage of the internal 
audit services. 
Data are derived from a 
survey of CIAs and the 
study relied on the 
accuracy of these 
responses. 
 
Study focuses on mid-sized 
public companies and the 
results might not be 
generalised to other public 
companies or to private 
organisations. 
 
Unmeasured factors, such 
as management 
characteristics may be 
correlated with both 
internal audit investment 
and certain independent 
variables. 
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Table 1 (Continued): Annotated Literature Review on AC Overseeing the Quality of the Internal Audit Function 
Author(s) 
(Year) 
Purpose/ Objective Sample & Data 
Collection 
Methods Main Findings Limitations & Future 
Research 
Abbott, L.J., 
Parker, S., & 
Peters, G.F. 
(2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Examine the association 
between the activities 
performed by the internal 
audit function and the 
extent of AC oversight of 
the internal audit 
function. 
 
Examine the association 
between AC oversight 
and the amount of 
internal audit function 
resources allocated to 
internal-controls-based 
activities.  
 
Examine the allocation of 
the internal audit function 
budget and utilize a better 
measure of the degree of 
AC involvement with the 
budget process. 
Questionnaire is mailed 
to Fortune 1000 
companies after 
excluding banks. 
 
The 1st survey is sent in 
July 2006 and results in 
a total of 72 usable 
responses. A follow-up 
mailing is conducted in 
September 2006 and 
produces an additional 
62 usable responses.  
 
Final sample consists of 
134 observations. 
Survey 134 CIAs 
from fortune 1000 
firms regarding the 
amount of internal 
audit resources 
allocated across 
internal audit 
activities in fiscal 
year 2005. 
 
Construct a 
composite measure 
of AC oversight 
contingent on the 
relative control that 
the AC has over 
internal audit 
function via vis-à-
vis management.  
AC with greater internal audit 
function oversight is 
associated with larger 
percentages of internal audit 
function hours being 
allocated toward internal 
controls activities.  
 
Document significant 
differences in the allocation 
of internal audit budget 
across different activities. 
  
Majority of the budget is 
devoted to internal controls 
activities.  
 
AC’s demand for better 
internal controls may lead to 
greater internal audit function 
focus on internal controls. 
Survey instrument captures 
the CIA’s perception of 
AC oversight may not 
indicate the complex 
relationship amount the 
various stakeholders. 
 
Do not allow study to 
make causal inferences, 
only to document 
associations. 
 
Response bias may reduce 
the generalisable of results 
and endogeneity issues 
may be at play. 
 
Future research: (1) Can 
utilise the study's results to 
benchmark both internal 
audit resource allocations 
and the degree of AC 
oversight of the internal 
audit function. (2) Fully 
explore the internal audit 
function and AC. 
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Table 1 (Continued): Annotated Literature Review on AC Overseeing the Quality of the Internal Audit Function 
Author(s) 
(Year) 
Discussions 
 
Cooper, B.J. 
(1993) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discuss the formation and membership of an AC in Australia. A successful AC usually comprises of three to five non-executive 
directors who are able and willing to accept the responsibility, has a chairman who understands the importance of his or her position 
and ensures that it maintains the confidence of management.  
 
Discuss the relationship of AC and internal audit. The author posited that the role of the AC in an organisation has been considered 
with particular emphasis on providing an internal audit perspective.  
 
Discuss on how to improve the relationship of the AC and internal audit. Internal auditors should see the establishment and operation 
of an AC as ideal opportunity to improve their service to management. However, they must be proactive and educate the committee on 
the real benefits of a good internal audit function. An effective and harmonious relationship between the AC and internal audit can 
have a profound beneficial effect on corporate management and control. 
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Table 1 (Continued): Annotated Literature Review on AC Overseeing the Quality of the Internal Audit Function 
Author(s) 
(Year) 
Purpose/ Objective Sample & Data 
Collection 
Methods Main Findings Limitations & Future 
Research 
Abbott, L., 
Parker, S., 
Peters, G., & 
Rama, D.V. 
(2003) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Examine the association 
between AC effectiveness 
and internal audit 
outsourcing. 
Data obtain from a 
survey of 219 CIAs and 
from relevant proxy 
statements filed in 2001. 
 
Final sample consists of 
287 usable responses. 
Use regression 
models to test the 
hypotheses. 
Companies with effective 
ACs are less likely to 
outsource internal auditing to 
the external auditors. 
 
Effective ACs also has 
authority over the CIAs’ 
dismissals and has an 
incrementally negative 
relation with the extent of 
outsourcing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Do not differentiate 
between alternative 
explanations for the 
findings. 
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2.5 AC Ensuring the Independence of the Internal Audit Function  
2.5.1 Introduction  
According to the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), internal auditing is an independent, 
objective assurance and consulting activity designed to evaluate and improve an 
organisation’s operations. Both the organisational independence of the internal audit function 
and the individual objectivity of internal auditors are important features as proposed by IIA. 
The standards require that the CIA report to a level within the organization that allows the 
internal audit function to fulfil its responsibilities. To achieve necessary independence, best 
practices suggest that the CIA should report directly to the AC or its equivalent. For day to 
day administrative purposes, the CIA should report to the most senior executive (IIA, 2010).  
 
The IIA recognises that ACs and internal auditors have interlocking goals. A good working 
relationship between the internal auditors and a company’s AC is necessary. A direct channel 
of communication between the CIA and the AC is required such as provisions for the CIA to 
have access to the AC, to attend AC meetings, to present the audit plan, to report on the 
results of major audits and key audit findings or other matters, and to discuss internal auditing 
observations on risk and internal controls within the organisation (IIA, 2010). Moreover, CIA 
and AC should meet regularly without the presence of senior management and the external 
auditors. 
 
The sub-sections below present, discuss and annotate the extant literature that has examined 
the relationship between AC and internal audit function independence. 
 
2.5.2 Extant Studies 
Goodwin and Yeo (2001) argued that the relationship between internal audit and AC may 
affect organisational independence while the use of the internal audit function as a 
management training ground may affect individual objectivity. Using a survey of CIAs in 
Singapore, they found that an effective AC can strengthen the position of the internal audit 
function by acting as an independent forum in which internal auditors may raise matters 
affecting management.  
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Moreover, in a recent study, Christopher et al. (2009) analysed the independence of the 
internal audit function through its relationship with the management and the AC. Based on 
survey of 34 CIAs from the Australian corporate sector, they identified a number of threats to 
independence including having the CEO and CFO approve the internal audit budget and 
being involved in the audit plan, not reporting functionally to the AC, the AC not having sole 
responsibility for appointing and dismissing the CIA and a lack of AC accounting expertise. 
 
In New Zealand, Van Peursem (2005) examined the internal auditor’s role and addressed how 
an effective internal auditor can overcome the tension of working with management to 
improve performance while also remaining sufficiently distant (independence) from 
management in order to report on their performance. The results indicated that an internal 
auditor’s close relationship with management can place their independence from management 
at risk.  
 
On the other hand, Schneider and Wilner (1990) examined the effects of managers’ 
perceptions of internal and external auditing on the potential commission of financial 
reporting irregularities. The authors found that in settings where the internal audit function is 
independent, in terms of reporting level, this will lead to an improved control environment 
and a reduction in reporting errors results. Their findings are also supported by Grambling et 
al. (2004) that independence through proper reporting relationship is viewed as the most focal 
criteria.  
 
Independence of the internal audit function may also be affected depending on whom has the 
responsibility and authority for hiring and firing the CIA.  McHugh and Raghunandan (1994) 
found that a large majority of the internal auditors indicated that vesting hiring or firing 
authority with the AC would enhance the independence of the internal audit function and 
improve the ability of internal auditors to generate action on audit findings. 
 
On the other hand, taking a cognitive perspective of internal auditor independence, Ahmad 
and Taylor (2009) developed measures for the concepts of commitment to independence, role 
conflict and role ambiguity in the context of the internal auditor’s work environment, in order 
to provide evidence of the effect of the role conflict and ambiguity, and their sub-dimensions, 
on the internal auditor’s commitment to independence. The results revealed that both role 
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ambiguity and role conflict are significantly negatively related to commitment to 
independence. 
 
2.5.3 Comparative Assessment 
Based on the above studies, a discussion is now provided on the effects of AC in ensuring the 
independence of the internal audit function.  The results of many studies (Schneider and 
Wilner, 1990; McHugh and Raghunandan, 1994; Goodwin and Yeo, 1998; Van Peursem, 
2005; Christopher et al., 2009) posited that the independence of the internal audit function 
plays an important role in an organisation. The broaden responsibilities of the internal audit 
function within the environment of a changing business world, coupled with increasing 
economic competition and globalisation are creating pressure on the internal audit function 
which can jeopardise its independence (Mutchler et al., 2001). 
 
Goodwin and Yeo (2001), Van Peursem (2005) and Christopher et al. (2009) took a similar 
research approach by investigating the independence of internal audit function through the 
working relationship with the management and AC. Although the three studies are conducted 
in different countries (Singapore, Australia and New Zealand respectively) where the 
reporting environment is different, all of the three studies produced the same results. Based 
on a survey of CIAs, Goodwin and Yeo (2001) and Christopher et al. (2009) found that an 
effective AC (performing all their duties) can strengthen the independence position of the 
internal audit function. In addition, Van Peursem (2005) made observations, examined 
documents and interviewed senior internal auditors in six New Zealand organisations to find 
that internal auditors close relationship with management can place their independence at risk. 
 
On the other hand, both Schneider and Wilner’s (1990) and Ahmad and Taylor’s (2009) 
studies investigated the perception of the internal auditor independence. Schneider and 
Wilner (1990) looked at the effects of managers’ perceptions of internal and external auditing 
on the potential commission of financial reporting irregularities in the United States while 
Ahmad and Taylor (2009) developed measures for the concepts of commitment to 
independence. Schneider and Wilner (1990) found that independence through proper 
reporting relationship is important. Whereas, Ahmad and Taylor’s (2009) study conducted in 
Malaysia suggested that ambiguity in both the exercise of authority by the internal auditor 
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and time pressure faced by internal auditors plus conflict between the internal auditors’ and 
managements’ personal values have the greatest impact on commitment to independence.  
 
2.5.4 Tabulated Annotations 
The annotated literature review on AC ensuring the independence of the internal audit 
function is presented in Table 2. 
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Table 2: Annotated Literature Review on AC Ensuring the Independence of the Internal Audit Function 
Author(s) 
(Year) 
Purpose/ Objective Sample & Data 
Collection 
Methods Main Findings Limitations & Future 
Research 
Goodwin-
Stewart, J., & 
Yeo, T.Y. 
(2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Argue that the 
relationship between 
internal audit and AC 
may affect organisational 
independence while the 
use of the internal audit 
function as a management 
training ground may 
affect individual 
objectivity. 
 
 
A total of 80 
questionnaires are 
mailed, 27 to CIAs of 
listed companies and 53 
to CIAs of unlisted 
companies. A total of 65 
responses are received. 
Data are collected 
by means of a 
questionnaire sent 
to CIAs of both 
listed and unlisted 
companies in 
Singapore. 
A strong relationship between 
the AC and the internal audit 
function is found, with the 
level of interaction being 
greater when AC is 
comprised solely of 
independent directors. 
 
The use of the internal audit 
function as a management 
training ground is also found 
to be quite widespread in 
Singapore. 
 
All respondents are 
members of the IIA and 
hence there may be a bias 
towards those who are 
career internal auditors 
rather than manager who 
are only temporarily 
employed as internal 
auditors. 
 
The sample size is 
relatively small, possibly 
leading to non-significant 
results. 
 
Future research: An 
analysis of the interaction 
between internal audit and 
AC will provide a 
complete picture. 
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Table 2 (Continued): Annotated Literature Review on AC Ensuring the Independence of the Internal Audit Function 
Author(s) 
(Year) 
Purpose/ Objective Sample & Data 
Collection 
Methods Main Findings Limitations & Future 
Research 
Christopher, 
J., Sarens, G., 
& Leung, P. 
(2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Analyse critically 
whether internal audit 
function in practice are 
operating independently, 
in line with theoretical 
best practice guidelines. 
The questionnaire is 
electronically 
distributed as an 
attachment to an e-mail 
cover letter sent by IIA 
Australia to their list of 
CIAs in the corporate 
sector. This represents a 
sample size of 206. A 
total of 34 responses are 
received, representing a 
response rate of 17 per 
cent. 
 
Results are based on 
a critical 
comparison of 
responses from 
questionnaires sent 
to Australian CIAs 
versus existing 
literature and best 
practice guidelines. 
With respect to the 
relationship with the AC, 
significant threats identified  
include CIAs not reporting 
functionally to the AC; the 
AC not having sole 
responsibility for appointing, 
dismissing and evaluating the 
CIA; and not having all AC 
members or at least one 
member qualified in 
accounting. 
Limited number of 
respondents can be an 
impediment to 
generalisation of the 
results. 
 
Questionnaire is only sent 
to IIA members. 
 
Different levels of 
independence threats are 
considered to exert the 
same level of impact, 
though it can be reasonably 
assumed that some threats 
exert a stronger influence 
than others. 
 
Future research: Undertake 
research in other countries 
to identify whether the 
findings of this study are a 
worldwide phenomenon or 
a localised issue.  
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Table 2 (Continued): Annotated Literature Review on AC Ensuring the Independence of the Internal Audit Function 
Author(s) 
(Year) 
Purpose/ Objective Sample & Data 
Collection 
Methods Main Findings Limitations & Future 
Research 
Van Peursem, 
K.A. (2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Examine the New 
Zealand internal auditor’s 
role and conceptualise on 
the auditor’s influence 
over the role and how an 
effective internal auditor 
can overcome the tension 
of working with 
management to improve 
performance while also 
remaining sufficiently 
distant from management 
in order to report on their 
performance. 
Six New Zealand 
organisations. 
An Eisenhardt-
inspired multiple 
case-based 
approach is applied 
in which the 
researcher make 
observations, 
examined 
documents and 
interviewed senior 
internal auditors in 
six NZ 
organisations. 
Three concepts characteristics 
of those who best balanced 
their role: the internal 
auditor’s external 
professional status, the 
presence of a formal an 
informal communication 
network and the internal 
auditor’s place in determining 
their own role. Informing 
these concepts is the auditor’s 
ability to manage ambiguity. 
 
 
Qualitative study generally 
is less objectively-
measured. 
 
Future research: (1) 
Explore each source of 
influence in more detail 
and in different contexts 
and examine the 
framework’s application 
elsewhere. (2) Gender 
studies may be of value. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36 
 
Table 2 (Continued): Annotated Literature Review on AC Ensuring the Independence of the Internal Audit Function 
Author(s) 
(Year) 
Purpose/ Objective Sample & Data 
Collection 
Methods Main Findings Limitations & Future 
Research 
Schneider, A., 
& Wilner, N. 
(1990) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Examine the effects of 
managers’ perceptions of 
internal and external 
auditing on the potential 
commission of financial 
reporting irregularities. 
 
Test whether the 
deterrence effects of 
internal and external 
auditing are similar. 
A total of 264 subjects, 
the vast majority of 
whom are experienced 
managers, make 
decisions on three cases 
involving financial 
reporting issues. 
Use the quantitative 
randomized 
response technique.  
The results support internal 
and external auditing as 
deterrents to financial 
reporting irregularities when 
all of the following four 
conditions are present: 
material dollar amounts, 
irregularities involving asset 
overstatements, unambiguous 
GAAP violations and less 
incentive for misstating 
income. 
 
Internal auditing effects are 
similar to those external 
auditing. 
Lack of significance 
obtains for some of the 
statistical tests. 
 
Despite the authors’ effort 
to assure anonymity by 
means of using the 
randomized response 
technique, some subjects 
still may have been 
reluctant to report 
truthfully. 
 
Inability to explain why 
the existence of audits is 
perceived as having 
deterrent effect. 
 
Be careful about the 
generalisability of the 
results.  
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Table 2 (Continued): Annotated Literature Review on AC Ensuring the Independence of the Internal Audit Function 
Author(s) 
(Year) 
Purpose/ Objective Sample & Data 
Collection 
Methods Main Findings Limitations & Future 
Research 
McHugh, J., & 
Raghunandan, 
K. (1994) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Examine how CIAs are 
hired and fired. 
Final sample consists of 
471 usable responses. 
 
Responses from internal 
auditors from 
governmental and non-
profit organizations are 
not included in this 
analysis since they 
differ substantially from 
for-profit entities. 
 
Responses from 
companies without an 
AC are also deleted. 
A questionnaire is 
mailed to a 
randomly selected 
list of 1,000 CIAs 
with the help of the 
IIA. 
A large majority of the 
internal auditors indicate that 
vesting hiring or firing 
authority with the AC would 
enhance the independence of 
the internal audit function, 
reduce oversight by the AC 
and improve the ability of 
internal auditors to generate 
action on audit findings. 
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Table 2 (Continued): Annotated Literature Review on AC Ensuring the Independence of the Internal Audit Function 
Author(s) 
(Year) 
Purpose/ Objective Sample & Data 
Collection 
Methods Main Findings Limitations & Future 
Research 
Ahmad, Z., & 
Taylor, D. 
(2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Develop measures for the 
concepts of commitment 
to independence, role 
conflict and role 
ambiguity in the context 
of the internal auditor’s 
work environment. 
The sample is drawn 
from the database of the 
IIAM in which listed 
companies with an in-
house internal audit 
function are extracted. 
 
A total of 101 useable 
responses are obtained. 
To measure these 
concepts, scales are 
developed for a 
questionnaire by 
drawing on 
measures 
established in the 
organizational 
behaviour literature 
and adapting these 
to the internal 
auditor’s context. 
 
 
Both role of ambiguity and 
role of conflict are 
significantly negatively 
related to commitment to 
independence. 
 
The underlying dimensions 
found to have the greatest 
impact on commitment to 
independence are: first, 
ambiguity in both the 
exercise of authority by the 
internal auditor and time 
pressure faced by internal 
auditor, and second, conflict 
between the internal auditor’s 
personal values and both 
management’s and their 
profession’s expectations and 
requirements. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Future research: (1) 
Outsource internal auditor 
should be considered. (2) 
Other independent 
variables could be 
modelled. (3) Alternative 
research methods (an 
experimental design) could 
provide considerable 
refinement to the 
understanding of the 
relationships between the 
variables in this study. 
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2.6 AC Facilitating the Quality of the External Audit 
2.6.1 Introduction 
This study examines the association between the effectiveness of AC roles and the quality of 
external audit using audit fees. Francis (2004) argued that a higher audit fees imply higher 
audit quality. A higher audit quality should improve the quality of financial reporting and 
reduce the risk of the external auditors providing an incorrect audit opinion (Goodwin and 
Kent, 2006).  
 
An AC may be expected to exert two-way pressure on audit fees (Collier and Gregory, 1996). 
The association of AC with external audit can be explained either from the demand for audit 
services by the client or the supply of audit services by the external auditors. The demand 
side of the argument suggests that ACs are likely to demand higher quality of audit because 
ACs will ensure that the audit hours are not reduced to a level where the quality of audit 
would be compromised and may also require additional work to be performed by the external 
auditors.  
 
For example, ACs might insist that the external auditors set the materiality limit at a lower 
level resulting in increased testing (Goddard and Masters, 2001). Evaluating the scope of 
external auditors’ audit plan, work and conclusions, is highly regarded as a vital role of the 
AC by the Cadbury Committee (1992), Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) and ASX CGC 
(2007). AC members also have incentives to ensure a high quality audit in order to reduce the 
risk of litigation and loss of reputation in the event of fraudulent financial reporting 
(Goodwin and Kent, 2006). Thus, under this approach, stronger ACs will be willing to incur 
greater total audit fees to ensure a higher level assurance.  
 
On the other hand, from the supply side of the argument, ACs may reduce the audit fees at 
the same time. One of the AC’s roles is to oversee and review the internal controls within the 
company. The AC’s involvement in tightening internal controls might help to reduce the 
assessed level of control risk and substantive testings by the external auditors and hence lead 
to a lower audit fees (Goodwin and Kent, 2006). 
 
However, the two-way pressure (demand and supply) exerted by the ACs on audit fees could 
cancel out, causing no observed relationship. O’Sullivan (1999) provided evidence that the 
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board and AC characteristics do not influence external auditors’ pricing decisions due to the 
conflicting pressures of the demand and supply theories on the audit fees. Furthermore, it 
could be argued that the quality of AC characteristics is positively related to audit fees 
because an increase in audit hours will result from the need for the audit partner to liaise 
regularly with the AC, attend AC meetings throughout the year and prepare reports for the 
committee. Carcello et al. (2002), Abbott et al. (2003), Goodwin and Kent (2006), Singh et al. 
(2009) and Hoitash and Hoitash (2009) each give evidence on the relationship between ACs’ 
characteristics and audit fees from the demand rather than supply of audit services. Therefore, 
this study is only able to examine the net effect of these two conflicting pressures. 
 
The sub-sections below present, discuss and tabulate studies that have examined the 
relationship between AC and audit fees. 
 
2.6.2 Extant Studies 
Two Australian studies examined the impact of AC on audit fees. Using a sample drawn from 
all companies listed on the ASX, Goodwin and Kent (2006) examined whether the existence 
of an AC, AC characteristics and the use of internal audit are associated with higher external 
audit fees. The authors found that the existence of an AC, more frequent committee meetings 
and increased use of internal audit are related to higher audit fees. Also, the authors found 
that expertise of AC members is associated with higher audit fees when meeting frequency 
and independence are low. Moreover, Singh and Newby (2010) extended Goodwin and Kent 
(2006)’s study by using year 2005 publicly available information to analyse the relationship 
between internal audit and audit fees. The authors used given data for internal audit existence 
(proxy for internal audit activities) from secondary resources. Their findings supported 
Goodwin and Kent (2006)’s study.  
 
Using 1991 United Kingdom data, Collier and Gregory (1996) seek to establish whether ACs 
are effective in ensuring audit quality by protecting the auditors from fee cuts which might 
affect audit quality and signal tighter internal controls which help to reduce audit time and 
hence audit fees. They found that the relationship between size-related audit fees and the 
presence of an AC is positive, although they found only weak support for a decreasing effect 
based on the risk and complexity-related audit fees.  
 
41 
 
In post-Cadbury regulation reform, Goddard and Masters (2001) tested the relationship 
between size of the audit fees and the existence of an AC for United Kingdom companies for 
the years ending in 1994 and 1995. The results of the study showed no evidence that ACs 
have any overall effect on audit fees. However, the authors also found inconclusive and 
conflicting results on complexity and risk-related audit fees and the existence of an AC.  
 
In addition, in a more recent United Kingdom study, Zaman et al. (2011) examined the 
influence of AC effectiveness, a proxy for governance quality on audit fees using a new 
composite measure comprising AC independence, expertise, diligence and size. The study 
used the UK FTSE-350 which represented a good mix of large and relatively small United 
Kingdom companies during the period 2001-2004. The findings indicated that after 
controlling for board of director characteristics, there is a significant positive association 
between AC effectiveness and audit fees only for larger client.   
 
In a New Zealand setting, Rainsbury et al. (2009) investigated the association between the 
quality of ACs and financial reporting quality and external audit fees, respectively, in an 
environment where the formation of ACs was unregulated. The study used a sample of 87 
firms and the result showed no significant association between the quality of an AC and the 
level of fees paid to external auditors. The authors posited that the benefits of ‘best practice’ 
ACs may be less than anticipated by regulators and policy markers.  
 
On the other hand, in Israel, Lifschutz et al. (2010) examined the association between 
corporate governance characteristics and external audit fees in large public companies. Using 
a sample size of 100 largest companies, the authors found that AC diligence (number of 
meetings) is positively and significantly associated with audit fees. The results are consistent 
with the demand-based perspective of audit services, wherein firms with strong corporate 
governance characteristics demand additional assurance from the auditors and higher quality, 
resulting in higher external audit fees. 
 
In the United States, Carcello et al. (2002) studied the relations between board characteristics 
and AC characteristics and audit fees for Fortune 1,000 companies audited by Big 6 auditors. 
They found that significant positive relations between audit fees and AC independence, 
diligence and expertise. Also, Abbott et al. (2003) examined the relationship between AC and 
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audit fees for a sample 492 non-regulated American firms audited by Big 5 auditors. They 
found that AC independence and financial expertise are positively related with audit fees but 
found no significance for AC meetings.  
 
In the post Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) period, Hoitash and Hoitash (2009) examined the 
association between AC characteristics and auditor’s compensation and dismissals using a 
large sample of 2,393 public companies audited by large and small auditors. It is observed 
that strong ACs demand higher level of assurance and is less likely to dismiss their auditors. 
Further, an increase is found in auditor’s independence as measured by reduced board 
involvement and less dismissals following an unfavourable audit opinion.  
 
Last but not least, Yatim et al. (2006) examined the association between external audit fees 
and board and AC characteristics of 736 Malaysian listed firms. Contradictory to other 
studies, Yatim et al. (2006) hypothesised that good AC characteristics reduce auditor’s 
assessments, resulting in lower audit fees. The authors found that external audit fees are 
negatively and significantly related to board independence, AC expertise and the frequency 
of AC meetings. 
 
2.6.3 Comparative Assessment 
Based on the discussion above, the results of the previous studies are mixed. Most studies 
show that the quality of AC characteristics are positively related to the level of audit fees 
(Carcello et al., 2002; Abbott et al., 2003; Goodwin and Kent, 2006; Yatim et al., 2006; 
Hoitash and Hoitash 2009; Lifschutz et al., 2010; Singh and Newby, 2010; Zaman et al., 
2011) while others find no significant association (Goddard and Masters, 2001; Rainsbury et 
al., 2009).  
 
The finding of Goddard and Masters (2001) are much different from the rest of the studies 
conducted because the authors investigated the effect of AC on audit fees adherence to the 
Cadbury Committee Report recommendations of 1992 by using data collected from financial 
reports for the years ending in 1994 and 1995. It could be argued that the effect of 
environmental changes is likely to increase the quality of all audits, irrespective of the 
presence of an AC.  
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Rainsbury et al. (2009) also found no significant association between the quality of an AC 
and the level of fees paid to external auditors in New Zealand. The authors tested a sample of 
87 firms including 29 that have adopted a high quality AC in an environment where the 
formation of AC was unregulated. Thus, their study is subjected to data availability and a 
small sample size which may cause the results to be insignificant. Moreover, the study only 
focused on AC membership in terms of independence and expertise but a number of other 
AC attributes such as business backgrounds of the members and the number of years they 
have served on the AC have not been tested (Rainsbury et al., 2009).  
 
On the other hand, Collier and Gregory (1996) found the relationship between size-related 
audit fees and the presence of an AC is positive but found only weak support for a decreasing 
effect based on the risk and complexity-related audit fees. The difference between the two 
results may be due to difference in variable definition. Moreover, Collier and Gregory (1996) 
conducted their study using 1991 data and great transformation have taken place in the audit 
setting since then that their findings are less applicable in current today’s environment. 
 
2.6.4 Tabulated Annotations 
The annotated literature review on AC facilitating the quality of the external audit is 
presented in Table 3. 
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Table 3:  Annotated Literature Review on AC Facilitating the Quality of the External Audit 
Author(s) 
(Year) 
Purpose/ Objective Sample & Data Collection Methods Main Findings Limitations & Future 
Research 
Goodwin-
Stewart, 
J., & 
Kent, P. 
(2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Examine whether in 
an Australian 
setting, the existence 
of an AC, AC 
characteristics and 
the use of internal 
audit are associated 
with a higher level 
of audit fees. 
A questionnaire is sent to all 
companies listed on the ASX 
in October 2000 
(approximately 1400 
companies), seeking 
information on their internal 
audit activities. 
 
Collect data from the annual 
reports which included both 
financial variables relating to 
size, profitability, risk and 
audit fee and non-financial 
variables concerning corporate 
governance, external audit, and 
the complexity of the entity.  
 
Final sample consists of 401 
companies. 
To test hypotheses, 
the study uses a 
number of ordinary 
least squares (OLS) 
regression models, 
extending the 
traditional audit fee 
model. 
The existence of an AC is 
associated with a higher level 
of audit fees. 
 
More frequent AC meetings 
are associated with higher 
audit fees. 
 
Committee independence and 
accounting and finance 
expertise are not significantly 
associated with audit fees. 
 
Expertise is associated with 
higher audit fees when both 
meeting frequency and 
independence are low.  
 
The use of internal audit is 
associated with higher external 
audit fees.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The number of employees 
in internal audit may not be 
a good measure of the use 
of internal audit as it do not 
take into account the use of 
outsourcing or of 
secondment of employees 
into internal audit on a 
temporary basis. 
 
Future research: (1) More 
refined measures of 
independence, expertise and 
diligence of AC members. 
(2) Need to distinguish 
between supply side and 
demand side effects on audit 
fees and to unravel the 
complex interrelationships 
between the various 
monitoring mechanisms.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45 
 
Table 3 (Continued): Annotated Literature Review on AC Facilitating the Quality of the External Audit 
Author(s) 
(Year) 
Purpose/ Objective Sample & Data Collection Methods Main Findings Limitations & Future 
Research 
Singh, H., 
& Newby, 
R. (2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Examine the 
direction of the 
relationship between 
a firm’s internal 
audit function and 
its external audit 
fees, extending 
previous study by 
Goodwin-Stewart 
and Kent (2006). 
Data are gathered from the 
annual reports of the top 300 
publicly listed companies in 
Australia during the year 2005. 
Hypotheses are 
tested via ordinary 
least squares (OLS) 
regression with 
identical control 
variables similar to 
those used by 
Goodwin and Kent 
(2006). 
 
For the OLS 
regression models, 
the existence of an 
internal function 
proxy for internal 
audit usage came 
from secondary 
sources. 
The findings support Goodwin 
and Kent (2006)’s result that 
the existence of an internal 
audit function in a firm has a 
significantly positive 
relationship with audit fees. In 
fact, the strength of this 
relationship has increased 
since 2000. 
The study focuses on the 
top 300 public companies 
from a market capitalisation 
perspective and, therefore, 
the results may not be 
generalisable to other 
smaller public companies or 
to private firms. 
 
Dichotomous experimental 
variable used in the study 
might not be an ideal 
measure of internal audit 
usage since it may not be 
sensitive enough to capture 
all the variation in external 
audit fees. 
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Table 3 (Continued): Annotated Literature Review on AC Facilitating the Quality of the External Audit 
Author(s) 
(Year) 
Purpose/ Objective Sample & Data Collection Methods Main Findings Limitations & Future 
Research 
Collier, 
P., & 
Gregory, 
A. (1996) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Seek to establish 
whether ACs are 
effective in ensuring 
audit quality by 
protecting the 
auditors from fees 
cuts which might 
affect audit quality, 
and signal tighter 
internal controls 
which help to reduce 
audit time and hence 
audit fees. 
The sample is 
constructed by sending 
questionaries on ACs to all 
firms which are members of 
the Financial Times All Share 
Index (FTASI) in 
December 1991 and for which 
accounting records (on the 
Stock Exchange 
Micro-Fiche Service) are 
available for the years ended in 
1991, 1990 and 1989. 
 
Final sample consists of 315 
responding firms. 
The hypotheses are tested 
by developing a regression 
model for the audit fees. 
 
Quality aspect of the audit 
can be captured through a 
dummy firm size variable, 
whilst the internal control 
aspects can be captured 
through dummy risk and 
complexity variables. 
The relationship 
between size-related 
audit fees and the 
presence of an AC is 
positive and statistically 
significant, but that 
although there is a 
negative relationship 
between risk-related 
and complexity-related 
audit fees and the 
presence of an AC, the 
relationships are not 
conclusively 
significant.  
 
The findings provide 
support for the 
contention that ACs are 
at least partially 
effective in preventing 
reductions in the audit 
fee to levels where the 
quality of the audit may 
be compromised. 
 
 
 
Non-response tests clearly 
show some size bias in 
responding companies, 
although there is no 
evidence of any industry 
bias. Nevertheless, given 
sample size, the authors 
believe that this size bias is 
unlikely to be a serious 
problem. 
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Table 3 (Continued): Annotated Literature Review on AC Facilitating the Quality of the External Audit 
Author(s) 
(Year) 
Purpose/ Objective Sample & Data Collection Methods Main Findings Limitations & Future 
Research 
Goddard, 
A. R., & 
Masters, 
C. (2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Report an analysis 
of the relationship 
between the size of 
the audit fees and 
the existence of an 
AC. 
 
Investigate the effect 
on audit fees of AC 
adherence to the 
Cadbury Committee 
Report 
recommendations of 
1992. 
Data is collected from financial 
reports for the years ending 
in1994 and 1995. 
 
The population test consists of 
companies listed on the Stock 
Exchange and included in the 
Times 1,000 of 1996, 
excluding the top 350. 
 
Final sample consists of 233 
companies in 1994 and 223 in 
1995, nine companies having 
ceased to exist in the interim. 
Data is analysed using two 
multiple regression models.  
 
 
 
 
ACs have been through a 
transitional phase 
comprising changes to the 
general audit environment 
and a learning phase for the 
establishment and operation 
of committees.  
 
By 1995 there is no 
evidence that ACs, whether 
adhering to the Cadbury 
Code or not, have any 
overall effect on audit fees. 
The only effect found is a 
reduction in fees due to 
improved internal controls 
in the presence of auditee’s 
complexity. 
 
There is evidence that size 
is the main determinant of 
the presence of an AC. 
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Table 3 (Continued): Annotated Literature Review on AC Facilitating the Quality of the External Audit 
Author(s) 
(Year) 
Purpose/ Objective Sample & Data Collection Methods Main Findings Limitations & Future 
Research 
Zaman, 
M., 
Hudaib, 
M., & 
Haniffa, 
R. (2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extend prior 
research on the 
relationship between 
governance quality 
and auditor 
remuneration. 
 
Examine the 
influence of AC 
effectiveness, a 
proxy for 
governance quality 
on audit fees and 
non-audit services 
fees using a new 
composite measure 
comprising AC 
independence, 
expertise, diligence 
and size.  
The population of the study is 
the UK FTSE-350 which 
represented a good mix of 
large and relatively small UK 
companies during the period 
2001-2004. 
 
The final sample consists of 
non-financial UK FTSE-350 
companies with a total number 
of 540 company year 
observations. 
Use a number of ordinary 
least squares regression 
models to help to explore 
further the various 
relationship between AC 
effectiveness and audit fees 
and non-audit fees while 
controlling for other 
variables. 
After controlling for board 
of director characteristics, 
there is a significant 
positive association between 
AC effectiveness and audit 
fees only for larger clients. 
 
Indicate that effective ACs 
undertake more monitoring 
which results in wider audit 
scope and higher audit fees. 
 
Findings support regulatory 
initiatives aimed at 
improving corporate 
governance quality.  
 
 
 
 
 
Use only four factors in 
the composite measure 
of AC effectiveness in 
different regulatory and 
institutional contexts. 
 
Use dichotomous 
measure of financial 
expertise, coded 1 if at 
least one member in the 
AC has financial 
expertise, and 0 other 
wise. 
 
The definition of 
financial expertise is 
perhaps too broad and 
encompasses skills that 
may not necessarily 
contribute to AC 
effectiveness. 
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Table 3 (Continued): Annotated Literature Review on AC Facilitating the Quality of the External Audit 
Author(s) 
(Year) 
Purpose/ Objective Sample & Data 
Collection 
Methods Main Findings Limitations & Future 
Research 
Rainsbury, 
E.A., 
Bradbury, 
M., & 
Cahan, 
S.F. 
(2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Examine firms that 
voluntarily adopt a 
high quality AC in 
an environment, 
New Zealand, where 
prior to 2003, the 
formation of ACs is 
completely 
unregulated. 
 
Examine whether 
New Zealand firms 
with high quality 
ACs in 2001 has 
higher financial 
reporting quality and 
lower external audit 
fees than New 
Zealand firms with a 
lower quality AC or 
no AC. 
The population of interest 
is all NZ companies listed 
on the NZX main trading 
board in the 2001 Datex 
Investment Guide. 
 
Final sample consists of 87 
firms. 
 
Financial and AC 
membership data are hand 
collected from the 2001 
annual reports of the 
sampled firms. 
Measure AC quality based on 
the quality of its membership 
using guidelines that were 
issued by the New Zealand 
Securities Commission (NZSC) 
in 2004. 
 
Measure financial reporting 
quality by adopting five 
accounting choices (estimated 
useful life of buildings, 
estimated useful life of motor 
vehicles, goodwill 
amortization, tax effect 
accounting and assigning costs 
to inventory) and then use these 
to create an accounting quality 
score. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No significant association 
between the quality of an 
AC and the quality of 
financial reporting. These 
results are robust to 
alternative measures of 
earnings quality. 
 
The quality of ACs have 
little impact on the level of 
fees paid to external 
auditors. 
 
The results suggest that the 
benefits of ‘best practice’ 
ACs may be less than 
anticipated by regulators 
and policymakers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Focus on AC 
membership in terms of 
independence and 
expertise, but a number 
of other AC attributes 
such as the business 
backgrounds of the AC 
members and the 
number of years they 
have served on the AC 
have not been tested. 
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Table 3 (Continued): Annotated Literature Review on AC Facilitating the Quality of the External Audit 
Author(s) 
(Year) 
Purpose/ Objective Sample & Data 
Collection 
Methods Main Findings Limitations & Future 
Research 
Lifschutz, 
S., Jacobi, 
A., & 
Feldshtein, 
S. (2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Examine the 
association between 
corporate 
governance 
characteristics and 
external audit fees in 
large public 
companies in Israel.  
The sample includes 100 
largest public companies 
on the Tel-Aviv 100 Stock 
Exchange Index with the 
exception of banks, 
insurance companies and 
dual-listed companies 
which have a distinct 
financial reporting. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Use multiple regressions to test 
the hypotheses of the study. 
Show that board 
independence and AC 
diligence are positively and 
significantly associated with 
audit fees. 
Small sample cover one 
year of Israeli data. 
 
The results may not be 
generalised over 
different time period 
and countries. 
 
Only a few corporate 
governance variables 
were tested. 
 
Future research: Other 
variables such as 
managerial ownership 
and internal control can 
be considered. 
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Table 3 (Continued): Annotated Literature Review on AC Facilitating the Quality of the External Audit 
Author(s) 
(Year) 
Purpose/ Objective Sample & Data 
Collection 
Methods Main Findings Limitations & Future 
Research 
Carcello, 
J.V., 
Hermanson, 
D.R., Neal, 
T.L., &  
Riley JR, 
R.A. (2002) 
Examine the 
relations between 
three board 
characteristics 
(independence, 
diligence and 
expertise) and Big 6 
audit fees for 
Fortune 1000 
companies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A questionnaire is sent to 
the controllers of all 
Fortune 1000 companies 
asking them to provide the 
amount of their external 
audit fee for the fiscal year 
ended between April 1992 
and March 1993. 
Use single-equation approach 
to test the hypotheses. 
 
 
There is a significant 
positive relation between 
audit fees and board 
independence, diligence 
and expertise. 
 
The results persist when 
similar measures of AC 
“quality” are included in 
the model. 
The sample is limited 
to very large public, 
non-financial 
companies and the 
extent to which the 
results apply in other 
settings is uncertain. 
 
There may be 
exogenous factors at 
the entity level that are 
correlated both with the 
board characteristics. 
 
Could not rule out the 
possibility that a more 
independent, diligent 
and expert board 
simply exhibits less 
price resistance. 
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Table 3 (Continued): Annotated Literature Review on AC Facilitating the Quality of the External Audit 
Author(s) 
(Year) 
Purpose/ Objective Sample & Data 
Collection 
Methods Main Findings Limitations & Future 
Research 
Abbott, L.J., 
Parker, S., 
Peters, G.F., & 
Raghunandan, 
K. (2003) 
Examine the 
association between 
certain AC 
characteristics 
(independence, 
financial expertise 
and meeting 
frequency) and one 
economic aspect of 
the auditor-
management 
relationship, audit 
fee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Examine a sample of 492 
non-regulated, Big 5-
audited firms that filed 
proxy statements with the 
SEC in the period from 
February 5, 2001 to Jun3 
30, 2001. 
Use cross-sectional regression 
model to examine the 
association between AC 
characteristics and audit fees. 
 
 
 
AC independence (defined 
as an AC comprised 
entirely of outside, 
independent directors) and 
financial expertise (defined 
as an AC containing at 
least one member with 
financial expertise) is 
significantly, positively 
associated with audit fees.  
 
Meeting frequency 
(defined as an AC that 
meets at least four times 
annually) is not associated 
with higher audit fees at 
conventional levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Future research: (1) 
Incorporating actual 
audit hours and AC 
characteristics can 
shed additional light 
on which of the two 
explanations drive the 
higher audit fees. (2) 
Emphasise subsequent 
changes in other 
corporate governance 
mechanisms that may 
be either complements 
or substitutes for AC 
activities. (3) Focus of 
research in this area 
may shift to an 
exploration of AC 
processes and decision 
making. 
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Table 3 (Continued): Annotated Literature Review on AC Facilitating the Quality of the External Audit 
Author(s) 
(Year) 
Purpose/ Objective Sample & Data 
Collection 
Methods Main Findings Limitations & Future 
Research 
Hoitash, 
R., & 
Hoitash, 
U. (2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Examine the 
association between 
AC characteristic 
and auditor related 
decisions following 
the mandated 
changes in its 
composition and 
responsibilities. 
 
  
 
Use large sample 
comprises of 2,393 public 
companies audited by large 
and small auditor with 
complete data for fiscal 
year 2004. 
Define AC expertise as the 
percentage of experts on the 
AC (PFE); AC size is measure 
as the number of board 
members on the AC (ACSIZE); 
and AC diligence is measure by 
the number of AC meetings 
(ACMEETING). 
 
Construct composite measure 
for the overall strength of the 
board using size, independence 
and the frequency of board 
meetings. 
Financial experts are 
associated with higher audit 
fees. 
 
AC size and the frequency 
of AC meetings are 
positively associated with 
audit fees. 
 
The measure of the board of 
directors is not associated 
with audit fees. 
 
Strong ACs might choose to 
authorize less non-audit 
services, possibly in order 
to contribute to the 
perception of auditors’ 
independence. 
 
Observe stronger ACs are 
less likely to dismiss their 
auditors and there is no 
association between the 
issuance of new going 
concern reports and auditor 
dismissals. 
Audit fees are 
determined based on 
the supply and the 
demand for audit 
services. Not able to 
detangle the impact of 
the demand and supply 
on audit fees but rather 
measure their combined 
effect. 
 
Audit fees are used as a 
level of proxy for the 
level of assurance 
which might not fully 
measure the quality of 
work performed by 
auditors. 
 
Dismissal decisions are 
often reached jointly by 
auditors and their 
clients. Inability to 
fully observe these 
decisions might bias 
results. 
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Table 3 (Continued):  Annotated Literature Review on AC Facilitating the Quality of the External Auditors 
Author(s) 
(Year) 
Purpose/ Objective Sample & Data 
Collection 
Methods Main Findings Limitations & Future 
Research 
Yatim, P., 
Kent, P., & 
Clarkson, P. 
(2006) 
Examine the association 
between external audit 
fees and board and AC 
characteristics of 736 
Malaysian listed firms. 
The sample 
comprises of the 
Bursa Malaysia non-
financial public 
listed companies in 
year 2003. 
 
 
Multiple regression analysis is 
used to estimate the 
relationships proposed in the 
hypotheses. 
External audit fees are 
positively and significantly 
related to board 
independence, AC 
expertise and the frequency 
of AC meetings. 
 
There is a strong negative 
association between 
external audit fees and 
Bumiputra-owned firms. 
Cannot be generalised 
and should be 
interpreted in the 
context of the 
Malaysian corporate 
environment, 
particularly where 
ethnicity is concerned. 
 
The financial and 
corporate data employ 
in this study and the 
findings thereafter may 
not completely explain 
the link between 
governance variables 
and external audit fees 
as other variables such 
as detailed ownership 
structures are likely to 
better explain the 
relationship. 
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2.7 AC Ensuring the Independence of the External Auditors 
2.7.1 Introduction 
In an organisation, the responsibilities of the external auditors are to review the annual 
financial reports, monitor and verify the actions of management and express an independent 
audit opinion to the shareholders of the company. In order to reduce agency costs from the 
separation of ownership between the management and shareholders, it is in the shareholders’ 
best interest to employ the external auditors. Therefore, external auditors must be 
independent from the company’s financial report, ownership structures and internal controls.  
 
Although shareholders ultimately appoint the external auditors, management’s influence in 
the decision process regarding the initial appointment and subsequent reappointment of the 
external auditors, shareholders are concerned about the independence of the auditors in 
protecting their interest (Firth, 1997). Since, the independence of external auditors will be 
hard to observe, shareholders will depend on the auditor’s good reputation, professional 
bodies, regulators and audit fees to monitor the external auditors. Fees paid to external 
auditors consist of audit fees as well as fees paid for other services. While all fees potentially 
create economic bonds between the auditor and the client, critics have alleged that the 
provision of non-audit services gives audit firms incentives to agree with management 
accounting choices, thus reducing auditor’s independence and ultimately the quality of 
financial reporting (Coulton et al., 2007). 
 
The sub-sections below present and assess previous papers that have investigated the 
relationship between AC and the independence of the external auditors and a summary table 
of annotated literature review is also presented. 
 
2.7.2 Extant Studies 
Previous studies have examined the economic bond (i.e., non-audit service fees) between the 
audit firm and its client (DeAngelo, 1981; Prakash and Venable, 1993; Firth, 1997; Frankel et 
al., 2002; Ashbaugh, 2003). These studies used the ratio of non-audit fees to total audit fees 
as the measure of the economic bond. The provision of non-audit services to audit client 
(management) will increase the economic bond between the auditor and the client. This can 
compromise the external auditor independence. DeAngelo (1981) examined whether audit 
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fees below total current costs on initial audit engagements (‘low balling’) impairs auditor 
independence. The author defined audit quality as the probability of detecting errors and the 
probability of reporting the errors. These attributes are analogous to competence and 
independence, respectively. The results of the study showed that ‘low balling’ does not 
impair independence.  
 
Using the ratio of non-audit service fees to audit fees as a proxy of the independence of 
external auditors, Prakash and Venable (1993) investigated the effects of agency incentives 
and knowledge spill-overs in joint engagements for audit and non-audit services. The 
frequency of non-audit service is expected to reflect knowledge spill-overs from joint 
engagements and the level of economic bonding between the auditor and the company. They 
found that firms with higher agency costs are likely to purchase higher level of audit quality 
and thus limit the demand for non-audit services purchases from their current auditor.  
 
Moreover, Firth (1997) developed a model that seeks to explain a company’s decision to hire 
non-audit services from the auditor. The author argued that companies faced with potentially 
high agency costs will purchase relatively smaller amounts of non-audit services from their 
auditors. This is because high agency cost companies need independent auditors in order to 
reassure investors and creditors.  
 
In the United States, Frankel et al. (2002) examined whether the audit fees are associated 
with earnings management and market reaction to the disclosure of auditor. Using data 
collected from proxy statements, the authors found that non-audit fees are positively 
associated with small earnings surprises and the magnitude of discretionary accruals while 
audit fees are negatively associated with these earnings management.  
 
Moreover, Ashbaugh et al. (2003) challenged the findings of Frankel et al. (2002) by using a 
different research approach in their study, adjusting discretionary current accruals for firm 
performance. In contrast to Frankel et al. (2002), the authors found no relation between 
positive discretionary accruals and any of the auditor fees when discretionary accruals are 
adjusted for firm performance and sample firms are partitioned by income increasing versus 
income decreasing accruals. They also found no systematic evidence that auditors violate 
their independence as a result of clients purchasing relatively more non-audit services. 
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Prior to SOX, Abbott et al. (2003) examined the association between AC characteristics and 
the ratio of non-audit service fees to audit fees. Using a sample of 538 firms, the authors 
found that ACs comprised solely of independent directors, meet at least four times annually 
are significantly and negatively associated with the non-audit service fees ratio. This 
evidence is consistent with AC members perceiving a high level of non-audit service fees in a 
negative light and taking action to decrease the non-audit service fees ratio.  
 
Meanwhile, in the post SOX period, Hoitash and Hoitash’s (2009) study investigated the 
association between AC characteristics and non-audit service fees. They hypothesized that 
there is an inverse relationship between the non-audit fees to total fees ratio and indicators of 
stronger ACs. Similar to the findings of Abbott et al. (2003), the authors found that strong 
ACs might choose to authorize less non-audit services, possibly in order to contribute to the 
perception of auditor independence.  
 
In a recent Australian study, Lary and Taylor (2011) examined the association between AC’s 
governance characteristics and their role effectiveness. The sampling frame is Australian 
listed companies, over the year 2004 to 2009, consisting of 180 observations. The results of 
the study showed that greater AC diligence, but not independence or competence is 
significantly related to lower non-audit fees ratio (higher independence of external auditors).  
 
Moreover, in the United Kingdom, Zaman et al. (2011) examined the influence of AC 
effectiveness, a proxy for governance quality on non-audit fees using a new composite 
measure comprising AC independence, expertise, diligence and size. The study used the UK 
FTSE-350 which represented a good mix of large and relatively small UK companies during 
the period 2001- 2004. The authors found that the association between AC effectiveness and 
non-audit fees to be positive and significant, especially for larger clients. This suggested that 
a larger client is more likely to purchase non-audit services even in the presence of effective 
ACs, probably due to the complexity of the client’s activities.  
 
2.7.3 Comparative Assessment 
The results of DeAngelo (1981), Prakash and Venable (1993), and Firth (1997) indicated that 
non-audit service fees can threaten the independence of external auditors. Moreover, the 
results of prior studies in the pre and post SOX periods (Abbott et al., 2003; Hoitash and 
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Hoitash, 2009; Lary and Taylor, 2011; Zaman et al., 2011), suggested that good AC 
characteristics will enable the AC to actively monitor and influence the firm’s non-audit 
service fees purchase decisions. 
 
DeAngelo (1981) developed a model to test the hypothesis that the higher the economic bond 
between the audit firm and client (management), the higher the audit firm’s dependence on 
the client. Prakash and Venable (1993) and Firth (1997) respectively used the same method 
by applying the ratio of non-audit service fees to audit fees (proxy of external auditor’s 
independence) and tested whether management manage the level of non-audit service fees 
purchased from their current auditor. Both consistently find that firms with higher agency 
costs are likely to purchase a higher level of audit quality and thus limit the demand for non-
audit services purchases from their auditor. 
 
Furthermore, motivated by regulatory action and criticism of non-audit service fees, Frankel 
et al. (2002) and Ashbaugh et al. (2003) have used indicators of earnings management and 
market reaction as a proxy for differences in the quality of financial reporting. The results of 
Ashbaugh et al.’s (2003) discretionary accruals tests differ from Frankel et al. (2002) because 
the authors used a different research method to identify the extent of possible accounting 
manipulation where discretionary current accruals for firm performance are adjusted. 
Moreover, Frankel et al.’s (2003) results are sensitive to sample selection and governance 
attributes. There is also a possibility that the sharply increased regulatory focus 
accompanying the statutory disclosure of United States’s audit and non-audit service fees 
might have encouraged the management to manipulate some of the fees beyond what may 
have otherwise occurred. 
 
However, neither of these studies examines the relationship between AC characteristics and 
non-audit service fees purchases. The role of an AC is to ensure the independence of external 
auditors by monitoring the extent of non-audit service fees supplied by the auditor to the 
management. Currently, there are four studies (Abbott et al., 2003; Hoitash and Hoitash, 
2009; Lary and Taylor, 2011; Zaman et al., 2011) that examine these association. Although 
Abbott et al.’s (2003) study is conducted in the pre-SOX period and Hoitash and Hoitash’s 
(2009) study is conducted in the post-SOX period, both studies consistently found the same 
results. This is evident that indicators of strong ACs are associated with a lower ratio of non-
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audit service fees to total audit fees. On the other hand, the findings of two more recent 
studies are different. Lary and Taylor (2011) found that AC diligence is significantly related 
to lower non-audit fees ratio but Zaman et al. (2011) found that AC characteristics are 
positively and significantly associated with non-audit fees in larger companies. It can be 
argued that the difference between the findings of these two studie is due to sample size. 
 
2.7.4 Tabulated Annotations 
The annotated literature review on AC ensuring the independence of the external auditors is 
presented in Table 4. 
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Table 4: Annotated Literature Review on AC Ensuring the Independence of the External Auditors 
Author(s) 
(Year) 
Purpose/ Objective Sample & Data 
Collection 
Methods Main Findings Limitations & Future 
Research 
DeAngelo, L. 
(1981) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Investigate the allegations 
of the Commission on 
Auditors' Responsibilities 
and the 
Securities and Exchange 
Commission that 'low 
balling' on initial audit 
engagements impairs 
auditor independence. 
 Develop a model of inter 
temporal audit pricing 
when incumbent auditors 
possess cost advantages 
over competitors in 
future audits of a given 
client.  
 
These advantages occur 
due to significant start-
up costs in audit 
technology and 
transactions costs of 
switching auditors. 
When incumbent 
auditors possess these 
advantages, they can 
raise future audit fees 
above the avoidable 
costs of producing 
audits. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Demonstrate that, contrary to 
these claims, 'low balling' 
does not impair 
independence; rather it is a 
competitive response to the 
expectation of future quasi-
rents to incumbent auditors 
(due, e.g., to technological 
advantages of incumbency).  
 
'Low balling' in the initial 
period is the process by 
which auditors compete for 
these advantages. Critically, 
initial fee reductions are sunk 
in future periods and 
therefore do not impair 
auditor independence. 
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Table 4 (Continued): Annotated Literature Review on AC Ensuring the Independence of the External Auditors 
Author(s) 
(Year) 
Purpose/ Objective Sample & Data 
Collection 
Methods Main Findings Limitations & Future 
Research 
Prakash, M., 
& Venable, 
C.F. (1993) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Investigate the effects of 
agency incentives and 
knowledge spill-over in 
joint engagements for 
audit and non-audit 
services. 
Data from Fortune 
500 companies, 
disclose under 
Accounting Series 
Release (ASR) No. 
250. 
 
Ownership data for 
1980 from the 
Corporate Data 
Exchange Stock 
Ownership 
Directory are 
collected form 
proxy statements. 
A multiple regressions 
are used to test whether 
companies vary non-
audit purchase in 
accordance with the 
potential agency costs 
that could arise. 
The variables related to 
expected agency costs 
(management ownership, 
outside investment 
concentration, and leverage) 
significantly explain cross-
sectional differences in the 
demands for recurring non-
audit services. 
 
Companies purchase higher 
levels of recurring services 
when they engaged particular 
auditors (i.e., industry 
services or the audit firm that 
is the largest overall provider 
of non-audit services). 
 
Overall agency costs do not 
explain the level of non-
recurring services purchased 
from the auditor. 
 
 
 
 
 
Operationalisation of 
recurring and non-
recurring services is 
difficult and may require 
finer partitioning. 
 
Managerial ownership 
unexpectedly is associated 
with non-recurring merger 
and acquisition services 
and is not associated with 
recurring systems or 
pension and personnel 
services. 
 
Restricted to publicly 
available data only. 
 
Future research: Explore 
how non-audit services 
influence auditor 
switching. 
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Table 4 (Continued): Annotated Literature Review on AC Ensuring the Independence of the External Auditors 
Author(s) 
(Year) 
Purpose/ Objective Sample & Data 
Collection 
Methods Main Findings Limitations & Future 
Research 
Firth, M. 
(1997) 
 
 
 
 
 
Seek to explain a 
company’s decision to 
hire non-audit services 
from the auditor in UK. 
Use data 
observations from 
500 largest British 
companies. 
 
Data are extracted 
from Datastream, 
Exstat, annual 
reports and the 
Financial Times. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Use multiple regression 
models to test whether 
companies that face high 
agency costs purchase 
relatively smaller 
amounts of non-audit 
services. 
Companies that have higher 
agency cost proxies are 
associated with smaller 
purchases of non-audit 
services from their auditors.  
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Table 4 (Continued): Annotated Literature Review on AC Ensuring the Independence of the External Auditors 
Author(s) 
(Year) 
Purpose/ Objective Sample & Data 
Collection 
Methods Main Findings Limitations & Future 
Research 
Frankel, R.M., 
Johnson, F.M., 
& Nelson, 
K.K. (2002) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Examine whether auditor 
fees are associated with 
earnings management and 
the market reaction to the 
disclosure of auditor fees. 
Initial sample 
consists of 4,701 
proxy statements 
on the SEC’s Edgar 
database with filing 
date between 
February 5, 2001 
and June15, 2001. 
 
Final sample 
consists of 3074 
firms 
 
 
 
Use multiple regression 
models to test the 
variables. 
There is a positive association 
between non-audit fees and 
the likelihood of reporting a 
small earnings surprise, the 
magnitude of absolute 
discretionary accruals, and 
the magnitudes of both 
income-increasing and 
income-decreasing 
discretionary accruals. 
 
There is a negative 
association between audit 
fees and these earnings 
management indicators 
 
No association between total 
fees and any of these earnings 
management indicators, 
indicating that combining 
audit and non-audit fees into 
a single measure masks their 
differential incentive effects.  
 
 
 
 
 
Future research: (1) Tests 
also suggest that size is an 
important conditioning 
variable in explaining the 
incentive effects of audit 
and non-audit fees. Future 
research could consider 
this and other economic 
circumstances that affect 
auditor incentives. (2) 
Analyses are based on the 
first year of disclosed fees. 
As additional years of data 
become available, research 
on changes in the market 
for audit and non-audit 
services and the effect of 
these changes on auditor 
incentives and financial 
reporting quality would be 
of interest. 
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Table 4 (Continued): Annotated Literature Review on AC Ensuring the Independence of the External Auditors 
Author(s) 
(Year) 
Purpose/ Objective Sample & Data 
Collection 
Methods Main Findings Limitations & Future 
Research 
Ashbaugh, H., 
LaFond, R., & 
Mayhew, 
B.W. (2003) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paper challenges the 
findings of Frankel, 
Johnson and Nelson 
(2002). 
Collect data for 
4959 firms from 
US registrants’ 
2000 proxy 
statements that are 
available on Edgar 
or Global Access 
during November 
and December of 
2001. 
 
Final sample 
consists of 317 
firms. 
Replicate Frankel, 
Johnson and Nelson 
(FJN)’s empirical tests to 
investigate whether their 
results are sensitive to 
research design choices 
 
Use multiple regression 
models to test the 
variables. 
Find no relation between 
positive discretionary 
accruals and any of the 
auditor fees metrics when 
discretionary accruals are 
adjusted for firm performance 
and sampled firms are 
partitioned by income 
increasing versus income 
decreasing accruals. 
 
No relation between fee ratio 
and the likelihood that firms 
beat analysts’ forecasts.  
 
No evidence that the market 
reacts to the magnitude of 
non-audit fees relative to total 
fees. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
65 
 
Table 4 (Continued): Annotated Literature Review on AC Ensuring the Independence of the External Auditors 
Author(s) 
(Year) 
Purpose/ Objective Sample & Data 
Collection 
Methods Main Findings Limitations & Future 
Research 
Abbott, L.J., 
Parker, S., & 
Peters, G. 
(2003) 
 
 
 
 
 
Examine the association 
between AC 
characteristics and the 
ratio of non-audit service 
fees to audit fees, using 
data gathered under the 
Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s (SEC’s) 
fee disclosure rules.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First examine all 
proxies filed with 
the Sec between 
February 5, 2001 
and March 6, 2001. 
 
Expand the original 
sample of 310 
firms; the authors 
then select a 
random sample of 
250 proxy filings 
from March 19, 
2001 to 30 June 
2001. 
 
After deleting 
observations with 
missing variables, 
538 companies 
remained. 
Use multivariate 
regression to address 
research question. 
 
 
Find ACs that consist of 
solely independent directors 
and that meet at least four 
times annually are 
significantly and negatively 
associated with non-audit 
service fees ratio. 
 
Consistent with AC member 
perceiving a high level of 
non-audit service fees in a 
negative light and taking 
actions to decrease the non-
audit service fees ratio. 
Cannot eliminate the 
possibility that 
management’s attitude 
towards corporate 
governance drives both AC 
characteristics and choices 
related to auditor services. 
 
Data are from the initial 
period in which the SEC 
had required registrants to 
include information about 
audit and non-audit service 
fees paid to the auditor.  
 
Given the time frame and 
speed of the rule’s 
enactment, the ability of 
managers to adjust the 
level of non-audit service 
fees provided by the 
incumbent auditor in 
response to the new 
disclosure requirements 
may have been limited. 
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Table 4 (Continued): Annotated Literature Review on AC Ensuring the Independence of the External Auditors 
Author(s) 
(Year) 
Purpose/ Objective Sample & Data 
Collection 
Methods Main Findings Limitations & Future 
Research 
Hoitash, R., & 
Hoitash, U. 
(2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Examine the association 
between AC 
characteristic an auditor 
related decisions 
following the mandated 
changes in its 
composition and 
responsibilities. 
 
  
 
Use large sample 
comprised of 2,393 
public companies 
audited by large and 
small auditor with 
complete data for 
fiscal year 2004. 
Define AC expertise as the 
percentage of experts on the 
AC (PFE); AC size was 
measured as the number of 
board members on the AC 
(ACSIZE); and AC diligence 
was measured by the number 
of AC meetings 
(ACMEETING). 
 
  
Financial experts are 
associated with higher 
audit fees. 
 
AC size and the frequency 
of AC meetings are 
positively associated with 
audit fees. 
 
The measures of the board 
of directors will not be 
associated with audit fees. 
 
Strong ACs might choose 
to authorize less non-audit 
services, possibly in order 
to contribute to the 
perception of auditor 
independence. 
 
Observe stronger ACs are 
less likely to dismiss their 
auditors and there is no 
association between the 
issuance of new going 
concern reports and auditor 
dismissals. 
 
Audit fees are 
determined based on 
the supply and the 
demand for audit 
services. Not able to 
disentangle the impact 
of the demand and 
supply on audit fees 
but rather measure 
their combined effect. 
 
Audit fees are used as 
a level of proxy for the 
level of assurance 
which might not fully 
measure the quality of 
work performed by 
auditors. 
 
Dismissal decisions are 
often reached jointly 
by auditors and their 
clients. Inability to 
fully observe these 
decisions might bias 
results. 
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Table 4 (Continued): Annotated Literature Review on AC Ensuring the Independence of the External Auditors 
Author(s) 
(Year) 
Purpose/ Objective Sample & Data 
Collection 
Methods Main Findings Limitations & Future 
Research 
Lary, A.M., & 
Taylor, D.W. 
(2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Examine the association 
between AC’s 
governance 
characteristics and their 
role effectiveness.  
 
To contribute a more 
comprehensive model 
and new evidence from 
Australia that 
complements and extend 
recent studies from 
different country settings 
on characteristics, roles 
and effectiveness of ACs. 
The sampling frame 
is Australian listed 
companies over 
years 2004 to 2009, 
consisting of 180 
observations. 
The study applies multiple 
regressions to validate the 
hypotheses and models. 
Reveal that stronger AC 
independence and 
competence, but not 
diligence, are significantly 
related to lower incidence 
and severity of financial 
restatements (i.e., to a 
higher integrity of financial 
statements). 
 
Greater AC diligence, but 
not independence or 
competence, is 
significantly related to 
lower non-audit fee ratio 
(i.e., to higher external 
auditor independence). 
AC major role of 
monitoring the 
company’s internal 
audit function is not 
integrated into the 
model of the study. 
 
Specific proxy 
measures use to 
represent the broader 
concepts of 
effectiveness of the 
ACs are likely to have 
deficiencies in their 
construct validity. 
 
AC members’ 
collective 
characteristics are 
likely to be constructed 
from several 
behavioural factors. 
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Table 4 (Continued): Annotated Literature Review on AC Ensuring the Independence of the External Auditors 
Author(s) 
(Year) 
Purpose/ Objective Sample & Data 
Collection 
Methods Main Findings Limitations & Future 
Research 
Zaman, M., 
Hudaib, M., & 
Haniffa, R. 
(2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extend prior research on 
the relationship between 
governance quality and 
auditor remuneration. 
 
Examine the influence of 
AC effectiveness, a proxy 
for governance quality on 
audit fees and non-audit 
services fees using a new 
composite measure 
comprising AC 
independence, expertise, 
diligence and size.  
The population of 
the study is the UK 
FTSE-350 which 
represents a good 
mix of large and 
relatively small UK 
companies during 
the period 2001- 
2004. 
 
The final consists of 
non-financial UK 
FTSE-350 
companies with a 
total number of 540 
company year 
observations. 
Use a number of ordinary least 
squares regression models to 
help to explore further the 
various relationship between 
AC effectiveness and audit 
fees and non-audit fees while 
controlling for other variables. 
Find that after controlling 
for board of director 
characteristics, there is a 
significant positive 
association between AC 
effectiveness and audit fees 
only for larger clients. 
 
Indicate that effective ACs 
undertake more monitoring 
which results in wider 
audit scope and higher 
audit fees. 
 
Find the association 
between AC effectiveness 
and non-audit fees to be 
positive and significant, 
especially for larger 
clients. 
 
Findings supported 
regulatory initiatives aimed 
at improving corporate 
governance quality.  
Use only four factors 
in the composite 
measure of AC 
effectiveness in 
different regulatory 
and institutional 
contexts. 
 
Use dichotomous 
measure of financial 
expertise, coded 1 if at 
least one member in 
the AC has financial 
expertise, and 0 other 
wise. 
 
The definition of 
financial expertise is 
perhaps too broad and 
encompasses skills that 
may not necessarily 
contribute to AC 
effectiveness. 
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2.8 Governance-related Agency Costs and their Value Relevance to  
       Shareholders  
2.8.1 Introduction 
Separation of ownership and control between the principal (shareholders) and the agent 
(managers) gives rise to agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Managers have the 
incentives to act in their own best interests by supplying biased financial information which 
does not reflect the true value of the company to the shareholders. Thus, from a financial 
reporting perspective, a desirable consequence of corporate governance is hypothesised to be 
the provision of high quality accounting information to financial statement user groups 
(Habib and Azim, 2008). An AC is in a good position to perform a monitoring function for 
the shareholders (Goddard and Masters, 2001).  
 
The sub-sections below present and assess literature that has examined the relationship 
between governance-related agency costs and their value relevance to shareholders and a 
summary table of annotated literature review is also presented.  
 
2.8.2 Extant Studies 
Bushman and Smith (2001) reviewed and proposed additional research concerning the role of 
publicly reported financial accounting information in the governance processes of 
corporations. The authors argued that future research on the relationship between governance 
use and capital market use of financial accounting information is important for developing a 
more complete understanding of the effect of financial accounting information on economic 
performance. While governance research typically focuses on a particular governance 
mechanism in isolation, more complete understanding requires an explicit recognition of the 
interactions across governance mechanisms (Bushman and Smith, 2001).  
 
On the other hand, Davis-Friday et al. (2006) examined the impact of the economic 
environment on the value relevance of earnings and book value in four Asian countries; 
Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia and Thailand, in the period surrounding the Asian financial 
crisis from 1996-1997. The authors also examined the effects of corporate governance 
mechanisms on the value relevance of accounting numbers. Using a sample of 1035 firms 
across two years, the results of the study indicated that value relevance of earnings in 
Indonesia and Thailand are significantly reduced during the Asian financial crisis while value 
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relevance of book value increased. In Malaysia, the value relevance of both earnings and 
book value did not decrease during the crisis while in Korea, neither book value nor are 
earnings significantly impacted by the crisis.  
 
Jamaluddin et al. (2009) extended the analysis of Davis-Friday et al. (2006) by examining the 
value relevance of equity book value and earnings, in a setting where the country experienced 
corporate governance reform (during and after the issuance of the Malaysian Code on 
Corporate Governance). The sample consisted of Main Board companies listed on Bursa 
Malaysia from 1999 to 2001. The authors found that Malaysian companies’ equity book 
value and earnings are of value relevance in determining the firm’s share price. However, the 
regulatory change experienced by the county to enhance the level of corporate governance in 
response to the financial crisis in 1997 does not have an impact on the valuation of equity 
book value and accounting earnings. 
 
Another corporate governance and value relevance study is conducted by Habib and Azim 
(2008). The authors examined the relationship between accounting numbers and share price 
as the measure of accounting information quality and also consider the impact of ASX 
Corporate Governance Best Practice Code on the changes in the value relevance of 
accounting information in Australia. This study uses board, AC and external audit related 
variables to proxy for corporate governance. Similar to Davis-Friday et al. (2006), the 
regression results showed that firms with strong governance structure exhibit higher value 
relevance of accounting information. Results further showed that firm-specific economic 
variables are important variables of the value relevance of accounting information. 
 
2.8.3 Comparative Assessment 
Based on the outlines of studies above, the findings of Davis-Friday et al. (2006), Habib and 
Azim (2008), and Jamaluddin et al. (2009) indicated that corporate governance structure has 
an impact on the value relevance to shareholders. Good corporate governance structure 
creates value by providing value relevance information to the shareholders. The issues of 
corporate governance have been debated extensively for it is believed that a sound corporate 
governance system is indispensable in protecting the quality of accounting information 
produced by companies (Machuga and Teitel, 2009). Past studies have examined the agency 
theory and corporate governance as a monitoring mechanism (Bonazzi and Islam, 2007; Dey, 
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2008; Miller, 2009; Safieddine, 2009) but to date no studies have tested the relationship 
between the audit-related agency monitoring costs (external audit fees, internal audit budget 
and AC fees) and total shareholders return. In order to fill the research gap, this study aims to 
examine this relationship. 
 
2.8.4 Tabulated Annotations 
The annotated literature review on governance-related agency costs and the value relevance 
of these costs to shareholders is presented in Table 5. 
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Table 5: Annotated Literature Review on Governance-related Agency Costs and their Value Relevance to Shareholders 
Author(s) 
(Year) 
Discussions 
 
Bushman, 
R.M., & 
Smith, A.J. 
(2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Review and propose additional research concerning the role of publicly reported financial accounting information in the governance 
processes of corporations. 
 
Discuss research on the use of financial accounting in managerial incentive plans and explore future research directions.  
 
Propose that governance research be extended to explore more comprehensively the use of financial accounting information in 
additional corporate control mechanisms, and suggest opportunities for expanding such research.  
 
Propose cross-country research to investigate more directly the effect of financial accounting information on economic performance 
through its role in governance and more generally. 
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Table 5 (Continued): Annotated Literature Review on Governance-related Agency Costs and their Value to Shareholders 
Author(s) 
(Year) 
Purpose/ Objective Sample & Data 
Collection 
Methods Main Findings Limitations & Future 
Research 
Davis-Friday, 
P., Eng, L.L., 
& Liu, C. 
(2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Examine the value 
relevance of earnings and 
book value in four Asian 
countries, Indonesia, 
South Korea, Malaysia 
and Thailand, in period 
surrounding the Asian 
financial crisis 
 
Examine the impact of 
the economic 
environment on the value 
relevance of book value 
and earnings. 
 
Examine the effects of 
corporate-governance 
mechanisms and the type 
of accounting system 
together with economic 
environment on the value 
relevance of accounting 
numbers. 
 
 
 
 
 
Sample consists of 
firms from 
Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia and 
Thailand for which 
all required data are 
available. 
 
Market value of 
equity, book value 
of equity and net 
income data are 
obtained from 
Datastream 
Research Services. 
 
The sample period is 
1996 and 1997 and 
consisted of 1035 
firms (across two 
years): 158 from 
Indonesia, 217 from 
Korea, 271 from 
Malaysia and 389 
from Thailand. 
The market value of equity is 
regressed on book value of 
equity and net income. 
 
Model 1 includes an indicator 
variable to examine the effect 
of the economic environment 
(the effect of the crisis) on the 
valuation of earnings and book 
value. 
 
Model 2 tests market value of 
equity on book value of equity 
and net income, controlling 
for the effects of negative 
book value and negative net 
income. 
 
Model 3 investigates whether 
the use of IAS had any impact 
on the value relevance of 
earnings and book value. 
The value relevance of 
earnings in Indonesia and 
Thailand is significantly 
reduced during the Asian 
financial crisis while the 
value relevance of book 
value increased. 
 
In Malaysia, the value 
relevance of both earnings 
and book value decreased 
during the crisis. 
 
In Korea, neither book 
value nor earnings is 
significantly impacted by 
the crisis. 
 
Results also indicate that 
the level of corporate 
governance mechanisms 
has impact on the extent of 
changes in the value 
relevance of book values, 
but not earnings. 
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Table 5 (Continued): Annotated Literature Review on Governance-related Agency Costs and their Value to Shareholders 
Author(s) 
(Year) 
Purpose/ Objective Sample & Data 
Collection 
Methods Main Findings Limitations & Future 
Research 
Jamaluddin, 
A., Mastuki, 
N., & Ahmad, 
A. E. (2009) 
 
 
 
Examine the effect of 
corporate governance 
reform on the value 
relevance of equity book 
value and earnings by 
employing the Ohlson’s 
Valuation model. 
 
 
 
 
 
Sample consists of 
Main Board 
companies listed on 
Bursa Malaysia 
from 1999 to 2001 
in order to 
investigate the effect 
during and after the 
issuance of the 
Malaysian Code on 
Corporate 
Governance 
(MCCG) as a 
measure of 
corporate 
governance reform. 
 
 
Examines the value relevance 
of equity book value and 
earnings, this study will be 
based on Ohlson’s valuation 
model which relates market 
value as a function of book 
value and earnings. 
Equity book value and 
earnings are value relevant 
in assisting investors to 
value firms’ equity. 
 
The regulatory change 
experience by the country 
did not have an impact on 
the valuation of equity 
book value and earnings. 
 
This suggests that most of 
the Malaysia companies 
may not have met the 
intended purpose of 
MCCG, but merely 
conformed to the minimum 
requirement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The study only 
examines the effect 
during and following 
the issuance of the 
code, covering only a 
three-year period 
(1999-2001). 
 
Future research: (1) 
Extend the period of 
the study to cover 
longer and more recent 
periods (2) A 
comparison between 
Malaysian and other 
emerging capital 
market may also 
contribute to the 
scarcity of research 
done in emerging 
markets. 
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Table 5 (Continued): Annotated Literature Review on Governance-related Agency Costs and their Value to Shareholders 
Author(s) 
(Year) 
Purpose/ Objective Sample & Data 
Collection 
Methods Main Findings Limitations & Future 
Research 
Habib, A., & 
Azim, I. 
(2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Seek to examine the 
relationship between 
corporate governance and 
the value relevance of 
accounting information. 
Use data from 
Australia’s top 500 
listed companies for 
the period 2001-
2003. 
 
Final sample 
consists of 1289 
firm-year 
observations from 
2001 to 2003 with 
430, 426 and 433 
firms, respectively. 
 
Financial statement 
data and corporate 
governance 
information came 
from the Aspect 
Financial Analysis 
and Connect 4 
databases, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
Use board, AC and external 
audit related variables to 
proxy for corporate 
governance.  
 
Value-relevance is measured 
by the adjusted R 
2
 derived 
from a regression of stock 
price on earnings and equity 
book values following 
Ohlson’s accounting-based 
valuation framework. 
Regression results show 
that firm with strong 
governance structure 
exhibit higher value-
relevance of accounting 
information.  
 
Results further show that 
firm-specific economic 
variables are important 
determinants of the value-
relevance of accounting 
information. 
Significant regulatory 
reforms regarding 
corporate governance 
around the world give 
an impression that 
regulators believe that 
governance plays a key 
role in ensuring, 
among others, credible 
financial reporting.  
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CHAPTER 3. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION AND 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the theoretical foundation of the study and develops the sets of 
hypotheses that will be tested. The theoretical foundation is first discussed. The behavioural 
assumption underlying this study is that humans are economically rational and act in their 
own self-interest. This underlies agency theory and provides the rationale for the extent to 
which monitoring costs are incurred to monitor the behaviour and performance of top 
management. Next the hypotheses are formulated. There are 5 sets of hypotheses to be tested 
in this study.  
 
3.2 Theoretical Foundation  
3.2.1 Agency Theory and AC 
Agency theory is the most common theoretical foundation in explaining corporate 
governance and its reforms. Agency theory provides particularly useful guidance in 
understanding the role of an AC which will be the focal point of this study. Berle and Means 
(1932) first emphasized the concept of separation of ownership and control stating that as the 
ownership of corporate wealth has become more widely dispersed, ownership of that wealth 
and control over it have come to lie less and less in the same hands. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) is the first study to place this ownership issue into a proper theoretical framework and 
model the agency relationship.  
 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), an agency relationship can be defined as a 
contract under which one or more persons (the principal) engage another person (the agent) to 
perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making 
authority to the agent. In the context of a company, the shareholders (principal) appoint the 
managers (agent) to carry out day-to-day business decision making on their behalf. Managers 
might have personal goals that compete with the principal's goal of maximising wealth. Since 
the shareholders authorise managers to take charge and control of the firm's economic 
resources, a potential conflict of interest exists between these two groups. Importantly, 
agency theory suggests that, in imperfect labour and capital markets, managers will seek to 
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maximize their own utility at the expense of shareholders due to information asymmetry and 
moral hazard (Kleiman, 2010). Managers may excessively consume firm resources and make 
decisions that are not in the shareholders’ best interests.  
 
Subsequent development in agency theory has been proposed by Fama and Jensen (1983). 
Similar to Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama and Jensen (1983) also argued that the contract 
structure of organisations which involves separating ownership from control, gives rise to 
agency problems resulting from the fact that the agents (managers) do not want to bear the 
risks. Furthermore, the development of the agency theory has resulted in the proposition and 
implementation of governance structures. The strengthening of corporate governance (i.e., 
board of directors, ACs, external auditors and internal audit function) can reduce this agency 
problem.  Without effective control procedures, managers are more likely to take actions that 
deviate from the interest of the shareholders (Psaros, 2009). An overview of key features of 
agency theory is given in Table 6. 
 
The concept of agency theory where managers will seek to act in their own best interest 
instead of the shareholders gives rise to three agency theory problems. The first problem 
relates to the potential for managers to maximize their own utility at the expense of 
shareholders. This can be manifest in excessive remuneration, bonuses, golden parachute and 
other unfair benefits provided to the managers by the company. The second problem of 
agency theory relates to the managers’ preference to focus on short term performance to meet 
their company’s profit target. This will eventually lead to a short fall of longer term goals and 
hence decreases the shareholders’ value. Longer term goals achieved by managers are 
arguable more beneficial to shareholders. The last problem of agency theory is the differences 
between managers’ and shareholders’ attitude towards risk. Managers prefer to take riskier 
investments compared to shareholders as managers are more likely to be rewarded for 
success than failure (Psaros, 2009). 
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Table 6: Agency Theory Overview 
Key idea Principal-agent relationships should reflect 
efficient organisation of information and 
risk-bearing costs. 
 
Unit of analysis Contract between principal and agent. 
 
Human assumptions Self-interest. 
Bounded rationality. 
Risk aversion. 
 
Organisational assumptions Partial goal conflict among participants. 
Efficiency as the effectiveness criterion. 
Information asymmetry between principal 
and agent. 
 
Information assumption Information as a purchasable commodity. 
 
Contracting problems Agency (moral hazard and adverse selection) 
Risk sharing. 
 
Problem domain Relationships in which the principal and 
agent have partly differing goals and risk 
preferences (e.g., compensation, regulation, 
leadership, impression management, whistle-
blowing, vertical integration, transfer 
pricing). 
 
Source: Clarke (2004) 
 
In order to deal with shareholder-manager agency conflicts, shareholders could monitor every 
managerial action to make sure that managers perform according to their written contract. 
The primary means of monitoring is via the annual financial statements whose reliability is 
enhanced by an audit report. However, financial statements may be inadequate for monitoring 
purposes due to information asymmetry and incomplete information (Goddard and Masters, 
2001).  The financial statements are prepared by managers who know more about the current 
condition and future prospects of the firm than shareholders or auditors. To exploit their 
information advantage at the expense of outsiders, managers are reluctant to disclose any 
private matters for fear that it may be used against them. Shareholders’ monitoring using 
financial statements could be extremely costly and inefficient.  
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Conversely, to reduce shareholders-managers agency conflicts, there is a role for an 
intermediary between the managers, auditors and shareholders. According to Fama and 
Jensen (1983), non-executive directors can act as arbiters in disagreements among internal 
managers and carry out tasks that involve serious agency problems between managers and 
shareholders. An AC that consists of independent non-executive directors, without a day-to-
day responsibility, is in a good position to perform a monitoring function for the shareholders 
(Goddard and Masters, 2001).  
 
Also, ACs are commonly viewed as monitoring mechanisms that enhance the financial 
reporting (Blue Ribbon Committee, 1999). The ASX CGC (2007) states that ACs are 
responsible for reviewing the entity’s financial statements before submission to the board of 
directors, ensuring the independence and competence of the internal and external auditors, 
overseeing the company’s internal controls and many more. Thus, the extensive roles and 
responsibilities of an AC will protect the interest of the shareholders and reduce the 
shareholders-managers agency conflicts. As a result, the demand for active, independent, 
expert audit committees to strengthen the quality of auditing and to reinforce the task of 
monitoring in general is likely to increase under pressure from outside shareholders (Garcia-
Sanchez et al., 2012). 
 
Past studies have examined the agency theory and corporate governance as a monitoring 
mechanism (Bonazzi and Islam, 2007; Dey, 2008; Miller, 2009; Safieddine, 2009). Since 
2000, where many high profile companies collapsed in Australia, there have been an 
increasing number of studies focusing on corporate governance. The importance of sound 
corporate governance also increased due to regulatory reforms (SOX Act 2002 in the United 
States, Combined Code on Corporate Governance 2003 in the United Kingdom and ASX 
CGC 2003 & 2007 in Australia). Therefore, the establishment of an AC in a company is a 
fundamental component of a good corporate governance structure. 
 
Based on the principal-agent theoretical perspective, this study will investigate how effective 
and relevant is the use of an AC (part of the corporate governance component) as a 
monitoring mechanism to reduce agency conflict between the managers (agent) and the 
shareholders (principal). The responsibilities of an AC facilitating the quality of external 
audit, ensuring the independence of external auditors, overseeing the quality of the internal 
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audit function and ensuring the independence of internal auditors can align the interest of the 
shareholders with the interest of the managers. The interaction between the AC, external 
auditors and internal auditors also helps to achieve maximum value for the company and its 
shareholders. 
 
3.3 Hypotheses Development 
3.3.1 AC Overseeing the Quality of the Internal Audit Function 
The main role of an AC is to oversee the quality of financial reporting and corporate 
accountability. Alternatively, the internal audit function plays a crucial role in preventing 
fraud and errors and ensuring effective controls. Hence, the objectives of the internal audit 
function and the AC are closely related with one another. An efficient AC can be helpful to 
the internal audit function in performing its duties. To maintain good corporate governance, 
communication and a good working relationship between the staff responsible for the internal 
audit function and the AC are important (Scarbrough et al., 1998, IIA 2002a, 2002b, 2003b).  
 
Thus, this study first aims to explore whether the effectiveness of AC roles based on AC’s 
governance characteristics are associated to financial resources and labour hours devoted to 
the internal audit function. Independent AC members and AC chair are more likely to be 
concerned with issues related to internal audit processes such as being involved in the 
decision to dismiss the CIA, and the frequency and length of meetings with the internal audit 
function (Goodwin, 2003). In addition, AC members equipped with financial or industry 
expertise are more likely to have a better understanding of the complex technical and design 
aspects of internal controls related to the particular company. DeZoort (1997) found that AC 
members with financial experience make judgements more similar to auditors than those AC 
members without such experience. 
 
A larger AC size with number of members that have a more diverse set of skills and 
knowledge would exercise a greater degree of expertise in monitoring the internal audit 
function. Another consideration is the frequency of meetings. By meeting more frequently, 
members would remain informed, alert and diligent about auditing issues (Scarbrough et al., 
1998). On the other hand, an AC charter is also important as it clearly sets out the AC’s roles 
and responsibilities, giving a stronger sense of authority to the AC. Kalbers and Fogarty 
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(1993) argued that the existence of a clear AC charter provides power for authoritative 
decision making and thus, the AC can achieve its oversight role more effectively. 
 
Earlier studies have explored the relationship between the internal audit function and the AC 
(Scarborough et al., 1998; Raghunandan et al., 1998; Raghunandan et al., 2001; Goodwin, 
2003; Abbott et al., 2010). Scarborough et al.’s (1998) study found that effective ACs (i.e., 
independent, diligent and capable members) are associated with an objective and independent 
internal audit function. Likewise, Raghunandan et al. (1998) demonstrated that ACs which 
have granted private access to the CIA and have reviewed both the plans and the results of 
internal auditing are more likely to be perceived as knowledgeable by their CIAs.  
 
In a later study, Raghunandan et al. (2001) argued that ACs comprised solely of independent 
directors and with at least one member having an accounting or finance background are more 
likely to have longer meetings with the CIA and review internal audit proposals. Furthermore, 
using data from Australia and New Zealand, Goodwin (2003) found that independence and 
accounting experience have a complementary impact on AC relations with the internal audit 
function. Moreover in the United States, Abbott et al. (2010) documented a strong, positive 
association between AC oversight variable and the amount of internal audit function budget 
allocated to internal controls-based activities. 
 
The findings of past studies suggest that characteristics of ACs are associated with aspects of 
the internal audit function. An effective AC should ensure that adequate financial resources 
and hours are devoted to internal control based activities. Also an AC should ensure that the 
CIA has private access to the chair or other members of the AC and is able to discuss 
concerns on resourcing needs of the internal audit function. Hence, the following hypotheses 
are formulated: 
 
Hypothesis One (a): The AC’s mechanisms for role effectiveness, based on its AC’s 
governance characteristics (i.e., chair independence, financial and industry expertise, size, 
frequency of meetings and charter) are positively related to financial resources devoted to the 
internal audit function. 
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Hypothesis One (b): The AC’s mechanisms for role effectiveness, based on its AC’s 
governance characteristics are positively related to labour hours devoted to the internal audit 
function. 
 
3.3.2 AC Ensuring the Independence of the Internal Audit Function  
In more recent years, the independence of the internal audit function has gained a lot of 
interest among the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), academics and practitioners. The 
motivation for this growth in research relates to the potential conflicts arising from the 
expanding role of the internal audit function as both a key corporate governance mechanism 
and an internal consultancy service (Stewart and Subramaniam, 2010). It can be argued that, 
internal auditors providing both assurances to external stakeholders and consulting services to 
management may cause a conflict of interest and threaten the internal auditors’ independence.  
 
Firms have established an AC to monitor corporate governance matters, risk management and 
assurance issues. Hence, the AC serves as an oversight role in ensuring the independence of 
the internal audit function. An effective AC with good governance characteristics can 
strengthen the independence position of the internal audit function (Verschoor, 1992). 
Empirically, Goodwin and Yeo (2001) argued that the relationship between internal audit 
function and AC may affect organisational independence while the use of the function as a 
management training ground may affect individual objectivity.  
 
Moreover, in Australia, Christopher et al. (2009) identified a number of threats to the internal 
audit function’s independence. These include having the management to approve the internal 
audit budget and being involved in the audit plan, the internal audit function not reporting 
functionally to the AC, the AC not having sole responsibility for appointing and dismissing 
the CIA and a lack of AC accounting expertise. McHugh and Raghunandan (1994) also found 
that a large majority of internal auditors indicated that vesting hiring or firing authority with 
the AC would enhance the independence of the internal audit function and improve the ability 
of internal auditors to generate action on audit findings.  
 
Thus, based on the argument above, the AC is an important vehicle in increasing the 
company’s status and the independence of internal audit function. AC ‘good governance’ 
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characteristics are more likely to ensure the independence of the internal audit function. The 
following hypotheses from the literature are articulated: 
 
Hypothesis Two (a): The AC’s mechanisms for role effectiveness, based on AC’s 
governance characteristics are positively related to the independence of the internal audit 
function. 
 
Hypothesis Two (b): The AC’s mechanisms for role effectiveness, based on AC’s 
governance characteristics are positively related to the extent of AC support for internal audit 
function independence. 
 
3.3.3 AC Facilitating the Quality of the External Audit 
Studies relating to AC and external audit fees have been published in recent years. To date, 
existing evidence from these previous studies is mixed. Most studies show that the quality of 
AC characteristics is positively related to the level of audit fees (Carcello et al., 2002; Abbott 
et al., 2003; Goodwin and Kent, 2006; Yatim et al., 2006; Hoitash and Hoitash, 2009; Singh 
and Newby, 2010), but some have found no significant association (Goddard and Masters, 
2001; Rainsbury et al., 2009). 
 
A number of studies have investigated the association of AC independence with financial 
reporting and audit fees. ACs comprised of independent members are less likely to 
experience earnings restatements as they are more effective in monitoring the corporate 
financial accounting process (Beasley et al., 2000; Carcello and Neal, 2000; Klein, 2002; 
Abbott et al., 2004). This implies that an AC independent from the management is more 
likely to question and dispute management on various issues and, therefore, is better at 
protecting the reliability of the accounting process. Independent ACs will also ensure that the 
audit hours are not reduced to a level where the quality of audit would be compromised.  
 
Moreover, in order to reduce financial misstatements, independent ACs may also demand 
additional work (beyond the initial audit plan) to be performed by the external auditors. 
Supporting the arguments above, Carcello et al. (2002) and Abbott et al. (2003) found that 
AC independence is positively related to external audit fees. Independent ACs will demand a 
greater level of audit assurance and potentially provide stronger support for external auditors 
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during scope negotiations with management (Abbott et al., 2003). Thus, this tends to improve 
the quality of external audit and leads to higher audit fees. 
 
On the other hand, the effectiveness of an AC in facilitating the quality of external audit is 
further enhanced if the members have relevant expertise. ACs equipped with financial and 
industry expertises are better at understanding complex external auditing risk assessment tests 
and procedures proposed. Furthermore, financial experts on the AC can provide additional 
support for external auditors when discussing or negotiating auditing issues with management 
(Abbott et al., 2003). Evidence from previous studies suggests that AC financial expertise is 
positively related to audit fees (Carcello et al., 2002; Abbott et al., 2003; Hoitash and Hoitash, 
2009). AC members that possess financial and industry expertise seek to purchase higher 
audit quality in order to protect their reputation and also protect the interest of shareholders. 
Following the ASX CGC’s recommendation, this study will examine two measures of 
expertise: accounting expertise and industry expertise. Consistent with previous studies, a 
high proportion of financial and industry experts on the AC will be positively related to audit 
fees. 
 
Previous studies have also shown that the frequency of AC meetings is a good measure of AC 
effectiveness. In regards to external audit fees, Carcello et al. (2002) found no significance 
between AC meetings and audit fees, while Abbott et al. (2003), Goodwin and Kent (2006) 
and Hoitash and Hoitash (2009) observed a positive significant association. AC that meets 
frequently with the auditors and management are more likely to be informed about the 
auditing issues and can prevent the occurrence of financial reporting problems. Higher 
frequency of AC meetings can proactively and positively influence the audit coverage during 
various stages of the audit (Abbott et al., 2003). Thus, the frequency of AC meetings will be 
positively associated with higher audit fees. 
 
On the other hand, AC size and charter are important characteristics to the overall 
effectiveness and strength of AC. Larger AC tends to have more authority (Kalbers and 
Fogarty, 1993) which is found to increase financial reporting quality (Felo et al., 2003), 
reduce the incidence of earnings restatements (Lin et al., 2003) and have a committee with a 
more effective monitoring function (Dalton et al., 1998). Hence, AC size is likely to be 
associated with higher external audit fees that facilitate better quality service. Furthermore, 
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the responsibilities of an AC are clearly defined and explained in its charter. Kalbers and 
Fogarty (1993) argued that the existence of a clear AC charter provides power for 
authoritative decision making. Thus, the AC can achieve its oversight role more effectively 
by successfully obtaining a good external audit function as reflected in their ability to get 
board approval for higher external audit fees. The presence of an AC charter will be 
positively related to audit fees. The following hypothesis drawn from the above studies is 
formulated: 
 
Hypotheses Three: The AC’s mechanisms for role effectiveness based on AC’s governance 
characteristics are positively related to external audit fees (a proxy for the quality of the 
external audit). 
 
3.3.4 AC Ensuring the Independence of the External Auditors 
The external auditors when acting as an independent party with knowledge of the company’s 
financial affairs can provide the AC with valuable, objective insight into aspects of the 
company’s governance and internal controls, including its risk management. The AC in turn 
aids the effectiveness of the external auditors (AUASB, AICD and IIA, 2008). Hence, one of 
the key roles of the AC is to ensure the independence of the external auditors and observe the 
extent of non-audit services provide by the auditor to the management.  
 
Given an active and independent AC’s concern for perceived external auditor’s independence, 
an AC can influence the non-audit services purchase decision (Abbott et al., 2003). The 
results of previous studies (DeAngelo, 1981; Prakash and Venable, 1993; Firth, 1997) 
showed that non-audit service fees can threaten the independence of external auditors. So far, 
only four studies examined the relationship between AC characteristics and non-audit service 
fees purchases (Abbott et al., 2003; Hoitash and Hoitash, 2009; Lary and Taylor, 2011; 
Zaman et al., 2011).  
 
Abbott et al. (2003) found that ACs comprised solely of independent directors and meet at 
least four times annually, are significantly and negatively associated with the non-audit 
service fees ratio. Moreover, in the post-SOX period, Hoitash and Hoitash (2009) also found 
that strong ACs might choose to authorize less non-audit services, possibly in order to 
contribute to the perception of auditor’s independence. Two more recent studies, Lary and 
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Taylor (2011) found that some AC characteristics are negatively and significantly associated 
with non-audit fees while Zaman et al. (2011) found that AC characteristics are positively 
and significantly associated with non-audit fees in larger companies. This prior literature 
suggests that an effective AC is more likely to reduce the level of non-audit service fees 
provided by the external auditor to the management. Hence, the following hypothesis is 
formulated: 
 
Hypotheses Four: The AC’s mechanisms for role effectiveness based on AC’s governance 
characteristics are negatively related to non-audit fees (a proxy for the independence of the 
external auditors). 
 
3.3.5 Audit-related Agency Monitoring Costs and Total Shareholders Return 
Separation of ownership and control (the agency problem) between the managers (agent) and 
the shareholders (principal) provide incentives for managers to act in their own best interest 
and maximise their personal wealth. This can lead to managers providing biased accounting 
and financial information to shareholders. Hence, the strengthening of the audit-related 
corporate governance structures and mechanisms (i.e., AC, external auditors and internal 
audit function) can mitigate this problem. In an organisation, an AC is an important 
component of board governance.  
 
Habib and Azim (2008) argued that from a financial perspective, a desirable consequence 
espoused for corporate governance is the provision of high quality accounting information to 
financial statement user groups. Strong AC’s governance characteristics help to align the 
interest of the managers with the interest of shareholders by reducing manger’s opportunistic 
earnings management practices and providing reliable financial information. Furthermore, 
Goodwin and Seow (2002) also argued that sound corporate governance is important because 
it can affect the quality of financial reporting and thus, leads to increased investor confidence 
especially in an emerging capital market. 
 
Based on the agency theory framework, owners would rationally incur higher agency 
monitoring costs in order to gain greater returns due to the restricting of management’s 
behaviour associated with adverse selection and moral hazard. In particular, adverse selection 
of financial information by management to report to, or withhold from shareholders, is 
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expected to be reduced when higher audit-related monitoring costs are incurred. Therefore, 
this study will investigate whether the resourcing of audit-related governance structures and 
mechanisms (i.e., incurring higher agency monitoring costs) is positively related to the 
company’s returns to shareholders. In this respect, no prior auditing studies have tested the 
relationship between audit-related governance costs (i.e., external audit fees, internal audit 
function budget and AC fees) and total shareholders return. The following hypothesis is 
developed: 
 
Hypothesis Five: Audit-related agency monitoring costs (external audit fees, internal audit 
function budget and AC fees) are positively related to shareholders return. 
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CHAPTER 4. RESEARCH METHODS 
4.1 Introduction 
Mixed methods are used to gather both primary and secondary data. There are two stages of 
data collection employed in this study: the primary data collection stage involving the 
administration of a questionnaire and the secondary data collection stage involving extraction 
from annual reports and financial databases. This chapter addresses the following areas: (1) 
justification of choice of selection of companies; (2) justification of the financial year 
selected; (3) questionnaire data collection stage; and (4) secondary data collection stage. Both 
data collection stages are discussed in detail in separate sections. 
 
4.2 Selection of Sample of Companies  
The sample of companies for both primary and secondary data collection is chosen as a 
census of all top 300 listed companies on the ASX with financial year ending in 2010. A 
constituent list of top 300 listed companies is obtained from the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 
website. These companies are selected because top 300 listed companies on the ASX include 
large capitalisation, mid capitalisation and small capitalisation components of the S&P/ASX 
index family. Moreover, top 300 listed companies also cover approximately 81% of 
Australian equity market capitalisation (ASX, 2010).  
 
Companies are then excluded from the sample for the following reasons:  
a) Missing or no data and other relevant information available on the Aspect Huntley 
FinAnalysis database and the Morningstar DatAnalysis database (i.e., annual reports, 
financial statements, AC variables, board of director variables and information 
regarding the CEO and CFO). 
b) Companies with no internal audit function. 
c) Foreign companies listed on the ASX. 
d) Incomplete or no company addresses provided. 
 
This resulted in a final sample of 255 listed companies with financial year ending in 2010 as 
shown in Appendix A. 
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4.3 Selection of Financial Year 
Company data for financial year ending in 2010 is selected for the following reasons. The 
ASX Listing Rule requires companies listed on the S&P/ASX All Ordinaries index to have an 
AC from 1
 
January 2003 onwards. This rule also requires the top 300 listed companies to 
comply with the recommendations of the ASX CGC’s Principles and Recommendations 
(Recommendation 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4) on the composition, operation and responsibility of 
the AC (AUASB, AICD and IIA, 2008). 
 
Moreover, in terms of the Australian economy and the share market, 2010 is a relatively 
normal year. The share market had recovered from the global financial crisis and company 
earnings announcements were improved on the downturn of 2008 and 2009. According to the 
Australian Industry Group’s (AIG) 2010 economic report, the economic recovery in Australia 
has gained momentum, underpinned by significant increases in commodity prices, stronger 
corporate profitability, strengthening labour market conditions and higher wage growth.  
 
Also, recent regulatory changes (ASX CGC, 2007) relating to ACs have lent themself to the 
research in this study. In year 2007, ASX CGC released Corporate Governance Principles 
and Recommendations which is a revised version of the original 2003 publication. The 
revisions included some amendments to details on the roles and responsibilities of ACs. 
Companies are expected make changes in an orderly way so as to meet these amendments 
over a reasonable period.  Hence, 2010 is an appropriate year to use in this study as it best 
captures the gradual strengthening of corporate governance since 2007, especially in ACs. 
 
4.4 Questionnaire Data Collection Stage 
This section discusses the methods used in the first stage of data collection. A questionnaire 
is developed and administered to the Chief Internal Auditor (CIA) of the sampled companies. 
The purpose is to investigate hypothesis one and two of this study by combining primary data 
with secondary data collected in the second stage.  
 
The information sought from the CIA in the questionnaire is divided into four sections. 
Section one relates to the background of both the CIA and the company. Section two asks 
respondents about the internal audit function activities while section three seeks data on the 
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relationship between the AC and the internal audit function. The fourth section of the 
questionnaire asks respondents about the independence of the internal audit function.  
 
Apart from presenting the questionnaire instrument, the issues concerning construction and 
administration of the instrument are discussed throughout this section. These issues are: (1) 
justification of the respondents selected; (2) construction and rationale for the research 
instrument used to collect the data; (3) approval required prior to using the research 
instrument; (4) and the approaches taken in administration of the questionnaire; and (5) the 
sample response rate. 
 
4.4.1 Selection of Respondents  
The data is collected by mailing a questionnaire to CIA of sampled top 300 ASX listed 
companies. This method is considered appropriate because the CIA is likely to be 
knowledgeable about the company’s internal audit function and the operations of the AC 
(Goodwin and Yeo, 2001). The information sought in the questionnaire is not available 
through secondary data sources. Moreover, using a questionnaire enables comparisons to be 
made with previous studies (Scarbrough et al., 1998; Goodwin, 2003; Ahmad and Taylor, 
2009; Abbott et al., 2010) that applied the same research method. 
 
4.4.2 Research Instrument 
The questionnaire of this study focuses mainly on the internal audit function and the AC. It 
consists of 22 questions, organised into four sections. Section One: Background, Section 
Two: Internal Audit Function Activities, Section Three: AC and the Internal Audit Function 
and Section Four: Internal Audit Function Independence (See Appendix D). Information 
collected from question 8, question 9, question 10, question 18 and question 21 is used to test 
hypotheses one and two of this study. Whereas, information collected from the rest of the 
questionnaire is used in comparative case study analysis. The nature and approach to the 
comparative case study methods is discussed in detail in Chapter 6, Section 6.2. 
 
Prior to completing the final version of the questionnaire, the formatting of the questionnaire 
is subjected to pretesting to ensure question comprehensiveness, relevancy, appropriateness 
and efficiency. It is pre-tested on four RMIT University academics with familiarity in 
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auditing and corporate governance research experience. The questionnaire is also presented to 
the manager of research and publishing at the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) Australia for 
review and approval before its distribution to IIA members for pilot testing. Amendments are 
made after receiving constructive feedback from both parties. The comments received are 
shown in the discussion parts of each of the four sections of the questionnaire, and again 
under the administration of the questionnaire. 
 
4.4.3 Questionnaire Design  
The questionnaire in this study is created and formatted according to Dillman’s (2000) 
scientific basis for survey research methodology such as the development of question scales 
and multiple choice answers, confidentiality requirements, minimisation of question bias and 
the use of unambiguous wording. Dillman (2000) is regarded as a leader in establishing a 
paper-based questionnaire. If respondent finds the questionnaire easy to read and follow, the 
response rate will improve. Moreover, a well formatted questionnaire will also reduce 
measurement error as the respondent will be more likely not to misread or overlook questions.  
 
In designing the questionnaire, a number of important factors are considered. Firstly, the CIA 
is an extremely busy person and difficult to gain access to. Therefore, the questionnaire 
should not be too long. Second, the questionnaire should not be too complicated and should 
not take more than 10 to 15 minutes to complete. This suggests that the questions created 
require the respondents to tick an answer as an alternative for written answers. Third, 
information required on the internal audit function is not publicly available and is regarded as 
a sensitive issue for a company. Annual reports do not provide information about an 
organisation’s internal audit function. Fourth, CIA is likely to be secretive about disclosing 
information concerning their organisation. Hence, personal information on the CIA will 
remain anonymous in this study. In summary, all of these issues are adhered to in the final 
questionnaire and cover letter. 
 
4.4.4 Questionnaire Cover Letter 
The questionnaire cover is a short single page letter explaining the purpose and the content of 
the research project. The cover letter also gives details to the respondents about the benefits 
of participating in the research project and a statement that personal details will be treated in 
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confidence. Further, the letter describes the instructions and options on how to complete the 
questionnaire, the approximate time to complete the questionnaire and instructions to return 
the questionnaire in the postage-paid envelope provided. The cover letter is signed by both 
the researcher and the thesis senior supervisor. The letter concludes with a paragraph stating 
that the research project is vetted and approved by the RMIT University’s Business College 
Human Ethics Committee. It directs respondents with questions about the manner in which 
the questionnaire is being managed to contact the thesis senior supervisor. A sample of the 
questionnaire cover letter is shown in Appendix C. 
 
4.4.5 Questionnaire Contents 
4.4.5.1 Section One: Background 
In terms of rationale, section one of the questionnaire is designed to identify the background 
of the respondents (CIAs) and the profile of the company. These questions are common 
questions used by most studies and are adapted from Scarbrough et al. (1998), Goodwin 
(2003) and Abbott et al. (2010). Respondents’ background in this questionnaire provides 
basic demographic information about age, gender, years of working experience in the internal 
audit field and their current job position. This section also includes a series of questions 
related to the profile of the company including company name, company size based on 
market capitalisation, company industry, professional audit staff employed and total annual 
internal audit budget.  
 
Information on the characteristics of the respondents and companies is deemed important in 
the interpretation of the questionnaire results. Analysis of the reported characteristics of the 
company profile and the respondents can indicate the quality of the information collected and 
whether or not it is a representative of the population. The questions in section one is 
numbered 1 to 9 in the questionnaire shown in Appendix D of the thesis. Feedback on the 
first draft of the questionnaire from the four RMIT University academics resulted in minor 
changes in the wording in a number of questions and reduction in the total number of 
questions. 
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4.4.5.2 Section Two: Internal Audit Function Activities 
In terms of rationale, section two explores the manner in which the internal audit function in 
the company operates. These questions are revised based on the questionnaire used in 
Goodwin and Yeo (2001), Raghunandan et al. (2001), Goodwin (2003) and Abbott et al. 
(2010). The second section of the questionnaire asks a number of questions relating to total 
hours devoted to internal audit function, the approximate percentage distribution of internal 
audit function activities, the use of internal audit function as training ground and staff 
turnover, internal audit function reporting responsibility, termination rights and budgetary 
oversight. Also, section two asks about the coordination of internal audit function with the 
external auditors in respect to audit coverage and work scheduling and also whether external 
auditors have access to working paper and management reports of the internal audit function.  
 
Information on the internal audit function activities is essential in interpreting the findings of 
this study. Data collected from question 10 will be used to test hypothesis one while the rest 
of the data gathered from question 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 will be used in comparative case 
analysis. The questions in section two are numbered 10 to 15 in the questionnaire as shown in 
Appendix D of the thesis.  There is a reduction in the number of questions in this section due 
to feedback from the four RMIT academic reviewers of the draft. 
 
4.4.5.3 Section Three: AC and the Internal Audit Function 
In terms of rationale, section three of the questionnaire is used to determine the relationship 
between the AC and the internal audit function of the company. The questions are designed 
and adapted according to Raghunandan et al. (1998), Scarbrough et al. (1998), Goodwin and 
Yeo (2001), Raghunandan et al. (2001) and Goodwin (2003). The third section collects data 
on the relationship between AC and internal audit function relating to AC meetings with the 
CIA (i.e., length, privacy and number of meetings), AC expertise in regards to internal 
control matters, AC reviewing of plans and receiving reports from the internal audit function. 
 
These questions provides insight into the level of AC involvement relative to its role in the 
internal audit function and the information collected from the questionnaire will be used in 
comparative case analysis. The questions in section three are numbered 16 to 20 in the 
questionnaire as shown in Appendix D of the thesis. Feedback on the draft of this section of 
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the questionnaire from the four RMIT University academics resulted in changes in the 
wording in a number of questions. 
 
4.4.5.4 Section Four: Internal Audit Function Independence  
In terms of rationale, section four looks at the independence of the internal audit function. 
These questions are originally created based on the questionnaire used in Ahmad and 
Taylor’s (2009) study. Taking a cognitive perspective of internal auditor independence, 
Ahmad and Taylor (2009) developed the questionnaire by drawing on measures established 
in the organisational behaviour literature and adapting these to the internal auditor’s context. 
The exercise of independence by internal audit function is important given their modern roles 
and responsibilities. The questions constructed in section four will be used to test hypothesis 
two of the study.  
 
The fourth section of the questionnaire asks respondents about the internal audit function 
independence in terms of: (a) the dedication of internal audit function to maintain 
independence; (b) whether internal audit function would resist any pressure and threat in 
order to maintain independence; (c) would the internal audit function comprise independence 
if they work under both audit role and advisory service role; (d) whether the AC provides a 
strong backing for the maintenance of internal audit function independence; (e) whether the 
independence of the internal audit function is strongly upheld because AC members have 
strong collective independence; and lastly (f) would AC be prepared to take action to 
maintain the independence of the internal audit function. 
 
The questions in section four are numbered 21 in the questionnaire as shown in Appendix D 
of the thesis. Feedback on the draft of the questionnaire from the four RMIT University 
academics resulted in changes in the wording in a number of sub-questions. 
 
4.4.6 Ethical Issues 
The rules and regulations of RMIT University require that when human data is collected by 
questionnaire, whether it is for a research project or thesis, a formal ethics approval of the 
contents of the questionnaire must be obtained from the RMIT Human Research Ethics 
Committee. The required procedure for the application process is to complete the specified 
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forms and submit the application to the Secretary of Business College Human Ethics 
Advisory Network for assessment. Ethics approval for the study is approved by the Chair of 
the Business College Human Ethics Advisory Network and approval is granted for the period 
from 21 June 2011 to 1 March 2014. The letters of ethics approval received from the 
committee appears in Appendix B of the thesis. 
 
4.4.7 Administration of the Questionnaire  
The questionnaire is first administered online by using the template on the online 
questionnaire software package, Survey Monkey. After setting up the template, a survey link 
is generated and respondents could click on the link to complete the questionnaire online. In 
parallel, a hard copy of the questionnaire is also sent to the sampled subjects to complete. 
Thus, the respondents of this study are given two options, either to complete the 
questionnaire online or by mail. 
 
The pilot test of the questionnaire is electronically sent by IIA Australia in an email together 
with a cover letter and an online questionnaire link. The research manager at IIA Australia 
arranged to forward the email to a limited number of IIA members who are CIAs in the top 
300 ASX listed companies. This represented a sample size of 60. The questionnaire is first 
sent on 10 October 2011 by IIA. A total of 4 usable responses are received representing a 
response rate of 7%. No further responses and comments are received from the respondents.  
 
Due to poor responses from the email sent by IIA to selected members who are CIAs of top 
300 companies, the administration of the questionnaire is reviewed again. It is found that 
there is an online technical error in one of the questions where the respondents could not key 
in their answer. The error is corrected and a second and third pilot test is sent by IIA 
Australia to the same number of members on 20 October 2011 and 10 November 2011 
respectively. A total of 9 usable responses are received, yielding a response rate of only 15%. 
The 9 responses are analysed, and no further revisions to the wording in the questionnaire are 
deemed necessary. Due to this continuing poor response rate, a different method of 
administration is chosen. 
 
Rather than going through IIA Australia using an email approach, the questionnaire is 
administered directly from RMIT University through a copy of the printed questionnaire, 
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cover letter and postage-paid envelope that is sent to the Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) of 
top 300 ASX listed companies. The CFO is instructed to pass the enclosed questionnaire to 
the company’s CIA for completion. After completing the questionnaire, the CIA is requested 
to return the questionnaire using the enclosed postage-paid envelope provided. The 
questionnaires are mailed out in two stages.  
 
The first stage of the questionnaires is sent on 2 December 2011 and a reminder of the 
questionnaire is mailed on 6 February 2012. There are two major reasons for selection of the 
dates to send the questionnaire. First, by these dates the previous financial year’s annual 
reports would have been completed and the CIA would most likely to be contactable and thus, 
would increase their willingness to complete the questionnaire sent to them. Second, the 
periods are before and after Christmas and summer holidays, so the CIA is likely to be 
available. A record is kept to track the number of questionnaires sent and recovered during 
the initial and reminder periods. 
 
4.4.8 Sample Response Rate 
The questionnaires are mailed out in two stages. A total of 255 questionnaires are initially 
mailed on 2 December 2011. A total of 23 usable responses are received, yielding a response 
rate of 9%. A follow-up mailing is conducted on 6 February 2012 and produced an addition 
of 13 usable responses. A total of 27 unusable responses consisted of 5 companies without 
internal audit function, 3 CIAs stating they are not interested to take part in the research 
project, 13 companies that outsourced their internal audit function and 6 questionnaires that 
are returned to sender. This led to the final sample size of 36 respondents, representing a 
response rate of 14%. Compared to other studies’ response rates, using a questionnaire of a 
similar nature targeting the CIA [Carcello et al., 2005 (25%); Pararit et al., 2012 (18%); 
Christopher et al., 2009 (17%); Abbott et al., 2010 (13%)], the response rate for this study is 
deemed fairly reasonable and may present a fair reflection of the views of the CIA.  
 
A non-response bias test is performed to compare the responses of those who returned the 
first mailing of the questionnaire to those who returned the second mailing of the 
questionnaire. The 36 usable response are divided into two groups, based on those sent in the 
first stage of the mailed out on 2 December 2011 (23 responses) and those sent in the second 
stage of the mailed out on 6 February 2012 (13 responses). Results of a t-test indicated that 
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there are no statistically significant differences between the means of the test variables for the 
two groups (p >0.05). 
 
4.5 Secondary Data Collection Stage 
This section discusses the methods used in the second stage of data collection. In this stage, 
secondary data (financial and non-financial) of top 300 ASX listed companies listed for the 
financial year ending in 2010 is hand collected from annual reports and financial databases. 
The purpose is to test all the hypotheses of this study by combining the secondary data 
collected at this stage with the questionnaire data collected at the first stage. The discussion in 
this section centres on the following areas: (1) the data sources utilised in data collection; (2) 
variable definition and measurement; (3) model specification; and (4) conceptual model. 
 
4.5.1 Secondary Data Sources 
Secondary data (financial and non-financial) are hand collected from the annual reports. 
Annual reports for the financial year ending in 2010 are downloaded for all sampled 
companies from the Connect 4 online database while various share market and other 
company data are extracted from the Aspect Huntley FinAnalysis and Morningstar 
DatAnalysis online databases. Non-financial data on the sampled companies’ ACs are 
collected from the annual reports. AC chair independence and AC members’ expertise and 
industry experience are gathered from the director’s profile while AC meetings are obtained 
from the director’s meeting section. AC size and charter are collected from the corporate 
governance section while the AC fees are obtained from the director’s report in the annual 
reports. 
 
Other data collected from annual reports are audit fees, non-audit fees and total shareholders 
return. Both audit fees and non-audit fees are obtained from the notes to the accounts of the 
financial statements. Calculated numbers for the total shareholders return, dividend per share, 
share price at the beginning of the period and share price at the end of the period are collected 
from the Aspect Huntley FinAnalysis database. Data on the characteristics of the company 
and external auditors are collected from the Aspect Huntley FinAnalysis database and 
modelled as control variables in this study (i.e., total assets, leverage, receivable ratio, 
inventory ratio, current ratio, operating cash flow, growth, mining, industry companies, 
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reported net loss, return on assets, debt ratio and big 4 auditors). Numbers of foreign 
subsidiaries and total subsidiaries of each sampled companies are obtained from the 
Morningstar DatAnalysis database while board of director’s independence and frequency of 
meetings are gathered from the director’s report in the annual reports. 
 
4.5.2 Variable Definitions and Measurements 
This study seeks to provide evidence on the effectiveness of ACs in fulfilling their roles. AC 
effectiveness is benchmarked against four main roles: 1) overseeing the quality of the internal 
audit function; 2) ensuring the independence of the internal audit function; 3) facilitating the 
quality of external audit; and 4) ensuring the independence of external auditors, To this end, 
seven regression models are developed. These models are detailed in section 4.6. The specific 
independent and dependant variables in this study that used questionnaire data and secondary 
data are defined and their measurement scales are described in turn. 
 
4.5.2.1 Independent Variables  
The independent variables applied are those describing the AC’s governance characteristics. 
This selected set of independent variables investigates the relationships between AC’s 
characteristics and the internal audit function or the external audit (Collier and Gregory, 
1996; Scarbrough et al., 1998; Goddard and Masters, 2001; Raghunandan et al., 2001; 
Carcello, 2002; Abbott et al., 2003; Goodwin, 2003; Goodwin and Kent, 2006; Yatim et al., 
2006; Hoitash and Hoitash; 2009; Rainsbury et al., 2009; Abbott et al., 2010; Singh and 
Newby, 2010). The definitions and measures of the separate independent variables are set out, 
in turn, below. 
 
AC Independence 
According to ASX CGC (2007) Recommendations 4.2, the AC should be structured so that it 
consists only of non-executive independent directors and is chaired by an independent AC 
chair. Based on previous studies, AC independence is measured as a percentage of 
independent directors on the committee (Goodwin and Kent, 2006; Yatim et al., 2006; Singh 
and Newby, 2010) or as a dichotomous variable equal to “1” when all the AC members are 
non-executive independent directors (Abbott et al., 2003; Rainsbury et al., 2003). A director 
is assumed to be independent if he or she is a non-executive (not part of a current 
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management team) who is not closely affiliated and has no related party transactions with the 
company.  
 
ASX Listing Rule 12.7 requires the top 300 listed companies on the S&P/ASX All Ordinaries 
Index to establish an AC and follow ASX CGC recommendations (Recommendation 4.1, 4.2, 
4.3 and 4.4). The next 200 companies on the Index are also required to establish an AC but 
not necessarily to follow ASX CGC recommendations (many still choose to do so). In this 
study, the independence of AC members is not examined as all the top 300 listed companies 
used in the sample will display the same level of independence characteristics. Instead, AC 
chair independence is tested, using a more demanding measure of independence than 
specified by the ASX. The chair of the AC plays an important role in shaping the agenda of 
the AC committee. The chair needs to have independence for the AC team to be seen to have 
credibility. 
 
To date, no study examined the chair of AC independence by comparing the AC chair’s 
common background data with the CEO and the CFO of the company (a new measure 
created for this study). A chair of the AC is deemed to be not independent if he or she shares 
a common background (same qualifications and same industry experience) with the CEO 
and/or the CFO of the company. It can be argued that with different qualifications and 
industry experience between the chair of the AC, CEO and CFO, the chair of the AC can be 
viewed as independent from the management because he or she would have a different 
mindset and arguments relating to particular financial reporting and auditing issues in the 
company and it is not dominated by one individual. 
 
AC chair independence (ACCHAIRIND) is measured as a scale. Scores are assigned to AC 
chair, CEO and CFO based on respective qualification and industry experience categories as 
shown in Table 7. The numbers assigned to categories in Table 7 are for purposes of 
determining the extent of matching/non-matching of the background of AC chair with the 
backgrounds of the CEO and CFO.    
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Table 7: Qualification, Industry and Category 
Qualification                   Category 
Accounting and Finance      1 
Engineering       2 
Law and Arts       3 
Health and Science      4 
Management and Marketing     5 
 
Industry             Category 
 
Mining and Energy      1    
Banking, Insurance, Finance and Law   2 
Service and Retail      3 
Manufacturing      4 
Health        5 
 
 
Because there can be multiple qualifications and industry experiences in the background of 
any individual, the numbering scheme needs to ensure uniqueness of multiple backgrounds. 
This is achieved by adding a 0 to the category number if a single background category applies 
to an individual, and combining the digits if a multiple background applies. For example, if 
an AC chair has an accounting qualification, a score of 10 would be given as 1 for accounting 
and finance qualification category and 0 for no second qualification. Whereas, if an AC chair 
has both accounting and engineering qualifications a score of 12 would be given as 1 for 
accounting qualification category and 2 for engineering qualification category. Scores for AC 
chair qualification, AC chair industry experience, CEO qualification, CEO industry 
experience, CFO qualification and CFO industry experience are each collected.  
 
Subsequently, a new single numbered score is assigned if AC chair matches or does not 
match one or more of the requirements: same qualifications to CEO and CFO and same 
industry experience to CEO and CFO. For instance, if an AC chair has a score of 10 for 
qualification and CEO has a score of 10 for qualification too (both an accounting and finance 
qualification), then a new score of 1 would be given. Also, if an AC chair has a score of 40 
for industry experience and CEO has a score of 40 for industry experience (both from 
manufacturing industry), then a new score of 1 would also be given and added to the total 
score (total AC chair independence score is now equals to 2). The same process is carried out 
by comparing the scores of AC chair qualification with the scores of CFO qualification and 
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comparing the scores of AC chair industry experience with the scores of CFO industry 
experience. In the end, the scores will be totalled up. Thus, the scale can range from 0 (i.e., 
chair of AC is very independent) to 4 (i.e., chair of AC is not independent). This shows that 
the higher score on the scale of 0 to 4, the more similar are the backgrounds. Hence, the 
higher the score, the less independent the chair of the AC. An overview of the total scores is 
shown in Table 8. 
 
Table 8: Overview of Total Scores 
AC Chair Independence 
 Qualification Industry experience 
CEO 1/0 1/0 
CFO 1/0 
 
1/0 
Total 4/0 is the maximum/minimum score for AC chair independence from 
both the CEO and CFO. 
 
 
AC Expertise 
To construct the expertise variables, biographical information of the AC members is collected 
from the annual reports and members are classified based on their qualifications.  Earlier 
papers measured expertise as a percentage of AC members with an accounting or finance 
qualification (Goodwin and Kent, 2006; Yatim et al., 2006; Singh and Newby, 2010) or as a 
dichotomous variable equal to “1” if at least one member of the AC has accounting or 
financial management experience (Abbott et al., 2003; Mangena and Pike, 2004; Rainsbury et 
al., 2009). On the other hand, Hoitash and Hoitash (2009) took a different approach in 
measuring AC expertise. The authors divided expertise into accounting financial expertise 
and supervisory financial expertise where each category of expertise is measured as a 
proportion of the AC size.  
 
ASX CGC (2007) states that the AC should include members, who are all financially literate, 
have relevant qualifications and have an understanding of the industry in which the entity 
operates. Following the ASX CGC’s recommendation, two measures of expertise are 
constructed in this study. Expertise of the AC is measured by two independent variables: 
accounting/financial expertise (ACEXP) and industry expertise (ACINDUS). Accounting 
experts include AC members who are or were certified public accountants, charted 
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accountants, CFOs, vice presidents of finance, financial controllers, certified management 
accountants, certified financial analysts, principal financial officers, auditors or chief 
accounting officers (Hoitash and Hoitash, 2009). ACEXP is a ratio of number of AC 
members with accounting or financial qualification to total number of AC members while 
ACINDUS is a ratio of number of AC members who has worked in the same industry as the 
company for a substantial number of years (at least 10 years) to total number of AC members. 
 
AC Meeting 
Recent papers have supported the importance of AC frequency of meetings (Beasley et al., 
2000 and Abbott et al. 2004). Given the various roles and responsibilities allocated to the AC, 
it needs to hold sufficient meetings to undertake its obligation effectively. The ASX CGC 
does not provide recommendations on the number of meetings that an AC should have each 
year. Following earlier studies (Abbott et al., 2003; Goodwin and Kent, 2006; Yatim et al., 
2006; Hoitash and Hoitash, 2009; Singh and Newby, 2010), AC frequency of meetings 
(ACMEET) in this study measures the number of AC meetings held during the financial year 
ending in 2010. 
 
AC Size 
Psaros (2009) argued that an AC needs to have sufficient members such that different and 
informed views can be canvassed, and also so that it is not dominated by one individual. 
However, an AC needs to be sufficiently small such that it is focused, and streamlined in 
decision making to accounting and auditing demands. ASX CGC (2007) Recommendation 
4.2 states that the AC should be structured so that it has at least three members. Three 
members is considered ideal by the ASX CGC as one member cannot possibly carry out the 
wide responsibilities of the AC and in an unforeseen circumstances that required a vote, there 
are enough numbers such that a majority decision can be made. In this study, AC size 
(ACSIZE) measures the number of members serving on the AC during the financial year 
ending in 2010 (Goodwin and Kent, 2006; Yatim et al., 2006; Hoitash and Hoitash, 2009; 
Singh and Newby, 2010). 
 
AC Charter 
AC formal charter shows the composition of the committee, its basic framework, structure, 
membership requirements and committee’s responsibilities. According to ASX CGC (2007) 
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Recommendations 4.3, the AC should have a formal charter. The ASX CGC’s 
Recommendations for an AC charter sets forward the minimum expectations of companies. 
To date, no study in Australia examines AC formal charter as one of the quality of AC’s 
governance characteristics. Hence, in this study the presence of an AC formal charter is 
measured as a categorical variable. AC formal charter (ACCHAR) is equal to the value of “1” 
if the AC has a charter and “0” otherwise. 
 
AC Fees 
Agency conflicts arise due to separation of ownership and control between the shareholders 
and the managers of the company. The managers working on behalf of the shareholders do 
not usually act in the best interest of the shareholders. An AC that consists of independent 
non-executive directors, without a day-to-day responsibility is in a good position to perform a 
monitoring function for the shareholders (Goddard and Masters, 2001). The ASX CGC 
(2007) states that ACs are responsible for reviewing the entity’s financial statements, 
ensuring the independence and competence of the external auditors and internal audit 
function and overseeing the entity’s internal controls.  
 
The wide roles and responsibilities of an AC will protect the interest of shareholders and thus, 
reduce the shareholders-managers agency conflicts. Agency costs arise due to the cost of 
hiring the AC to monitor the actions of the managers and directors of the company. In this 
study, AC fees (ACFEES) measures the total fees paid to the chair and AC members for the 
financial year ending in 2010.  
 
A summary of the definitions and measurements of the independent variables is presented in 
Table 9. 
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Table 9: Definitions and Measurements of the Independent Variables 
Independent 
Variables 
Acronym 
Definition Measurement References 
ACCHAIR 
IND 
Chair of AC 
independence 
Score is assigned if AC chair satisfies the 
requirements: same qualifications to CEO 
and CFO and same industry experience to 
CEO and CFO.  
 
Abbott et al. (2003) 
Rainsbury et al. (2003) 
Goodwin and Kent (2006) 
Yatim et al. (2006) 
Singh and Newby (2010) 
  
ACEXP AC 
accounting/ 
financial 
expertise  
 
(Number of AC members with accounting or 
financial qualifications) / Total AC 
members. 
 
Abbott et al. (2003) 
Mangena and Pike, (2004) 
Goodwin and Kent (2006) 
Yatim et al. (2006) 
Hoitash and Hoitash (2009) 
Rainsbury et al. (2009) 
 
ACINDUS AC industry 
expertise 
 
{Number of AC members who worked in 
the same industry for a substantial number 
of years (at least 10 years)}/ Total AC 
members. 
 
ACMEET AC 
frequency of 
meetings 
Number of AC meetings held during the 
financial year. 
Abbott et al. (2003) 
Rainsbury et al. (2003) 
Goodwin and Kent (2006) 
Yatim et al. (2006) 
Hoitash and Hoitash (2009) 
 
ACSIZE AC size  Number of members serving on the AC 
during the financial year. 
Goodwin and Kent (2006) 
Yatim et al. (2006) 
Hoitash and Hoitash, (2009) 
Singh and Newby (2010) 
 
ACCHAR AC formal 
charter 
Equal to the value of “1” if AC has a charter 
and “0” otherwise. 
 
Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) 
ACFEES AC fees Total fees paid to the chair and AC 
members. 
 
 
ACFEES 
RATIO 
AC fees ratio Ratio of total fees paid to the chair and AC 
members to total number of AC members. 
 
 
AUDFEES 
RATIO 
External 
audit fees 
ratio 
 
Ratio of total external audit fees to total 
assets. 
  
Hoitash and Hoitash (2009)  
Yatim et al. (2006) 
IAFBUD 
RATIO 
Internal audit 
function 
budget ratio 
Ratio of total internal audit budget to total 
assets. 
 
 
Carcello et al. (2005) 
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4.5.2.2 Dependent Variables 
There are seven dependent variables employed in this study. The definitions and measures for 
these dependent variables are set out below. 
 
Internal Audit Function Resourcing  
Model 1 uses regression model approach similar to Carcello et al. (2005) where the authors 
addressed the relationship between the internal audit function budget and the AC review of 
the internal audit budget. In Model 1 of this study, the dependent variable is IAFBUD. 
IAFBUD measures the total annual internal audit function budget multiply by full-time 
equivalent staff. The total internal audit function budget measure is collected from question 9 
in the questionnaire and the total annual internal audit function budget measure ranges from 
scale 1 to 7 (see Table 10). 
 
Table 10: Internal Audit Function Budget Measure 
Scale Total Annual Budget 
1 $20,000 and below 
2 $21,000 to $50,000 
3 $51,000 to $100,000 
4 $101,000 to $200,000 
5 $201,000 to $500,000 
6 $501,000 to $1,000,000 
7 $1,001,000 and above 
 
 
Model 2 examines the association between labour hours devoted to the internal audit function 
and the effectiveness of AC role (AC’s governance characteristics. Previous study, Abbott et 
al. (2010) investigated the association between the AC’s oversights of the internal audit 
function and the nature of internal audit function activities. The dependent variable for Model 
2 of this study is full-time equivalent staff working in the internal audit function. Full-time 
equivalent staff is a unit that indicates the workload of a full-time employee employed in the 
internal audit function in a way that makes workload comparable
 
across the companies 
collected in the sample of this study. 
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To obtain a measure of full-time equivalent staff, the numerator of the formula is a 
multiplication of two products: maximum weekly working hours multiply by working weeks 
per year. The standard maximum weekly working hours in Australia is 38 weeks and the 
average working weeks per year is 52 weeks. The denominator of the formula is total hours 
per employee that are devoted to internal audit services which are obtained from question 10 
in the questionnaire. Then, the whole fraction is multiply by the number of internal audit staff 
employed in the company which is obtained from question 8 in the questionnaire. A 
mathematical representation of full-time equivalent staff is: 
 
 
      Maximum weekly working hours x Working weeks per year           X    
  Total hours per employee that are devoted to internal audit services 
 
 
 
Internal Audit Function Independence  
The results of many studies (Schneider and Wilner, 1990; McHugh and Raghunandan, 1994; 
Goodwin and Yeo, 1998; Van Peursem, 2005; Christopher et al., 2009) posited that the 
independence of the internal audit function plays an important role in an organisation. Model 
3 and 4 of this study measures the association between the effectiveness of AC role (AC’s 
governance characteristics) and the internal audit function independence. The dependent 
variable for Model 3 is internal audit function independence (IAFIND) and the dependent 
variable for Model 4 is AC support for the internal audit function independence 
(ACSUP_IAFIND). Both dependent variables are factor scores from a principal component 
analysis (PCA). PCA are performed to reduce the number of items in question 21 in the 
questionnaire into components that account for most of variance in the internal audit function 
independence variables.   
 
External Audit Quality 
Similar to most literature (Abbott et al., 2003; Goodwin and Kent, 2006; Yatim et al., 2006; 
Hoitash and Hoitash, 2009), the dependent variable for the Model 5 in this study is external 
audit fees. External audit fees are measured by the total value of audit fees paid by the 
company to the external auditors. The total audit fees are collected from the annual reports 
Number of 
internal audit 
staff 
employed in 
the company 
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and are then transformed into natural log (LNAUDFEES). The natural log is used to control 
for the skewed nature of audit fees (Yatim et al., 2006).  
 
External Auditors Independence 
The dependent variable for Model 6 is the ratio of non-audit fees to total fees (Abbott et al., 
2003; Hoitash and Hoitash, 2009). The ratio of non-audit fees to total audit fees is 
transformed into natural log (LNNONAUDAFEES) too. Fees paid to external auditors 
consists of audit service fees as well as fees paid for other services such as taxation and 
management advice. While all fees potentially create economic bonds between the auditor 
and client, critics have alleged that the provision of non-audit services gives audit firms 
incentives to agree with accounting choices by management, thus reducing auditor 
independence and ultimately the quality of financial reporting (Coulton et al., 2007).  
 
Shareholders Return 
Lastly, Model 7 in this study tests the association between the audit-related agency 
monitoring costs (external audit fees, internal audit function budget and AC fees) and total 
shareholders return. The dependent variable for Model 7 is total shareholders return. Total 
shareholders return is calculate by subtracting share price at the end of the period with share 
price at the beginning of the period and adding dividend per share. The whole equation would 
then be divided by share price at the beginning of the period. A mathematical representation 
of total shareholders return is: 
 
(Share price at the end of the period - Share price at the beginning of the period + Dividend 
per share) 
Share price at the beginning of the period 
 
 
A summary of the definitions and measurements of the dependent variables is presented in 
Table 11. 
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Table 11: Definitions and Measurements of the Dependent Variables 
Independent 
Variables 
Acronym 
Definition Measurement References 
IAFBUD Internal audit 
function budget 
Total annual internal audit budget measure x 
full-time equivalent staff. 
 
Carcello et al. 
(2005) 
IAHOUR  
 
Internal audit 
function hours  
Full-time equivalent staff working in the 
internal audit function. 
 
Abbott et al. 
(2003)  
IAFIND Internal audit 
function 
independence 
Internal audit function independence is factor 
score from PCA. 
Ahmad and 
Taylor (2009) 
 
ACSUP_IAFIND 
 
AC support for internal audit function 
independence is factor score from PCA. 
 
LNAUDFEES 
 
Total value of 
audit fees paid by 
the firm to the 
external auditors  
 
Total audit fees are collected from the company 
annual reports and are then transformed into 
natural log. 
Hoitash and 
Hoitash 
(2009)  
Yatim et al. 
(2006) 
 
LNNON 
AUDFEES  
 
Total value of non-
audit fees paid by 
the firm to the 
external auditors 
 
Total fees paid for non-audit services divided 
by the total fees paid to the external auditors 
and are then transformed into natural log. 
 
Hoitash and 
Hoitash 
(2009)  
 
TSR Total shareholders 
return 
(Share price at the end of the period - Share 
price at the beginning of the period + Dividend 
per share) / Share price at the beginning of the 
period. 
 
Habib and 
Azim (2008) 
 
 
4.5.2.3 Control Variables  
Additional variables are included in the regression models to control for other factors that are 
expected to potentially affect the dependent variables. The definitions and measures for these 
control variables are set out below. 
 
Control Variables for Model 1 and Model 2 
Both Model 1 and Model 2 control for the same effects of other variables. These models 
control for firm size: natural log of total assets (LNTA) and ratio of total long-term debt to 
total assets (LEVERAGE). A positive association between the control variables and the 
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dependent variables would be expected as larger and more leveraged firms are likely to 
increase the internal audit function labour hours and budget to ensure greater efficiency of the 
internal control system (Carcello et al., 2005 and Abbott et al., 2010). Since firm complexity 
has the potential to increase the need for better monitoring and internal controls, this study 
expects the control variables such as ratio of inventory to total assets (INVENRATIO), ratio 
of receivables to total assets (RECRATIO), ratio of number of foreign subsidiaries to total 
number of subsidiaries (FORSUB) and square root of total number of subsidiaries (SUB) to 
be positively related to the dependent variables.  
 
Model 1 and 2 also control for growth (Carcello et al., 2005 and Abbott et al., 2010). 
According to Beasley (1996), firms experiencing rapid growth rates may experience 
deterioration in controls, driving the AC to demand more controls-oriented work. Thus, there 
will be a positive relationship between the three-year rate of sales growth (GROWTH) and 
the dependent variables. Furthermore, similar to Carcello et al. (2005), this study also expects 
a positive sign for operating cash flow (OPCASH) and ratio of current assets to current 
liabilities (CURATIO). 
 
Control Variables for Model 3 and Model 4 
Model 3 and 4 controls for firm size: natural log of total assets (LNTA). A positive 
association between firm size and the dependent variables would be expected as larger firm 
will ensure better internal audit function independence. The regression models also control 
for the quality of the external auditor by indicating whether the firm is audited by Big 4 
auditors (BIG4), expecting a positive sign. 
 
Control Variables for Model 5 
Furthermore, Model 5 controls for the outcome of other variables that can affect the external 
audit fees. Studies have found external audit fees to be related to firm size, firm complexity, 
audit risk of the client firm, profitability, the use of Big 4 audit firm and industry (Simunic, 
1980; Francis, 1984; Craswell and Francis, 1999; Abbott et al., 2003; Goodwin and Kent, 
2006; Hoitash and Hoitash, 2009; Singh and Newby, 2010). Similar to Goodwin and Kent 
(2006) and Singh and Newby (2010), the firm size control variable is measured by the natural 
log of the firm’s total assets (LNTA) and a positive sign is expected. The firm complexity 
control variable is measured by the square root of the total number of subsidiaries (SUB) and 
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the ratio of foreign subsidiaries to total number of subsidiaries (FORSUB) (Low et al., 1990; 
Simon, 1995). Firm complexity variables will be positively related to audit fees. 
 
In addition, the risk level of the company is measured by whether the firm records a loss in 
any of the three years prior to 2010 (LOSS) and by the ratio of earnings before interest and 
tax to total assets (ROA) (Johnson et al., 1995). Further measures of risk also comprise of the 
ratio of receivables to total assets (RECRATIO), the ratio of non-current liabilities to total 
assets (DEBTRATIO) and the ratio of inventory to total assets (INVENRATIO) (Sumunic, 
1980; Taylor, 1997). This study expects that ROA will be negatively related to audit fees and 
that there will be a positive association between the rest of the risk variables and audit fees. 
The regression model also controls for the quality of the external auditor by indicating 
whether the firm is audited by Big 4 auditors (BIG4), expecting a positive sign (Chan et al., 
1993).  
 
Moreover, this study includes control variables: whether the firm is in the mining sector 
(MINING), board-related factors involving board independence (BOARDINDEP) and 
number of board meetings (BOARDMEET). According to Carcello et al. (2002) and Abbott 
et al. (2003), board independence and board meetings are positively associated with audit 
fees. The reasoning is that outside directors on the board who act diligently will demand a 
higher quality of audit and thus leads to higher audit fees. 
 
Control Variables for Model 6 
The same control variables in Model 5 are also used in Model 6, the non-audit fees model. 
This study expects that firm size (LNTA) and complexity variables (SUB and FORSUB) are 
positively related to non-audit fees because larger and more complex firms are more likely to 
purchase non-audit services (Palmrose, 1986). Furthermore, risk variables such as LOSS, 
RECRATIO, DEBTRATIO and INVENRATIO (except for ROA) will be positively related 
with non-audit fees. Hoitash and Hoitash (2009) posited that risk variables reflect the 
financial state of the firm and its ability to invest in a good internal control system.  
 
Similar to Model 5, Model 6 also controls for Big 4 auditors (BIG4). Since Big4 auditors 
have the potential to provide more non-audit services, this study expects that BIG4 variable 
will be positively associated to non-audit fees. In addition, control variables such as board 
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independence (BOARDINDEP) and number of board meetings (BOARDMEET) will be 
negatively associated to non-audit fees as board of directors whom are independent and 
diligent will demand less non-audit services to ensure the external auditors’ independence.  
 
Control Variables for Model 7 
No control variables are employed in Model 7 for this study. 
 
A summary of the definitions and measurements of the control variables are presented in 
Table 12. 
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Table 12: Definitions and Measurements of the Control Variables 
Control 
Variables 
Acronym 
Definition Measurement References 
BIG4 Big 4 audit firm Equal to the value of “1” if a Big 4 auditor is 
used and “0” when a smaller audit firm is 
used. 
 
Simunic (1980) 
 
Francis (1984) 
 
Palmrose (1986) 
Low et al. 
(1990)  
 
Chan et al. 
(1993) 
 
Johnson et al. 
(1995) 
 
Simon (1995) 
 
Beasley (1996) 
 
Taylor (1997) 
 
Francis (1999) 
 
Carcello et al. 
(2002) 
 
Abbott et al. 
(2003) 
 
Carcello et al. 
(2005) 
 
Goodwin and 
Kent (2006) 
 
Hoitash and 
Hoitash (2009) 
 
Singh and 
Newby (2010) 
 
Abbott et al. 
(2010) 
LNTA Total assets Natural log of total assets (in millions). 
 
LEVERAGE Leverage Ratio of total long-term debt to total assets. 
 
RECRATIO Receivables ratio Ratio of receivables to total assets. 
 
INVENRATIO Inventory ratio 
 
Ratio of inventory to total assets. 
 
CURATIO Current ratio 
 
Ratio of current assets to current liabilities. 
 
OPCASH Operating cash 
flow 
 
Ratio of operating cash flow to total assets. 
 
FORSUB Foreign 
subsidiaries 
 
Ratio of number of foreign subsidiaries to 
total number of subsidiaries. 
SUB Subsidiaries  
 
Square root of total number of subsidiaries. 
LNAUDFEES External audit fees 
 
Natural log of total audit fees paid to 
external auditor. 
 
GROWTH Growth Three-year rate of sales growth. 
 
BODIND Board of directors 
independence 
 
Ratio of non-executive directors on the board 
to total number board of directors. 
BODMEET Board of directors 
meetings 
 
Number of board meetings held during the 
year. 
MINING Mining  Equal to the value of “1” when the company 
is in the mining industry, “0” otherwise. 
 
LOSS Loss 
 
Equal to the value of “1” if the company has 
reported a loss in any of the three years prior 
to, “0” otherwise. 
 
ROA Return on assets 
 
Ratio of earnings before interest and tax to 
total assets. 
 
DEBTRATIO Debt ratio Ratio of non-current liabilities to total assets. 
 
113 
 
4.6 Model Specification 
4.6.1 Introduction 
There are seven ordinary least squares (OLS) multiple regression models used to test the 
hypotheses of this study. Regression analysis helps researchers to understand how the typical 
value of the dependent variable changes when any one of the independent variables is varied, 
while the other independent variables are held fixed. OLS regression models are used in this 
study to better understand which among independent variables (AC’s governance 
characteristics) are related to the dependent variables (internal audit function and external 
audit).  
 
Also, OLS regression models are employed to explore the forms of these relationships 
whether ACs in Australia are effective in fulfilling their roles in overseeing the quality of the 
internal audit function, ensuring the independence of the internal audit function, facilitating 
the quality of the external audit and ensuring the independence of the external auditors. 
Agency costs arise due to the cost of hiring the AC, as well as internal and external auditors 
to monitor the actions of the management in the company. Such agency costs are also tested 
using an OLS regression model. 
 
4.6.2 AC Overseeing the Quality of the Internal Audit Function 
Models 1 and 2 examine the effectiveness of AC roles in overseeing the quality of the 
internal audit function. The first model examines the association between the effectiveness of 
AC role, based on AC’s governance characteristics (i.e., independence, financial and industry 
expertise, size, frequency of meetings and charter) and financial resources (internal audit 
function budget) devoted to the internal audit function. To test hypothesis one (a), this study 
employs an OLS regression model approach similar to Carcello et al. (2005), Goodwin and 
Kent (2006) and Abbott et al. (2010) that used an agency-based framework to explain the 
demand for internal audit services. The regression framework is summarized as follows: 
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MODEL 1 
IAFBUD =  b0 + b1ACCHAIRIND + b2ACEXP + b3ACINDUS + b4ACMEET + 
b5ACSIZE + b6ACCHAR + b7BIG4 + b8LNTA + b9LEVERAGE + 
b10RECRATIO + b11INVENRATIO + b12CURATIO + b13OPCASH + 
b14FORSUB + b15SUB + b16LNAUDFEES + b17GROWTH + ε 
 
Note: Refer to Table 9, 11 & 12 for definitions and measurements of the variables in Model 1. 
 
 
The second model examines the association between the effectiveness of AC role and total 
hours devoted to the internal audit function. The result of running Model 2 will test 
hypothesis one (b). Similar to Abbott et al. (2010) the regression equation is summarized as 
follows: 
 
MODEL 2 
IAHOUR =  b0 + b1ACCHAIRIND + b2ACEXP + b3ACINDUS + b4ACMEET + 
b5ACSIZE + b6ACCHAR + b7BIG4 + b8LNTA + b9LEVERAGE + 
b10RECRATIO + b11INVENRATIO + b12CURATIO + b13OPCASH + 
b14FORSUB + b15SUB + b16LNAUDFEES + b17GROWTH + ε 
 
Note: Refer to Table 9, 11 & 12 for definitions and measurements of the variables in Model 2. 
 
4.6.3 AC Ensuring the Independence of the Internal Audit Function  
Models 3 and 4 examine the association between the effectiveness of AC role in ensuring the 
independence of the internal audit function. The results of running both the models are to test 
hypothesis two (a) and hypothesis two (b) of this study. AC is an important vehicle in 
increasing the status and the independence of the internal audit function. Previous literature 
(McHugh and Raghunandan, 1994; Goodwin and Yeo, 2001; Christopher et al., 2009) argued 
that the relationship between the internal audit function and the AC could affect the internal 
auditor’s independence. The regression equations are summarized as follows: 
 
MODEL 3  
IAFIND =  b0 + b1ACCHAIRIND + b2ACEXP + b3ACINDUS + b4ACMEET + b5ACSIZE 
+ b6ACCHAR + b7BIG4 + b8LNTA + ε 
 
MODEL 4 
 
ACSUP_IAFIND =  b0 + b1ACCHAIRIND + b2ACEXP + b3ACINDUS + b4ACMEET + 
b5ACSIZE + b6ACCHAR + b7BIG4 + b8LNTA + ε 
 
Note:  Refer to Table 9, 11 & 12 for definitions and measurements of the variables in Model 3 and Model 4. 
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4.6.4 AC Facilitating the Quality of the External Audit  
Model 5 examines the relationship between the effectiveness of AC role and the quality of 
external auditors using audit fees. To test hypothesis three, this study employed and extended 
the traditional audit fee model (Simunic, 1980; Francis, 1984; Francis and Simon, 1987; 
Craswell and Francis, 1999). The regression equation is summarized as follows: 
 
MODEL 5 
LNAUDFEES =  b0 + b1ACCHAIRIND + b2ACEXP + b3ACINDUS + b4ACMEET + 
b5ACSIZE + b6ACCHAR + b7BODIND + b8BODMEET + b9BIG4 + 
b10MINING + b11LOSS + b12ROA + b13INVENRATIO + 
b14RECRATIO + b15DEBTRATIO + b16FORSUB + b17SUB + b18LNTA 
+ ε 
 
Note: Refer to Table 9, 11 & 12 for definitions and measurements of the variables in Model 5. 
 
4.6.5 AC Ensuring the Independence of the External Auditors 
Model 6 examines the association between the effectiveness of AC role and the independence 
of the external auditors. To test hypothesis four, whether strong ACs is associated with a 
lower ratio of non-audit fees to total audit fees (a proxy for the independence of the external 
auditors), this study extends the non-audit fees model. Previous studies (DeAngelo, 1981; 
Prakash and Venable, 1993; Firth, 1997) showed that non-audit fees can threaten the 
independence of external auditors.  Model 6 is summarized as follows: 
 
MODEL 6 
LNNONAUD 
FEES =  b0 + b1ACCHAIRIND + b2ACEXP + b3ACINDUS + b4ACMEET + 
b5ACSIZE + b6ACCHAR + b7BODIND + b8BODMEET + b9BIG4 + 
b10MINING + b11LOSS + b12ROA + b13INVENRATIO + 
b14RECRATIO + b15DEBTRATIO + b16FORSUB + b17SUB + b18LNTA 
+ ε 
 
Note: Refer to Table 9, 11 & 12 for definitions and measurements of the variables in Model 6. 
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4.6.6 Audit-related Agency Monitoring Costs and Total Shareholders Return 
Model 7 tests the association between the audit-related agency monitoring costs (external 
audit fees, internal audit function budget and AC fees) and total shareholders return. The 
result of running this model is to test hypothesis five. Model 7 is summarized as follows: 
 
MODEL 7 
TSR =  b0 + b1ACFEESRATIO + b2AUDFEESRATIO + b3IAFBUDRATIO + ε 
 
Note: Refer to Table 9, 11 & 12 for definitions and measurements of the variables in Model 7. 
 
4.7 Conceptual Model 
These model specifications are framed within the development of a conceptual model. The 
hypothesised relationships between the variables in this study are shown by the arrows 
connecting the boxes in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Conceptual Model 
H1 & H2 
H3 & H4 
H5 
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CHAPTER 5. DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
5.1 Introduction 
The main purpose of this chapter is to present the results of tests of the five hypotheses as set 
out in Chapter 3. Before presenting these hypotheses test results, the chapter begins by giving 
the profile, description and validation of variables for the questionnaire-data based sample 
(referred to as sample 1) and secondary-data based sample (referred to as sample 2), 
respectively. It further gives an explanation and justification of the methods of analysis that 
will be used on the data from samples 1 and 2, involving: (1) tests for small sample size 
relating to sample 1; (2) normality tests on data that will be used in parametric analysis; (3) 
explanation of the choice of model specifications; and (4) justification of the choice of 
correlation analysis and multiple regression analysis. 
 
For sample 1 (questionnaire-data based sample), it is optional for the respondents to provide a 
company name but all 36 respondents did so. Hence, the primary data from the 36 
respondents in sample 1 could be linked to the secondary data of their 36 corresponding 
companies drawn from the 255 companies in sample 2 (secondary-data based sample). 
Moreover, the questionnaire contains questions that go beyond those specifically required for 
use in testing the hypotheses of this study. Some data from sample 1 relating to internal audit 
function activities is used to measure variables contained in models that test hypotheses one 
and two, while other data from sample 1 is used in comparative case study analysis which is 
discussed in detail the next chapter (Chapter 6).  
 
The secondary data from sample 2, on the other hand, is used to measure variables concerned 
with aspects of external audit, corporate governance characteristics and company financial 
results and structures. These variables arising from sample 2’s data are used in models related 
to all the five hypotheses of this study.  
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5.2 Sample 1 (Questionnaire-data Based Sample): Profile, Description and 
Validation of Variables 
5.2.1 Profile of the Questionnaire Respondents and their Companies 
From Table 13, it can be seen that of the total of 36 respondents, approximately half (50%) 
are between 45 to 54 years of age, and 78% are male. Also the experience of the respondents 
in the internal audit field is reasonably high with 50% having more than 10 years experience 
in the field. 89% of the respondents’ current job position is Chief Internal Auditor (CIA) or 
an equivalent title, while the remaining 11% of the respondents hold the CFO position. 
 
Table 13 also shows the profile of the companies in which the respondents work. 
Approximately 44% of the companies surveyed are in the ASX top 101- 200 (based on 
market capitalisation), 42% of the companies are in the ASX top 21-100 while the rest of the 
companies, 14% are in the ASX top 20. The companies are well spread across the GICS 
industry sectors in the ASX with industries most represented being materials and financials 
(both at 22%) while health care and utilities are under-represented (both at 3%). No 
companies are represented in information technology and telecommunications services. 
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Table 13: Profile of the Respondents and Companies (n= 36) 
 
No. Questionnaire items Frequency 
No % 
1 Your age group:    
 Below 35                                                                                5 14 
 35 to 44 8 22 
 45 to 54 18 50 
 55 to 64  5 14 
 65 or older 
 
0 0 
2 Gender:    
 Male 28 78 
 Female 
 
8 22 
3 How long have you worked in the internal audit field over your 
career?  
  
 Less than 5 8 22 
 Between 5-10 10 28 
 Between 11-15 6 17 
 Between 16-20 7 19 
 More than 20 
 
5 14 
4 What is your current job position?    
 Chief Internal Auditor or other similar titles 32 89 
 CFO 
 
4 11 
6 Size of your company based on market capitalization:     
 ASX top 20 5 14 
 ASX 21- 100 15 42 
 ASX 101- 200 16 44 
 ASX 301- 500 0 0 
 ASX below 500 
 
0 0 
7 Industry of your company:    
 Consumer Discretionary 6 17 
 Consumer Staples 5 14 
 Energy 2 5 
 Financials 8 22 
 Health Care 1 3 
 Industrials 5 14 
 Information Technology 0 0 
 Materials 8 22 
 Telecommunication Services 0 0 
 Utilities 1 3 
 Others 
 
0 0 
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5.2.2 Profile of ACs  
Respondents are asked about the working relationship between the internal audit function and 
the AC. Their responses are summarised in Table 14. The number of meetings and the length 
of meetings per year between the respondents (CIA) and the AC are presented in Panel A of 
Table 14. A total of 70% of CIAs attended 4 to 5 meetings a year with the AC and the length 
of the meetings is between 81 to 120 minutes for 36% of the respondents. As an indicator of 
the diligence of the AC, these results compare favourably with previous studies that found 
CIAs have about 4 meetings per year with the AC (Raghunandan et al., 1998; Scarbrough et 
al., 1998; Goodwin and Yeo, 2001). Raghunandan et al. (2001) reported on average, 3.3 
meetings per year with the CIAs and 4.53 times per year for Goodwin (2003). Raghunandan 
et al. (2001) and Goodwin (2003) also reported on the length of the meetings, which is on 
average 60 and 99 minutes respectively.  
 
In terms of privacy of the meetings with the AC, 36% of the CIAs in this study have some 
meetings in a year that have private time, while 8% of the respondents have all meetings that 
are totally private and 22% of the respondents have no private meetings at all with the CIA. 
So there is no common practice concerning the confidentiality that the CIA can have from 
other executives when meeting with the AC. The 22% of CIAs who indicated no private 
meetings with the AC could prospectively have their independence compromised.  
 
Further results in Table 14, Panel A, show 58% of ACs receive 3 to 5 routine internal audit 
reports per year, and 84% of ACs receive 1 to 5 special investigation reports from the internal 
audit function. Moreover, ACs review or assess the plans of the internal audit function in 
terms of scheduling of work projects, on average, 3.64 times a year (shown in Panel B, Table 
14).  In terms of coordination between the internal audit function and the external auditors, 
the AC reviews this on average 3.25 times a year. These results compare favourably with 
earlier studies by Raghunandan et al. (1998) and Goodwin and Yeo (2001) where both 
studies found that almost 70% of ACs review all plans, budgets and results relating to 
financial reporting, internal controls and compliance. Likewise, Scarbrough et al. (1998) 
found that 69% of ACs review the proposed internal audit program. 
 
On the issue of financial expertise, CIAs are requested to rate the overall expertise of their 
AC members in regards to accounting, auditing and internal control matters. Results in Panel 
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A of Table 14 show that 64% of respondents perceived their AC to have excellent expertise, 
with a further 25% reporting that their AC members have good expertise. Only one 
respondent rated his/her AC expertise as poor. 
 
Generally, results in Table 14 suggest that there is a considerable level of communication and 
interaction between the CIA and the AC in large listed companies through formal meetings, 
presentations of reports by the CIA and reviews of the internal audit function’s plans, budgets 
and results by the AC. This considerable communication and interaction between the CIA 
and the AC is in line with expectations of recommended practice issued by both the ASX and 
the IIA. The ASX’s CGC recommends that a key role of the AC is overseeing and monitoring 
the internal audit function, while the IIA (2002a, 2002b, 2003a, 2003b) recommends that 
communication between the personnel responsible for the internal audit function and the AC 
is important for the maintenance of good corporate governance.  
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Table 14: AC and the Internal Audit Function (n= 36) 
PANEL A 
No. Questionnaire items Frequency 
No % 
16 How many times a year does you/ your internal audit function meet 
with the AC and how long is the length of the meeting? (n= 36) 
  
 Number of meetings a year: 
Less than 1 
 
1 
 
3 
 Between 2- 3 3 8 
 Between 4- 5 25 70 
 Between 6- 7 4 11 
 More than 7 
 
3 8 
 Length of the meetings:   
 Less than 40 minutes 6 17 
 Between 40- 80 minutes 8 22 
 Between 81- 120 minutes 13 36 
 Between 121- 160 minutes 2 6 
 More than 160 minutes 
 
7 19 
17 In terms of privacy of your meetings with the AC (chair, individual 
members or committee): (n= 36) 
  
 All meetings are totally private 3 8 
 All meetings are partially private 12 34 
 Some meetings in a year have private time 13 36 
 No private meetings 
 
8 22 
18 How do you rate the overall expertise of the AC members in regards 
to accounting, auditing and internal control matters? (n=36) 
  
 Poor 1 3 
 Moderate 3 8 
 Good  9 25 
 Excellent 
 
23 64 
20 How often per year does the AC receive reports from your internal 
audit function related to: (n= 36) 
  
 Routine internal audit activities:   
 None per year 0 0 
 1-2 per year 6 17 
 3-5 per year 21 58 
 6 or more per year 
 
9 25 
 Special Investigations:   
 None per year 3 8 
 1-2 per year 15 42 
 3-5 per year 15 42 
 6 or more per year 
 
3 8 
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PANEL B 
No. Questionnaire items Mean Median 25
th 
% 
75
th 
% 
Std. 
Dev. 
19 Likert-Scale (1= Never, 2= Seldom, 3= 
Sometimes, 4= Often, 5= Almost Always) 
     
 How often does the AC review or assess 
the plans of the internal audit function in 
terms of its:  
 
     
 Scheduling of work projects 3.64 4.00 3.00 4.00 1.18 
 Co-ordinating with the external auditors 
 
3.25 3.00 2.00 3.00 1.25 
 
 
5.2.3 Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Model 1 and Model 2  
The descriptive statistics for variables in Model 1 and Model 2 are presented in Tables 15 and 
16. Table 15 gives results relating to the internal audit function’s resources and activities 
(from questions 8 to 10 of the questionnaire).  
 
In Panel A, it shows 58% of the respondents’ internal audit function has human resources of 
less than 5 professional internal audit staff employed and only 8% have more than 20 
professional internal audit staff employed. Panel A further shows the extent of money 
resources in the form of the total annual internal audit function budget. More than half, 54% 
of the respondents’ internal audit function has a total annual budget ranging from $201,000 to 
$1,000,000, with a further 31% reporting a total annual budget, above $1,001,000. Turning to 
the work activity level of the internal audit function, Panel B in Table 15 indicates the total 
hours devoted to internal audit services. On average, 1,489 hours per annum (or 28 hours per 
week) per person are devoted to internal audit services by professional staff during the 2010 
financial year. This suggests not all professional staff is employed in the internal audit 
function on a full-time basis.  
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Table 15: Internal Audit Function Activities (n= 36) 
PANEL A 
No. Questionnaire items Frequency 
No % 
8 How many professional internal audit staff is employed in your 
company?  
  
 Less than 5 21 58 
 Between 5- 10 9 25 
 Between 11- 15 2 6 
 Between 16- 20 1 3 
 More than 20 
 
3 8 
9 What is the total annual internal audit budget?    
 $20,000 and below 1 3 
 $21,000 to $50,000 1 3 
 $51,000 to $100,000 1 3 
 $101,000 to $200,000 2 6 
 $201,000 to $500,000 10 27 
 $501,000 to $1,000,000 
$1,001,000 and above 
 
10 
11 
27 
31 
PANEL B 
No. Questionnaire items Mean Median 25
th 
% 75
th 
% Std. 
Dev. 
10 How many total hours are 
devoted to internal audit 
services by professional staff 
(per person) during your 
company’s most recent 
financial year?  
 
 
1,488.89 
 
1,550.00 
 
1,060.00 
 
1975.00 
 
661.13 
 
Descriptive statistics for the variables in Table 16 are drawn from sample 2’s (secondary-data 
based sample) published data of the 36 respondents’ companies. Panel A of Table 16 reports 
statistics for continuous variables while Panel B reports statistics for dichotomous variables.  
 
The AC’s governance characteristics (independent variables) are the variables of interest in 
this study. The size of ACs (ACSIZE) ranges from 2 to 9 members, with a mean of 3.53 
members. On average 4.47 AC frequency of meetings (ACMEET) are held during the 
financial year ending in 2010 with a minimum of 0 meeting and a maximum of 9 meetings. 
The mean percentage of AC members with accounting or financial qualifications to total 
members (ACEXP) is 69%, ranging from 25% to 100%. Furthermore, the mean percentage of 
total AC members that have worked in the same industry for at least 10 years (ACINDUS) is 
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about 50%. The mean AC chair independence (ACCHAIRIND) is 65% of cases. The 
inference from these results is that AC characteristics of size and frequency of meetings, 
expertise and independence are quite variable across the 36 companies in sample 1. 
 
In terms of control variables, Table 16 reveals considerable diversity in the sample. The total 
audit fees paid to the external auditors (AUDFEES) range from a minimum of $0.13 million 
to a maximum of $16.38 million, with a mean of $2.74 million; the number of subsidiaries 
(SUB) in this study ranges from 1.73 to 22.72 with a mean of 8.08 subsidiaries; the 
percentage of foreign subsidiaries to total subsidiaries (FORSUB) ranges from 0% to 81%, 
with a mean of 36%; the levels for inventory (INVENRATIO) and receivable ratios 
(RECRATIO) are at both ends of the liquidity scale, with means of 7% and 19% respectively; 
leverage (LEVERAGE) and current (CURATIO) ratios display means of 23% and 166% 
correspondingly; operating cash flows ratio (OPCASH) shows a minimum of -13% and a 
maximum of 139%; growth rate (GROWTH) shows a minimum of -33% and a maximum of 
182%. 
 
In Model 1 and Model 2, the dependent variables are measures of the internal audit function’s 
relative extent of monetary resourcing (IAFBUD) and human resourcing (IAFHOUR). They 
reflect the importance accorded to the internal audit function, which should largely be 
championed by the AC as the company’s oversight body for the internal audit function.  
Table 16, Panel A, shows that the average total annual internal audit budget per full-time 
equivalent internal audit staff member (IAFBUD) is $45.56, ranging from a minimum of $0 
to a maximum of $532. The number of full-time equivalent staff working in the internal audit 
function (IAHOUR) is between 0 and 76 with an average staff size of 6.83.  
 
Additional corporate governance characteristics are shown in Panel B of Table 16. Results 
indicate that almost all companies in sample 1 have a formal charter for their AC. Also 
almost all companies engage a Big 4 auditor firm as their external auditors. 
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Table 16: Descriptive Statistics for Model 1 and Model 2 (n=36) 
PANEL A: Continuous Variables  
Variable Name Mean Median Minimum Maximum Standard 
Deviation 
ACCHAIRIND  0.65 0.75 0.25 1.00 0.24 
ACEXP 0.69 0.67 0.25 1.00 0.21 
ACINDUS 0.50 0.33 0.00 1.00 0.28 
ACMEET 4.47 4.00 0.00 9.00 1.86 
ACSIZE 3.53 3.00 2.00 9.00 1.16 
LEVERAGE 0.23 0.90 0.00 3.71 0.61 
RECRATIO 0.19 0.72 0.00 3.33 0.55 
INVENRATIO 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.24 0.08 
CURATIO 1.66 1.28 0.01 10.27 1.71 
OPCASH 0.13 0.08 -0.13 1.39 0.23 
FORSUB 0.36 0.37 0.00 0.81 0.29 
SUB 8.08 7.28 1.73 22.72 4.90 
GROWTH 0.16 0.03 -0.33 1.82 0.41 
IAFBUD 45.56 13.00 0.00 532.00 96.20 
IAHOUR 6.83 2.00 0.00 76.00 13.67 
ASSET ($) 24,800M 3,090M 163.4M 0.60B 0.10B 
AUDFEES ($) 2.74M 1.14M 0.13M 16.38M 4.11M 
 
PANEL B: Dichotomous Variables  
Variable Name Mean Median Number of Firms 
Coded “0” 
Number of Firms 
Coded “1” 
ACCHAR 0.94 1.00 2 34 
BIG4 0.97 1.00 1 35 
 
Note: ACCHAIRIND is ratio of total scores assigned to each of the two criteria for AC chair independence; 
ACEXP is ratio of number of AC members with accounting or financial qualifications to total AC members;  
ACINDUS is ratio of number of AC members worked in the same industry for a substantial number of years (at 
least 10 years) to total AC members; ACMEET is number of AC meetings held during the financial year; 
ACSIZE is number of members serving on the AC during the financial year; LEVERAGE is ratio of total long-
term debt to total assets; RECRATIO is ratio of receivables to total assets; INVENRATIO is ratio of inventory 
to total assets; CURATIO is ratio of current assets to current liabilities; OPCASH is ratio of operating cash flow 
to total assets; FORSUB is ratio of number of foreign subsidiaries to total number of subsidiaries; SUB is square 
root of total number of subsidiaries; GROWTH is three-year rate of sales growth; IAFBUD is total annual 
internal audit budget measure * full-time equivalent staff; IAHOUR is full-time equivalent staff working in the 
internal audit function; ASSET is total assets; AUDFEES is total of audit fees; ACCHAR is equal to the value 
of “1” if the AC has a charter and “0” otherwise; BIG4 is equal to the value of “1” if a Big 4 auditor is used and 
“0” when a smaller audit firm is used. 
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5.2.4 Validity and Reliability Tests on Variables in Model 3 and Model 4  
To test the construct validity of the concept of independence of the internal audit function, 
confirmatory factor analysis based on the principal components approach (PCA) is performed. 
PCA is used to reduce the 6 items or sub-questions of internal audit function independence 
into components that account for most of the variance. PCA seeks a linear combination of 
variables such that the maximum variance is extracted from the variables. It then removes 
this variance and seeks a second linear combination which explains the maximum proportion 
of the remaining variance, and so on (Habib and Azim, 2008). An orthogonal rotation 
(varimax) is used because this allows the 6 items to be more highly loaded onto each factor 
resulting in more interpretable clusters of factors.  
 
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure verifies the sampling adequacy for the analysis. 
For the sample 1 data, this test gives KMO= 0.677 (acceptable according to Field, 2009), and 
all KMO values for individual items are more than 0.529, which is above the acceptable limit 
of 0.5 (Field, 2009). Further, Bartlett’s test of sphericity x2(36)= 97.25 is significant, 
indicating that the correlations between components are (overall) significantly different from 
zero. Then an initial analysis is run to obtain eigenvalues for each component in the data.  
 
As shown in Table 17, two components have eigenvalues over Kaiser’s criterion of 1 and in 
combination explained 72.17% of the variance. Based on the scree plot in Figure 2, the point 
of inflexion occurs at the second data point (component); therefore only one component is 
extracted. However, the scree plot does not provide a particularly reliable criterion for faction 
selection. Given the small sample size, Kaiser’s criterion on two components is the number of 
components retained in the final analysis. 
 
Table 17 shows the factor loadings after rotation. Loadings less than 0.70 are excluded; the 
analysis yields a two-factor solution. Stevens (2002) recommends that for a small sample size 
a loading of 0.70 can be considered significant. The items that cluster on the same 
components suggest that component 1 represents internal audit function independence 
(IAFIND) and component 2 represents AC support for internal audit function independence 
(ACSUP_IAFIND). The factor scores from these two components will be used in the 
subsequent regression models (Model 3 and Model 4) when examining the association 
between the effectiveness of AC role and internal audit function independence. 
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Figure 2: Scree Plot 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Point of Inflexion 
129 
 
Table 17: Summary of Confirmatory Factor Analysis Results for Internal Audit 
Function Independence (n= 36) 
 
 
 
Item 
Rotated Factor Loadings 
Internal audit 
function 
independence  
(IAFIND) 
AC support for 
internal audit 
function 
independence 
(ACSUP_IAFIND) 
 
Your internal audit function puts a great 
deal of effort beyond that normally expected 
in order to ensure dedication to 
independence. 
 
 
0.706 
 
0.203 
Your internal audit function would resist 
almost any type of pressure and threat in 
order to maintain independence. 
 
0.545 0.605 
When your internal audit function is 
required to work under both an ‘audit’ role 
and ‘advisory service’ role by the 
management this will never compromise 
independence in the audit role. 
 
0.892 0.131 
The existing relationship between the AC 
(or its chair) and the internal auditor 
provides a strong backing for the 
maintenance of your internal audit 
function’s independence. 
 
0.477 0.713 
The independence of your internal audit 
function is strongly upheld because of AC 
members have strong collective 
independence. 
 
0.155 0.907 
The AC would be prepared to take action to 
maintain the independence of your internal 
audit function if it is threatened by 
management. 
 
0.127 0.846 
Eigenvalues 
 
1.048 3.382 
Percentage of total variance 
 
15.795 56.371 
Number of test measures 
 
2 3 
Note:  Factor loadings over 0.70 appear in bold and italic 
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Since this study has a small sample size (n= 36), caution needs to be taken when a factor 
analysis is performed. Further considerations are necessary. These are: 1) to apply Bartlett’s 
test of sphericity (Cooley and Lohnes, 1971); 2) to have at least five times as many 
observations in the study as the number of variables (Hair et al., 1995); and 3) to have 
components with factor loadings above 0.70 (Stevens, 2002). In this study, the result of 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity is significant. Moreover, there are more than five times the 
number of observations to variables (there are two variables and 36 observations). All the 
component loadings are more than 0.70. Consequently, these three tests suggest that the 
results of factor analysis in this study produce two separate valid independent variables. 
 
5.2.5 Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Model 3 and Model 4  
The descriptive statistics for variables in Model 3 and Model 4 are presented in Tables 18 and 
19. Table 18 shows the scoring of the items for internal audit function independence by the 
36 respondents (CIAs). The results for these separate items suggest that the staff in the 
internal audit function:  
 
1)  Put in a reasonable high effort in order to ensure dedication to independence (with a mean 
[median] agreement of 3.69 [4.00]);  
2) Resist almost any type of pressure and threat in order to maintain independence (with a 
mean [median] agreement of 4.42 [4.00]); 
3) Seek to be seen not to compromise their independence when required to work under both 
an ‘audit’ role and ‘advisory service’ role (with a mean [median] agreement of 3.92 [4.00]);  
4) Believe the relationship between the AC (or its chair) and the CIA provides a strong 
backing for the maintenance of the internal audit function’s independence (with a mean 
[median] agreement of 4.19 [4.00]);  
5) Believe the independence of the internal audit function is seen to be strongly upheld when 
AC members have strong collective independence (with a mean [median] agreement of 4.28 
[4.00]); and  
6) See the AC as being prepared to take action to maintain the independence of the internal 
audit function if it is threatened by the management (with a mean [median] agreement of 4.31 
[4.00]).  
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In summary, the results in Table 18 indicate that CIAs’ rate their company’s internal audit 
function as having a satisfactory level of independence from the management and the AC as 
providing strong support to the internal audit function independence. 
 
 
Table 18: Internal Audit Function Independence (n= 36) 
No. Questionnaire items Mean Median 25
th 
% 
75
th 
% 
Std. 
Dev. 
21 Likert-Scale (1= Strongly Disagree, 2= Disagree, 3= Neutral, 4= Agree, 5= Strongly 
Agree) Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements: (n= 36) 
 
 Your internal audit function puts a great 
deal of effort beyond that normally 
expected in order to ensure dedication to 
independence. 
 
3.69 4.00 3.00 4.00 0.89 
 Your internal audit function would resist 
almost any type of pressure and threat in 
order to maintain independence. 
 
4.42 4.00 4.00 5.00 0.60 
 When your internal audit function is 
required to work under both an ‘audit’ 
role and ‘advisory service’ role by the 
management this will never compromise 
independence in the audit role. 
 
3.92 4.00 4.00 4.75 0.94 
 The existing relationship between the AC 
(or its chair) and the internal auditor 
provides a strong backing for the 
maintenance of your internal audit 
function’s independence. 
 
4.19 4.00 4.00 5.00 0.98 
 The independence of your internal audit 
function is strongly upheld because of AC 
members have strong collective 
independence. 
 
4.28 4.00 4.00 5.00 0.78 
 The AC would be prepared to take action 
to maintain the independence of your 
internal audit function if it is threatened 
by management. 
 
4.31 4.00 4.00 5.00 0.79 
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Descriptive statistics for the dependent variables in Model 3 and Model 4 are presented in 
Table 19. The results of the independent variables (ACCHAIR, ACEXP, ACINDUS, 
ACMEET, ACSIZE and ACCHAR) and control variables (ASSET and BIG4) in Model 3 
and Model 4 have been discussed in Section 5.2.3. IAFIND (internal audit function 
independence) and ACSUP_IAFIND (AC support for internal audit function independence) 
are the dependent variables of Model 3 and Model 4 which are generated from PCA above. 
The average internal audit function independence (IAFIND) is 3.81, ranging from a minimum 
of 2.00 to a maximum of 5.00 with a standard deviation of 0.77, while the average AC 
support for the internal audit function independence is higher at 4.26, ranging from a 
minimum of 2.67 and to a maximum of 5.00 with a standard deviation of 0.74. 
 
 
Table 19: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables in Model 3 and Model 4 (n=36) 
Variable Name Mean Median Minimum Maximum Standard 
Deviation 
IAFIND 3.81 4.00 2.00 5.00 0.77 
ACSUP_IAFIND 4.26 4.33 2.67 5.00 0.74 
 
       Note: IAFIND is internal audit function independence; ACSUP_IAFIND is AC support for internal audit    
     function independence. 
 
5.2.6 Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Model 7  
Descriptive statistics for the independent and dependent variables in Model 7 are presented in 
Table 20. The ratio of total fees paid to the chair and AC members to total number of AC 
members (ACFEESRATIO) ranges from a minimum of $2,000 to a maximum of $28,967, 
with a mean of $11,552. Moreover, the ratio of total of external audit fees to total assets 
(AUDFEESRATIO) ranges from a minimum of 0.003% to a maximum of 17.47%, with a 
mean of 0.109%. The mean ratio of total internal audit budget to total assets 
(IAFBUDRATIO) for the sample is 502.45 ranging from a minimum of 1.03 to a maximum 
of 4,975. The variables described (ACFEESRATIO, AUDFEESRATIO and 
IAFBUDRATIO) are the independent variables of this study. On the other hand, the 
dependent variable, total shareholders return (TSR) shows a mean of 5.06 ranging from a 
minimum of -0.76 to a maximum of 11.53 with a standard deviation of 3.43. 
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Table 20: Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Model 7 (n=36) 
Variable Name Mean Median Minimum Maximum Standard 
Deviation 
TSR 5.06 5.38 -0.76 11.53 3.43 
ACFEESRATIO 11,552 10,000 2,000 28,967 6,426 
AUDFEESRATIO 0.00109 0.00043 0.00003 0.17478 0.00288 
IAFBUDRATIO 502.45 148.87 1.03 4,975.15 1,031.96 
 
Note: TSR is total shareholders return [(Share price at the end of the period - Share price at the beginning of the 
period + Dividend per share) / Share price at the beginning of the period]; ACFEESRATIO is ratio of total fees 
paid to the chair and AC members to total number of AC members. AUDFEESRATIO is ratio of total of 
external audit fees to total assets; IAFBUDRATIO is ratio of total internal audit budget to total assets. 
 
 
 
5.3 Sample 2 (Secondary-data Based Sample): Profile, Description and  
      Validation of Variables 
5.3.1 Industry Distribution 
The industry distribution of the 255 companies in sample 2 is provided in Table 21. The 
number of firms in each GICS industry sector ranges from 3 to 69. The industries most 
represented are materials (27.1%) and industrials (17.3%), while telecommunications services 
(1.2%) and information technology (3.1%) are under-represented.  
 
 
Table 21: Industry Distribution (n= 255) 
GICS Industry Sector Number of Companies Percentage (%) 
 
Consumer Discretionary 29 11.4 
Consumer Staples 10 3.9 
Energy 33 12.9 
Financials 38 14.9 
Health Care 12 4.7 
Industrials 44 17.3 
Information Technology 8 3.1 
Materials 69 27.1 
Telecommunications Services 3 1.2 
Utilities 
 
9 3.5 
Total 255 100 
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5.3.2 Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Model 5 and Model 6  
Descriptive statistics for variables in Model 5 and Model 6 are presented in Table 22. Panel A 
reports statistics for continuous variables. In sample 2 (n= 255), company size in terms of 
total assets (ASSET) ranges from a minimum of $14.42 million to a maximum of $700 
billion, with a mean of $15.4 billion. The total audit fees paid to the external auditors 
(AUDFEES) also ranges widely from a minimum of $25,450 to a maximum of $196.79 
million, with a mean of $2.38 million, as does the total non-audit fees (NONAUDFEES), 
ranging from $0 to $12.84 million, with a mean of $663,543.  
 
The number of subsidiaries (SUB) attached to companies in this sample is also a high 
variance, ranging from 0 to 974, with a mean of 51.06 subsidiaries. The percentage of foreign 
subsidiaries to total subsidiaries (FORSUB) ranges from 0% to 100%, with a mean of 32%. 
The minimum and maximum level for inventory (INVENRATIO) and receivable 
(RECRATIO) ratios have means of 9% and 7% respectively (i.e., not showing high levels of 
audit risk). Moreover, debt ratio (DEBTRATIO) and return on assets (ROA) display means 
of 18% and 6% respectively and both have the same standard deviation of 20%. 
 
Of particular interest to this study are the AC’s governance characteristics. In this study, the 
size of AC (ACSIZE) ranges from 2 to 9 members, with a mean of 3.38 members. The 
number of AC meetings held during the year (ACMEET) averages 4.09 with a minimum of 0 
meetings and a maximum of 9 meetings. The mean percentage of AC members with 
accounting or financial qualifications to total members (ACEXP) is 60%, ranging from 0% to 
100%. Furthermore, the mean percentage of total members that has worked in the same 
industry for at least 10 years (ACINDUS) is 54%. ACCHAIRIND, the test of AC chair 
independence shows a percentage mean of 63%. 
 
In terms of the composition of the board, Table 22 reveals that the average number of non-
executive directors on the board (BODNONEX) for the sample is 5.39, ranging from a 
minimum of 2 to 10 non-executive board members. The number of directors on the board 
(BODSIZE) is between 3 and 13 with an average board size of 6.92. The mean percentage of 
non-executive directors on the board to total number of directors (BODIND- test of board of 
directors’ independence) is 77%. Finally, Panel B in Table 22 reveals that sample 2 is made 
up of 87% of companies that have an AC charter (ACCHAR), 85% that have a Big 4 external 
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auditor (BIG4), 23% that are in the mining industry (MINING), and 50% that reported a net 
loss during the past 3 years (LOSS).  
 
 
Table 22: Descriptive Statistics Variables in Model 5 and Model 6 (n=255) 
PANEL A: Continuous Variables  
Variable Name Mean Median Minimum Maximum Standard 
Deviation 
ACCHAIRIND  0.63 0.75 0.00 1.00 0.26 
ACEXP 0.60 0.67 0.00 1.00 0.24 
ACINDUS 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.25 
ACMEET 4.09 4.00 0.00 9.00 0.25 
ACSIZE 3.38 3.00 2.00 9.00 0.86 
BODNONEX 5.39 5.00 2.00 10.00 1.79 
BODSIZE 6.92 7.00 3.00 13.00 1.94 
BODIND 0.77 0.80 0.40 1.00 0.11 
BODMEET 11.80 11.00 3.00 37.00 4.74 
ROA 0.06 0.07 -1.12 1.75 0.20 
INVENRATIO 0.09 0.04 0.00 0.58 0.12 
RECRATIO 0.07 0.03 0.00 0.43 0.09 
DEBTRATIO 0.18 0.13 0.00 1.10 0.20 
SUB 51.06 23.00 0.00 974.00 88.63 
FORSUB 0.32 0.22 0.00 1.00 0.31 
ASSET ($) 15.4B 919M  14.42M 700B 78.8B 
AUDFEES ($) 2.38M 493,620 25,450 196.79M 12.66M 
NONAUDFEES 
($) 
663,543 169,000 0.00 12.84M 1.57M 
PANEL B: Dichotomous Variables  
Variable Name Mean Median Number of Firms 
Coded “0” 
Number of Firms 
Coded “1” 
ACCHAR 0.87 1.00 34 221 
BIG4 0.85 1.00 38 217 
MINING 0.23 0.00 196 59 
LOSS 0.50 1.00 127 128 
 
Note: ACCHAIRIND is ratio of total scores assigned to each of the two criteria for AC chair independence; 
ACEXP is ratio of number of AC members with accounting/financial qualifications to total AC members; 
ACINDUS is ratio of number of AC members who has worked in the same industry for a substantial number of 
years (at least 10 years) to total AC members; ACMEET is number of AC meetings held during the financial 
year; ACSIZE is number of members serving on the AC during the financial year; BODNONEX is total number 
of non-executive directors on the board; BODSIZE is total number of directors on the board; BODIND is ratio 
of non-executive directors on the board to total number board of directors; BODMEET is number of board 
meetings held during the year; ROA is ratio of earnings before interest and tax to total assets; INVENRATIO is 
ratio of inventory to total assets; RECRATIO is ratio of receivables to total assets; DEBTRATIO is ratio of non-
current liabilities to total assets; SUB is number of subsidiaries; FORSUB is ratio of number of foreign 
subsidiaries to total number of subsidiaries; ASSET is total assets; AUDFEES is total of audit fees; 
NONAUDFEES is total of non-audit fees; ACCHAR is equal to the value of “1” if the AC has a charter and “0” 
otherwise; BIG4 is equal to the value of “1” if a Big 4 auditor is used and “0” when a smaller audit firm is used; 
MINING is equal to the value of “1” when the company is in the mining industry, “0” otherwise; LOSS is equal 
to the value of “1” if the company has reported a loss in any of the three years prior to, “0” otherwise. 
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5.4 Hypotheses Testing 
5.4.1 Normality of the Variables 
Initial descriptive statistics for the variables to be modeled in this study suggest that all the 
independent variables have non-normality in their data distributions. Non-normality is 
detected for these variables due to significance values for both Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and 
Shapiro-Walk test (p< 0.05). Also, skewness and kurtosis levels are found to be outside 
normal tolerance limits. For all the independent variables in the models employed to test all 
five sets of hypotheses, the Blom normal score transformation is applied because neither 
logarithmic nor square root transformation is able to yield a normal distribution of these 
measures (Kanel et al., 2008). Blom scores represent rank approximations of the exact order 
of a normal distribution (Kraja et al., 2007). Using Blom’s proportional estimation formula in 
SPSS, the assumption of normality is satisfied (data is normally distributed). 
 
5.4.2 Test for Small Sample Size of Sample 1  
The size of the sample used in a multiple regression has a direct effect on the statistical power 
(R
2
) of the model and the generalisability of the results. Since the size of sample 1 of this 
study is small (a total of 36 responses collected from the questionnaire), the findings can be 
weakened when using multiple regressions. According to Hair et al. (1995), a small sample 
that is characterized as having fewer than 20 observations, will be appropriate only for 
bivariate analysis using correlations or simple regression with a single independent variable.  
 
To gauge whether the sample size in this study has a direct and sizable impact on statistical 
power, Hair et al.’s (1995) criterion is used. As shown in Table 23, this criterion compares 
the significance level (α) and the number of independent variables in detecting a significant 
R
2
. The values provided in this table are the minimum R
2
 that the given sample size will 
detect as statistically significant at significance level (α) of 0.05.   
 
This study employs 6 independent variables and 11 control variables. With sample size of 36 
(>20), these results satisfy the sample size statistical power test as Models 1, 2, 3 and 4 have 
R
2
 more than 70%. According to Table 23, the minimum R
2
 that a specified sample size will 
detect as statistically significant at the 0.05 significance level is 42%. 
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Table 23: Sample Size Statistical Power Test 
 Significance Level (α)= 0.05 
No. of Independent Variables 
Sample Size 2 5 10 20 
20 39 48 64 NA 
50 19 23 29 42 
100 10 12 15 21 
250 4 5 6 8 
500 3 4 5 9 
100 1 1 2 2 
 
                                      Source: Hair et al. (1995) 
                                      Note: Minimum R
2
 that can be found statistically significant for  
                                      varying numbers of independent variables and sample sizes. 
 
 
5.4.3 Choice of Stepwise Regression for Sample 1  
Multivariate testing is performed to test the relative influence of each independent variable 
when modeled together as determinants of a dependent variable.  According to Singh and 
Newby (2010), multivariate testing not only tests the significance of the relationship between 
the independent and dependent variables but, more importantly it controls for the effects of a 
number of other independent variables on this relationship. 
 
In stepwise multiple regression, the independent variables are entered according to their 
statistical contribution in explaining the variance in the dependent variable. Stepwise 
regression is used in Models 1, 2, 3 and 4 (sample 1) of this study because it reduces the 
number of independent variables in the model by excluding non-significant variables. This 
study has 6 independent variables and 11 control variables. Therefore, stepwise regression is 
considered the suitable choice of analysis by finding the set of predictors that are most 
effective in predicting the dependent variable. Given that Models 1, 2, 3 and 4 have a small 
sample size (36 respondents), it is essential to have a small number of independent variables 
entering into the model when analysis occurs. Since variables will not be added to the 
stepwise regression equation unless they make a statistically significant addition to the 
analysis, all of the independent variables selected for inclusion will have a statistically 
significant relationship to the dependent variable. 
 
138 
 
5.4.4 Model 1 and Model 2: Tests of Hypothesis One (a) and One (b) 
5.4.4.1 Correlation Analysis 
Table 24 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients for the variables used in Model 1 and 
Model 2. The correlation matrix in Table 24 shows high significant correlations between 
internal audit function labour hours (IAHOUR) and number of subsidiaries (SUB) (0.596), 
between internal audit function budget (IAFBUD) and number of subsidiaries (SUB) (0.595) 
and between internal audit function labour hours (IAHOUR) and internal audit function 
budget (IAFBUD) (0.994). These correlations are intuitively expected since they relate the 
size or diversity of internal audit tasks (i.e., number of subsidiaries) to the extent of internal 
audit resourcing (i.e., IAFBUD and IAHOUR). Additionally, Table 24 shows that some 
independent variables are significantly correlated with each other. However, these 
correlations do not necessarily indicate that multicollinearity will be a serious problem for 
stepwise regression analysis later. 
 
The correlations of interest in Table 24 are those between the independent variables (i.e., 
AC’s governance characteristics) and the dependent variables (IAFBUD and IAHOUR).The 
correlations between AC size (ACSIZE) with both internal audit function labour hours 
(IAHOUR) and  internal audit function budget (IAFBUD) are  statistically significant (p< 
0.05). The inference is that the monetary and human resourcing of the internal audit function 
is dependent on the company having a larger AC.   
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Table 24: Correlation Analysis for Model 1 and Model 2 
 AC 
CHAIR 
IND 
AC 
EXP 
AC 
INDUS 
AC 
MEET 
AC 
SIZE 
AC 
CHAR 
BIG 4 LNTA LEVER
AGE 
REC 
RATIO 
INVEN 
RATIO 
CU 
RATIO 
OP 
CASH 
FOR 
SUB 
SUB LNAU
D 
FEES 
GROW
TH 
IA 
HOUR 
IAF 
BUD 
 
ACCHAIR 
IND 
 
 
1.00 
                  
 
ACEXP 
 
0.380* 
 
1.00 
                 
 
ACINDUS 
 
0.452** 
 
0.196 
 
1.00 
                
 
ACMEET 
 
0.044 
 
0.139 
 
0.019 
 
1.00 
               
 
ACSIZE 
 
0.062 
 
0.115 
 
0.027 
 
0.052 
 
1.00 
              
 
ACCHAR 
 
0.105 
 
0.150 
 
0.272 
 
0.156 
 
0.140 
 
1.00 
             
 
BIG 4 
 
0.106 
 
0.182 
 
0.047 
 
0.246 
 
0.164 
 
0.041 
 
1.00 
            
 
LNTA 
 
0.190 
 
0.210 
 
0.239 
 
0.196 
 
0.474** 
 
0.130 
 
0.141 
 
1.00 
           
 
LEVERAGE 
 
0.168 
 
0.254 
 
0.160 
 
0.044 
 
0.003 
 
0.342* 
 
0.308* 
 
0.228 
 
1.00 
          
 
RECRATIO 
 
0.142 
 
0.008 
 
0.178 
 
0.105 
 
0.411** 
 
0.304* 
 
0.096 
 
0.478** 
 
0.415** 
 
1.00 
         
 
INVENRATIO 
 
0.403** 
 
0.266 
 
0.478** 
 
0.208 
 
0.328* 
 
0.200 
 
0.481 
 
0.202 
 
0.358* 
 
0.309* 
 
1.00 
        
 
CURATIO 
 
0.265 
 
0.026 
 
0.273 
 
0.188 
 
0.208 
 
0.328* 
 
0.200 
 
0.481** 
 
0.202 
 
0.358* 
 
0.309* 
 
1.00 
       
 
OPCASH 
 
0.548** 
 
0.231 
 
0.284* 
 
0.309* 
 
0.095 
 
0.229 
 
0.110 
 
0.336* 
 
0.279* 
 
0.209 
 
0.186 
 
0.255 
 
1.00 
      
 
FORSUB 
 
0.245 
 
0.040 
 
0.088 
 
0.021 
 
0.097 
 
0.059 
 
0.227 
 
0.054 
 
0.151 
 
0.349* 
 
0.127 
 
0.155 
 
0.098 
 
1.00 
     
 
SUB 
 
0.031 
 
0.063 
 
0.012 
 
0.152 
 
0.189 
 
0.031 
 
0.276 
 
0.394** 
 
0.062 
 
0.275 
 
0.180 
 
0.242 
 
0.154 
 
0.588** 
 
1.00 
    
 
LNAUDFEES 
 
0.166 
 
0.332* 
 
0.161 
 
0.396** 
 
0.305* 
 
0.070 
 
0.371* 
 
0.633** 
 
0.144 
 
0.078 
 
0.265 
 
0.420** 
 
0.149 
 
0.316* 
 
0.632** 
 
1.00 
   
 
GROWTH 
 
0.025 
 
0.155 
 
0.065 
 
0.112 
 
0.014 
 
0.047 
 
0.298* 
 
0.236 
 
0.062 
 
0.013 
 
0.058 
 
0.116 
 
0.318* 
 
0.176 
 
0.312* 
 
0.174 
 
1.00 
  
 
IAHOUR 
 
0.032 
 
0.257 
 
0.112 
 
0.180 
 
0.440** 
 
0.082 
 
0.268 
 
0.370* 
 
0.077 
 
0.101 
 
0.029 
 
0.273 
 
0.051 
 
0.255 
 
0.596** 
 
0.295* 
 
0.258 
 
1.00 
 
 
IAFBUD 
 
0.004 
 
0.229 
 
0.101 
 
0.174 
 
0.451** 
 
0.075 
 
0.266 
 
0.365* 
 
0.071 
 
0.089 
 
0.046 
 
0.252 
 
0.052 
 
0.262 
 
0.595** 
 
0.293* 
 
0.262 
 
0.994** 
 
1.00 
 
 
Note: ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed); * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed) 
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5.4.4.2 Regression Analysis  
Stepwise regression analysis is used to test hypotheses one (a) and one (b). In relation to the 
test of hypothesis one (a), the results for Model 1 are given in Table 25. Panel A of Table 25 
shows the stepwise regression model summary. The model has a reasonable explanatory 
power of R
2 
= 0.473, indicating that internal audit budget accounts for 47.3% of the variation 
in the model. The model is low in autocorrelation (Durbin-Watson= 2.434) which is 
significant at p< 0.05. Mutlicolinearity is not a concern as indicated by VIF and tolerance 
statistics (tolerance not below 0.5 and VIF not above 2) in Panel B of the table. The VIF and 
tolerance statistics indicate whether an independent variable has a strong relationship with the 
other independent variables. 
 
Panel B of Table 25 presents the regression coefficients. Only ACSIZE (number of members 
serving on the AC) and SUB (square root of number of subsidiaries) are left in the model 
after stepwise regression excludes all non-significant independent variables. The coefficient 
for ACSIZE is positive and significant at 0.010 (t= 2.726, p< 0.05), indicating that the 
internal audit function budget is higher in companies where the AC has more members. 
Moreover, the coefficient for SUB (control variable) has a positive and significant (t= 4.110, 
p< 0.05) relationship with the internal audit function budget. 
 
Interestingly, the extent of the internal audit function budget, which would reflect on its work 
effectiveness, is only impacted by the size of AC. Other AC characteristics do not have an 
impact, namely, independence of AC chair, financial expertise of AC, relevant industry 
experience of AC, frequency of meetings of AC and whether the AC has a charter.  Hence, 
hypothesis one (a) is only minimally supported. 
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Table 25: Stepwise Regression Results for Model 1 
PANEL A: Model Summary 
R R Square Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
Durbin-
Watson 
F-ratio Sig. 
0.688 0.473 0.441 0.709 2.434 7.434 0.000 
 
PANEL B: Regression Coefficients 
Dependent 
Variable 
IAFBUD 
Unstandardized 
coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
  Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. 
Error 
Beta t-value Sig. Tolerance VIF 
Intercept 0.002 0.118  0.018 0.986   
 
Independent  
Variables 
ACSIZE 0.411 0.151 0.351 2.726 0.010 0.964 1.037 
SUB 
 
0.514 0.125 0.529 4.110 0.000 0.964 1.037 
Note: ACCHAIRIND, ACEXP, ACINDUS, ACMEET, ACCHAR, BIG4, LNTA, LEVERAGE, RECRATIO, 
INVENRATIO, CURATIO, OPCASH, FORSUB, LNAUDFEES and GROWTH are not a significant predictor 
in this model. 
 
 
Turning to the test of hypothesis one (b), regression results for Model 2 are shown in Table 
26. Panel A indicates a high explanatory power (R
2
= 0.531). The model is low in 
autocorrelation (Durbin-Watson= 2.447, p< 0.05). Mutlicolinearity is not a concern as 
indicated by VIF and Tolerance statistics in Panel B of table 26 (tolerance not below 0.5 and 
VIF not above 2).  
 
The results in Panel B of Table 26 shows that ACEXP (number of AC members with 
accounting/financial qualifications to total AC members), ACSIZE (number of members 
serving on the AC) and SUB (square root of number of subsidiaries) are left in the model 
after stepwise regression excludes all non-significant variables. The coefficients for ACEXP 
and ACSIZE are positive and significant at 0.044 and 0.020 respectively (t= 2.101 and 2.456, 
p< 0.05), indicating that labour hours undertaken by the internal audit function are higher in 
companies where the AC has more accounting/financial experts and a larger number of 
members. The inference is a larger and more expert AC will generate a more effective 
internal audit function in terms of its business in hours worked. In addition, the coefficient for 
SUB (control variable in the model) is positively and significantly (t= 4.473, p< 0.05) related 
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to the internal audit function labour hours. Number of subsidiaries could be a proxy for the 
complexity of the internal audit function’s tasks. 
 
In summary, it is found that AC expertise and size significantly impact on the effectiveness of 
an AC in its role of overseeing the quality of the internal audit function. Other AC 
characteristics of chair independence, relevant industry experience, frequency of meetings 
and existence of a charter, do not impact on the quality of the internal audit function, as was 
the finding for Model 1. Hence, hypothesis one (b) is also partially supported.  
 
 
Table 26: Stepwise Regression Results for Model 2  
PANEL A: Model Summary 
R R Square Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
Durbin-
Watson 
F-ratio Sig. 
0.728 0.531 0.487 0.675 2.447 4.415 0.044 
 
PANEL B: Regression Coefficients 
Dependent 
Variable 
IAHOUR 
Unstandardized 
coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
  Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. 
Error 
Beta t-value Sig. Tolerance VIF 
Intercept 0.001 0.113  0.013 0.990   
Independent  
Variables  
ACEXP 0.271 0.129 0.257 2.101 0.044 0.979 1.021 
ACSIZE 0.355 0.145 0.306 2.456 0.020 0.948 1.055 
SUB 0.535 0.210 0.554 4.473 0.000 0.957 1.045 
 
Note: ACCHAIRIND, ACINDUS, ACMEET, ACCHAR, BIG4, LNTA, LEVERAGE, RECRATIO, 
INVENRATIO, CURATIO, OPCASH, FORSUB, LNAUDFEES and GROWTH are not a significant predictor 
in this model. 
 
 
5.4.4.3 Discussion of Findings on Model 1 and Model 2 
Both dependent variables, internal audit function budget and internal audit function labour 
hours used in Model 1 and Model 2 have captured whether an AC is effective in ensuring the 
firm’s internal audit function is well resourced with funds and staff to perform its functions. 
The assumption is that the degree of resourcing of the internal audit function is largely in the 
hands of the AC in its capacity as the firm’s oversight body for the quality of the internal 
audit function. The findings in Table 25 and Table 26 add limited support to Scarborough et 
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al. (1998), Raghunandan et al. (1998), Raghunandan et al. (2001), Goodwin (2003) and 
Abbott et al. (2010) who have concluded that an AC with better governance characteristics 
will improve the status of the internal audit function in a company. 
 
In relation to Model 1, Table 25 shows that AC size, is the only independent variable that is 
positively and highly significantly related to the internal audit function budget which leads to 
partial acceptance of hypothesis one (a). This result suggests that a larger sized AC is likely 
to have more influence over the board of directors in advocating an adequate budget for the 
internal audit function. A larger AC may also have more time to work with the CIA and CFO 
in preparing a strong case for the internal audit function budget to be presented to the board.  
 
Moreover, a larger AC can give greater attention to monitoring the internal audit function’s 
funding needs and budget constraints. Such a commitment to reviewing the internal audit’s 
on-going budgetary needs is likely to improve the resources allocated to the internal audit 
function. Carcello et al. (2005) found that the internal audit budget is higher when an AC 
reviews the internal audit budget.  Raghunandan et al. (2001) also found that ACs that review 
the internal audit budget are associated with a larger budget for internal audit monitoring. 
Both studies have similar findings to this study. A further possibility is that the CIA can use 
the AC as a lever if the AC is larger and more powerful within the company when negotiating 
for extra funding within management, particularly during meetings with the management 
Abbott et al., 2010).  
 
On the other hand, in relation to Model 2 concerning internal audit staff resourcing, the 
findings in Table 26 show that AC expertise and AC size are positively and highly 
significantly related to the internal audit function labour hours (IAHOUR). The inference 
from this result is that an AC with larger size and comprising of more members with 
accounting or financial qualifications will be able to bring more pressure on ensuring that 
labour hours allocated to the internal audit function are not compromised. In addition, AC 
members equipped with financial expertise are more likely to have a better understanding of 
the technicalities and complexities of internal audit tasks related to the company in a 
particular industry. Results of this study are supported by Goodwin’s (2003) findings that 
found AC members with accounting expertise are more involved in reviewing the work of the 
internal audit function and ensuring that resources are allocated to the internal audit function.  
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During the review of the internal audit function budget and plan, larger size and financial 
experts AC members have the power to influence the board and management over, not only 
the amount of labour hours to be allocated to the internal control activities, but also the nature 
and scope of internal audit programs (Abbott et al., 2010). Furthermore, an AC with financial 
expertise is more likely to demand the internal audit function to act and to improve the 
existing internal control system or increase the amount of work to be done in higher risk areas 
(Carcello et al., 2005).  
 
One of the responsibilities of the AC in a company is overseeing the internal audit function 
by ensuring that management has designed and implemented an effective internal control 
system (Raghunandan et al., 1998). To fulfil this role, an AC must have good corporate 
governance characteristics to ensure adequate budget and labour hours are allocated to the 
internal audit function. Raghunandan et al. (1998) found that good working relationships with 
the CIA can enhance the effectiveness of the AC. They argued that an AC which reviews the 
internal auditing program is more likely to be knowledgeable about accounting issues.  
 
Based on the discussion above, it can be argued that AC size and AC expertise have an 
impact on the effectiveness of an AC’s role in overseeing the quality of the internal audit 
function. The evidence indicates that AC size is more associated with the internal audit 
budget while both AC expertise and size are associated with the internal audit labour hours.  
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5.4.5 Model 3 and Model 4: Tests of Hypothesis Two (a) and Two (b) 
5.4.5.1 Correlation Analysis 
Table 27 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients for the variables used in Model 3 and 
Model 4. The correlation matrix in Table 27 reveals significant correlations of interest to 
Model 3 and Model 4. These are between the independent variables (AC’s governance 
characteristics) and the dependent variables (IAFIND and AC_IAFIND).  
 
The correlation between internal audit function independence (IAFIND) and AC size 
(ACSIZE) (0.258) and between AC support for internal audit function independence 
(AC_IAFIND) and AC size (ACSIZE) (0.207) are statistically significant at the p< 0.05 level. 
Although AC size does not display a high correlation with IAFIND and AC_IAFIND, it does 
imply that AC size has a significant influence on the dependent variables. While some of the 
independent variables are significantly correlated with each other, their correlations do not 
indicate that multicollinearity is a serious problem.  
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Table 27: Correlation Analysis for Model 3 and Model 4 
 AC 
CHAIR 
IND 
AC 
EXP 
AC 
INDUS 
AC 
MEET 
AC 
SIZE 
AC 
CHAR 
BIG 4 LNTA IAFIND AC_ 
IAFIAND 
 
ACCHA
IR 
IND 
 
 
1.00 
         
 
ACEXP 
 
0.380* 
 
1.00 
        
 
AC 
INDUS 
 
0.452** 
 
0.196 
 
1.00 
       
 
AC 
MEET 
 
0.044 
 
0.139 
 
0.019 
 
1.00 
      
 
AC 
SIZE 
 
0.062 
 
0.115 
 
0.027 
 
0.052 
 
1.00 
     
 
AC 
CHAR 
 
0.105 
 
0.150 
 
0.272 
 
0.156 
 
0.140 
 
1.00 
    
 
BIG 4 
 
0.106 
 
0.182 
 
0.047 
 
0.246 
 
0.164 
 
0.041 
 
1.00 
   
 
LNTA 
 
0.190 
 
0.210 
 
0.239 
 
0.196 
 
0.474** 
 
0.130 
 
0.141 
 
1.00 
  
 
IAFIND 
 
0.185 
 
0.203 
 
0.217 
 
0.070 
 
0.258* 
 
0.042 
 
0.186 
 
0.104 
 
1.00 
 
 
AC_ 
IAFIND 
 
0.016 
 
0.001 
 
0.030 
 
0.006 
 
0.207* 
 
0.188 
 
0.326* 
 
0.156 
 
0.462** 
 
1.00 
 
 
                         Note: ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed); * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed) 
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5.4.5.2 Regression Analysis 
Stepwise regression analysis is used to test hypothesis two (a) and two (b) of this study. After 
running Models 3 and Model 4, the results of stepwise regression show that no variables are 
entered into either of the equations. In stepwise regression, the independent variables are 
entered according to their statistical contribution in explaining the variance in the dependent 
variable. Variables are added to the regression equation one at a time, using the statistical 
criterion of maximizing the R² of the included variables. This shows that the independent 
variables will not be added to the regression equation unless they make a statistically 
significant addition to the analysis. Hence, all of the independent variables (ACCHARIND, 
ACEXP, ACINDUS, ACMEET, ACSIZE and ACCHAR) and control variables (BIG4 and 
LNTA) have very little or no statistically significant relationship to the dependent variables 
(IAFIND and AC_IAFIND). The relationship between the dependent variables and 
independent variables are only justifiable in univariate analysis (correlation analysis) where 
AC size (ACSIZE) has a significant correlation with each of IAFIND and AC_IAFIND.  
 
Since, there are no results generated from the stepwise regression for Model 3 and Model 4, 
both hypotheses two (a) and (b) are rejected. This result infers that there are no attributes of 
AC’s governance characteristics that significantly impact on the effectiveness of an AC in its 
role of ensuring the independence of the internal audit function. 
 
5.4.5.3 Discussion of Findings on Model 3 and Model 4 
There are two possible reasons for this lack of any significant result.  First, the two dependent 
variables internal audit function independence and AC support for internal audit function 
independence have been generated from a two-factor solution (see Table 17), when the 6 
items in the questionnaire concerning the perceived degree of independence of the internal 
audit function are expected to load onto a single factor. Hence, the measures used for these 
two variables, one of which is based on two scales only, may lack content validity or 
reliability.  
 
If these two dependent variables are of questionable statistical quality, then their application 
in Model 3 and Model 4 could be attributable to the poor result from these models. The poor 
relationships between the AC’s governance characteristics variables and internal audit 
function independence variables are also evident in Table 27. In this table, only AC size is 
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significantly correlated to the dependent variables. An alternative measure of the concept of 
internal audit function independence might produce a more significant result for Model 3 and 
Model 4. For example, taking a cognitive perspective of internal auditor independence, 
Ahmad and Taylor (2009) developed measures for the concepts of commitment to 
independence, role conflict and role ambiguity in the context of the internal auditor’s work 
environment. 
 
Second, the specification of Models 3 and Model 4 may be the reason for the lack of a 
significant result. In other words, the AC’s governance characteristics could, in fact, have 
quite minimal explanatory power as determinants of the extent of independence of the 
internal audit function. Other factors, not included in the specification of Model 3 and Model 
4, such as the demands and values of senior management in the company, or the pressures 
from professional bodies like the IIA Australia, could be the more dominant influences on 
shaping the independent of internal audit staff.   
 
5.4.6 Model 4 and Model 5: Tests of Hypothesis Three and Hypothesis Four 
5.4.6.1 Correlation Analysis 
Table 28 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients for the variables used in the Model 5 and 
Model 6. This table shows several significant correlations. The variables significantly 
correlated to the natural log of audit fees (LNAUDFEES) worthy of noting are: AC meetings 
(ACMEET) (0.560); natural log of non-audit fees (LNNONAUDFEES) (0.650); the number 
of subsidiaries (SUB) (0.677); and the natural log of total assets (LNTA) (0.813).   
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Table 28: Correlation Analysis for Model 5 and Model 6 
 AC 
CHAIR 
IND 
AC 
EXP 
AC 
INDUS 
AC 
MEET 
AC 
SIZE 
AC 
CHAR 
BOD 
IND 
BOD 
MEET 
BIG4 MINING LOSS ROA INVEN 
RATIO 
REC 
RATIO 
DEBT 
RATIO 
FOR 
SUB 
SUB LN 
AUD 
FEES 
LN 
NON 
AUD 
FEES 
LN 
TA 
 
ACCHAIR 
IND 
 
1.00 
 
 
                  
 
ACEXP 
 
0.241** 
 
1.00 
                  
 
ACINDUS 
 
0.149** 
 
0.105* 
 
1.00 
                 
 
ACMEET 
 
0.010 
 
0.198** 
 
0.090 
 
1.00 
                
 
ACSIZE 
 
0.009 
 
0.091 
 
0.235** 
 
0.290** 
 
1.00 
               
 
ACCHAR 
 
0.079 
 
0.098 
 
0.113* 
 
0.033 
 
0.109* 
 
1.00 
              
 
BODIND 
 
0.122* 
 
0.110* 
 
0.192** 
 
0.269** 
 
0.232** 
 
0.117* 
 
1.00 
             
 
BODMEET 
 
0.053 
 
0.070 
 
0.028 
 
0.134* 
 
0.022 
 
0.195** 
 
0.036 
 
1.00 
            
 
BIG4 
 
0.023 
 
0.131* 
 
0.092 
 
0.268** 
 
0.221** 
 
0.160** 
 
0.285** 
 
0.153** 
 
1.00 
           
 
MINING 
 
-0.069 
 
-0.194** 
 
-0.168** 
 
-0.189** 
 
-0.132* 
 
-0.004 
 
-0.139* 
 
-0.060 
 
-0.188** 
 
1.00 
          
 
LOSS 
 
0.067 
 
0.155** 
 
0.208** 
 
0.181** 
 
0.173** 
 
0.094 
 
0.129* 
 
0.059 
 
0.342** 
 
0.342** 
 
1.00 
         
 
ROA 
 
0.192** 
 
0.111* 
 
0.248** 
 
0.124* 
 
0.089 
 
0.070 
 
0.013 
 
0.039 
 
0.230** 
 
-0.230** 
 
-0.479** 
 
1.00 
        
 
INVEN 
RATIO 
 
0.235 
 
0.009 
 
0.303 
 
0.026 
 
0.203 
 
0.064 
 
0.065 
 
0.037 
 
0.150 
 
-0.105 
 
-0.233 
 
0.326 
 
1.00 
       
 
REC 
RATIO 
 
0.235** 
 
0.064 
 
0.231** 
 
0.148** 
 
0.088 
 
0.062 
 
0.029 
 
0.022 
 
0.150** 
 
-0.325** 
 
-0.397** 
 
0.461** 
 
0.431** 
 
1.00 
      
 
DEBT 
RATIO 
 
0.051 
 
0.041 
 
0.080 
 
0.209** 
 
0.062 
 
0.148** 
 
0.049 
 
0.048 
 
0.114* 
 
-0.149** 
 
-0.080 
 
0.142* 
 
0.072 
 
-0.216** 
 
1.00 
     
 
FORSUB 
 
0.207** 
 
0.072 
 
0.011 
 
0.107* 
 
0.021 
 
0.042 
 
0.015 
 
0.027 
 
0.019 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.068 
 
0.063 
 
0.061 
 
0.156** 
 
0.045 
 
1.00 
    
 
SUB 
 
0.005 
 
0.131* 
 
0.222** 
 
0.433** 
 
0.309** 
 
0.100 
 
0.285** 
 
0.063 
 
0.305** 
 
-0.381** 
 
-0.272** 
 
0.178** 
 
0.233** 
 
0.372** 
 
0.134* 
 
0.262** 
 
1.00 
   
 
LNAUDFEES 
 
0.046 
 
0.189** 
 
0.199** 
 
0.560** 
 
0.443** 
 
0.096 
 
0.365** 
 
0.023 
 
0.447** 
 
-0.321** 
 
0.328** 
 
-0.229** 
 
0.218** 
 
0.288** 
 
0.252** 
 
0.253** 
 
0.677** 
 
1.00 
  
 
LNNON 
AUDFEES 
 
-0.060 
 
-0.175** 
 
-0.102 
 
-0.403** 
 
-0.380** 
 
-0.102 
 
-0.319** 
 
-0.036 
 
0.408** 
 
 -0.195** 
 
0.198** 
 
-0.112* 
 
0.152 
 
0.190** 
 
0.166** 
 
0.118* 
 
0.483** 
 
0.650** 
 
1.00 
 
 
LNTA 
 
0.104 
 
0.204** 
 
0.148* 
 
0.538** 
 
0.469 
 
0.149* 
 
0.430** 
 
0.007 
 
0.402** 
 
-0.303** 
 
-0.269** 
 
0.144* 
 
0.153* 
 
0.122 
 
0.218** 
 
0.058 
 
0.674** 
 
0.813** 
 
0.651** 
 
1.00 
 
Note: ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed); * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed) 
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5.4.6.2 Comparisons of Means 
An independent samples t-test is performed for the AC continuous variables to determine 
whether ACs that follow the ASX CGC’s principles and recommendations are significantly 
different in terms of audit and non-audit fees from those that do not follow the guidelines. 
The ASX CGC requires an AC to be chaired by an independent chair (who is not chair of the 
board), has at least one member who has relevant qualifications and experience, has some 
members who have an understanding of the industry in which the entity operates, has at least 
3 members on the committee and should meet at least four times annually.  
 
Review of Table 29 shows many of these significant differences. On average, ACs that 
follow the ASX CGC recommendations have higher mean audit fees and lower mean non-
audit fees compared to firms that do not follow the guidelines.  ACs that adhere to the ASX 
CGC recommendations are more likely to demand a greater level of audit assurance by 
accepting higher audit fees and reducing the level of non-audit service fees for consulting 
services provided by the external auditor firm to the management.  
 
The mean differences are significant (p< 0.05) in Table 29 for all the groups except for the 
independence of AC chair. The mean of the independence of AC chair is not significantly 
different between ACs that follow the ASX CGC recommendations and the ACs that do not 
follow the guidelines. It can be argued that an AC chair is often a non-executive director of 
the company but could still have a substantial relationship with the company as a customer, a 
supplier or a professional advisor or there is some other matter that compromises that 
person’s independence. This appears to be reflected in the finding of a non-significant 
difference between the means of the independence of AC chair 
 
In summary, the results in Table 29 show that:  
i) Companies with higher audit fees (a proxy for higher quality of external audit) are 
characterized as having an AC with significantly greater financial expertise, greater 
industry experience, meet more frequently and are larger in size. 
ii) Companies with higher non-audit fees (a proxy for weaker auditor independence) are 
characterized as having an AC with significantly lower financial expertise, lower industry 
experience, and meet less frequently and are smaller in size. 
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iii) Companies that have an apparently higher quality of external audit and external auditors’ 
independence are more in conformity with ASX CGC guidelines.  
 
This conclusion implies that ACs with higher quality of governance structures will be more 
effective in fulfilling their role of maintaining the quality of the external audit function and 
ensuring the independence of external auditors. 
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Table 29: Comparison of Means 
Variable 
Name 
Group Mean 
Score 
Difference  
between 
means 
t-value Sig. 
Audit Fees 
LN 
AUDFEES 
ACCHAIRIND ≥ 0.50% of the chairs are 
independent 
13.340 0.129 -0.517 0.303 
ACCHAIRIND < 0.50% of the chairs are 
independent 
 
13.211 
LN 
AUDFEES 
ACEXP ≥ 2 members have financial 
expertise 
13.547 0.992 5.846 0.000 
ACEXP < 2 members have financial 
expertise 
 
12.539 
LN 
AUDFEES 
ACINDUS ≥ 2 members have 10 years 
industry experience 
13.270 0.070 3.760 0.035 
ACINDUS < 2 members have 10 years 
industry experience  
 
13.200 
LN 
AUDFEES 
ACMEET ≥ 4 meetings held a year  13.816 1.490 9.143 0.000 
ACMEET < 4 meetings held a year 
 
12.326 
LN 
AUDFEES 
ACSIZE ≥ 3 members in the committee 13.330 1.791 7.737 0.000 
ACSIZE < 3 members in the committee 
 
11.539 
Non-Audit Fees 
LNNON 
AUDFEES 
ACCHAIRIND ≥ 0.50% of the chairs are 
independent 
10.648 0.446 -0.598 0.275 
ACCHAIRIND < 0.50% of the chairs are 
independent 
 
11.094 
LNNON 
AUDFEES 
ACEXP ≥ 2 members have financial 
expertise 
9.204 2.196 3.450 0.001 
ACEXP < 2 members have financial 
expertise 
 
11.400 
LNNON 
AUDFEES 
ACINDUS ≥ 2 members have 10 years 
industry experience 
10.695 0.054 9.700 0.046 
ACINDUS < 2 members have 10 years 
industry experience  
 
10.749 
LNNON 
AUDFEES 
ACMEET ≥ 4 meetings held a year  8.893 3.005 5.275 0.000 
ACMEET < 4 meetings held a year 
 
11.898 
LNNON 
AUDFEES 
ACSIZE ≥ 3 members in the committee 8.886 1.940 1.619 0.045 
ACSIZE < 3 members in the committee 10.826 
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5.4.6.3 Regression Analysis 
The findings of the univariate analysis shows that a number of AC’s governance variables 
(both continuous and dichotomous variables) have statistically significant relationships with 
the dependent variables (audit fees and non-audit fees). In spite of this, it is important to 
perform multivariate testing because it will test the relative influence of each independent 
variable when modeled together as determinants of a dependent variable.  According to Singh 
and Newby (2010), multivariate testing not only tests the significance of the relationship 
between the experimental variable and the dependent variable but, more importantly it 
controls for the effects of a number of other independent variables on this relationship. 
Ordinary least squares multiple regression models will be used to test hypothesis three and 
hypothesis four of this study. 
 
5.4.6.3.1 Results for Model 5 (The Effects of Control Variables on Audit Fees) 
Table 30 shows the ordinary least squares regression results for the effects of company-
specific control variables on audit fees. In order to test the validity of the Model 5 used in this 
study, the traditional audit fees model (Simunic, 1980; Francis, 1984; Francis and Simon, 
1987; Craswell and Francis, 1999) is used. In this traditional audit fees model the natural log 
of audit fees is regressed on the control variables. Studies have found audit fees to be related 
to firm size, complexity, audit risk of the client firm, profitability, the use of Big 4 audit firm 
and industry (Simunic, 1980; Francis, 1984; Craswell and Francis, 1999; Abbott et al., 2003; 
Goodwin and Kent, 2006; Hoitash and Hoitash, 2009; Singh and Newby, 2010). 
 
Panel A of Table 30 presents the regression model summary. The model has a high 
explanatory power. R
2 
= 0.756 shows that audit fees accounts for 75.6% of the variation in 
the model. Adjusted R
2 
= 0.743, F-ratio= 62.334 and the model is low in autocorrelation 
(Durbin-Watson= 2.019) which is significant at p< 0.05. To test the problem of 
mutlicolinearity, variance inflation factor (VIF) and tolerance statistics are calculated and 
presented in Table 30, Panel B. Mutlicolinearity is not a concern as indicated by VIF and 
tolerance statistics (tolerance not below 0.5 and VIF not above 2).  
 
Results in Panel B of Table 30 present the regression coefficients. Following previous studies, 
the coefficients for BIG4 (whether a firm uses Big Four audit firms), DEBTRATIO (ratio of 
non-current liabilities to total assets), FORSUB (ratio of number of foreign subsidiaries to 
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total number of subsidiaries), SUB (square root of number of subsidiaries) and LNTA 
(natural log of total assets) are all positively related to audit fees and are significant (p< 0.05). 
By comparison, the remaining five coefficients estimate, MINING (whether a firm is in the 
mining industry), LOSS (whether a firm has reported a loss), ROA (ratio of earnings before 
interest and tax to total assets), INVENRATIO (ratio of inventory to total assets) and 
RECRATIO (ratio of receivables to total assets) are in the predicted direction but not 
significant in explaining audit fees. These variables found not to be significant in this study 
have mixed results in the previous studies, with some finding significance and others are not 
(Abbott et al., 2003; Goodwin and Kent, 2006; Hoitash and Hoitash, 2009; Singh and Newby, 
2010). 
 
In terms of board characteristics, the coefficient estimates for BODIND (ratio of non-
executive directors on the board to total number board of directors) and BODMEET (number 
of board meetings held during the year) are not significantly related to audit fees. This result 
is consistent with a newer study (Hoitash and Hoitash, 2009) that found that characteristics of 
the board of the directors are not associated with audit fees. However, the results of this study 
and Hoitash and Hoitash (2009) are in contrast to the findings of Carello et al. (2002), Abbott 
et al. (2003) and Goodwin and Kent (2006). It can be argued, there are a number of possible 
reasons for the differences between the results.  
 
Firstly, since ASX CGC Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice 
Recommendations are introduced in 2003, it became the minimum standard for firm 
corporate governance performance in Australia. Under the recommendations, companies 
have a choice to follow and implement any new corporate governance strategies or 
mechanisms. However, companies wanting to distinguish themselves from other companies 
may choose to signal their corporate governance performance by using other corporate 
governance mechanisms which are not compulsory under the recommendations of the ASX 
CGC (Singh and Newby, 2009). Thus, this could the reason that BODIND and BODMEET 
variables have changed from being significant to non-significant variables in explaining the 
audit fees. Furthermore, it can also be posited that the lack of association between the board 
of directors’ independence and meetings is consistent with the increased oversight and 
responsibilities of the AC with respect to audit fees.  This result indicates that ASX CGC 
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achieved its objective with regard to the monitoring oversight of the external auditors by re-
positioning this oversight from the board of directors to the AC. 
 
 
Table 30: Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results Model 5 (The Effects of Control 
Variables on Audit Fees) 
PANEL A: Model Summary 
R R Square Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
Durbin-
Watson 
F-ratio Sig. 
0.869 0.756 0.743 0.504 2.019 62.334 0.000 
 
PANEL B: Regression Coefficients 
Dependent 
Variable 
LNAUDFEES 
Unstandardized 
coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
  Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. 
Error 
Beta t-value Sig. Tolerance VIF 
Intercept 0.005 0.032  0.143 0.886   
 
Independent  
Variables 
BODIND 0.009 0.036 0.009 0.238 0.812 0.785 1.274 
BODMEET 0.040 0.033 0.40 1.208 0.228 0.937 1.067 
BIG4 0.224 0.062 0.131 3.630 0.000 0.779 1.284 
MINING -0.016 0.058 -0.010 -0.276 0.783 0.751 1.332 
LOSS 0.075 0.057 0.051 1.302 0.194 0.664 1.506 
ROA -0.022 0.039 -0.022 -0.565 0.573 0.654 1.528 
INVENRATIO 0.021 0.040 0.020 0.530 0.597 0.733 1.363 
RECRATIO 0.075 0.046 0.071 1.635 0.103 0.529 1.889 
DEBTRATIO 0.071 0.036 0.069 1.988 0.048 0.844 1.185 
FORSUB 0.189 0.036 0.175 5.177 0.000 0.884 1.131 
SUB 0.097 0.051 0.096 1.904 0.058 0.501 1.499 
LNTA 0.636 0.050 0.636 12.616 0.000 0.598 1.512 
 
Note: LNAUDFEES is total audit fees are collected from the company annual reports and are then transformed 
into natural log; BODIND is ratio of non-executive directors on the board to total number board of directors; 
BODMEET is number of board meetings held during the year; BIG4 is equal to the value of “1” if a Big 4 
auditor is used and “0” when a smaller audit firm is used; MINING is equal to the value of “1” when the 
company is in the mining industry, “0” otherwise; LOSS is equal to the value of “1” if the company has reported 
a loss in any of the three years prior to, “0” otherwise; ROA is ratio of earnings before interest and tax to total 
assets; INVENRATIO is ratio of inventory to total assets; RECRATIO is ratio of receivables to total assets; 
DEBTRATIO is ratio of non-current liabilities to total assets; FORSUB is ratio of number of foreign 
subsidiaries to total number of subsidiaries; SUB is square root of total number of subsidiaries; LNTA is natural 
log of total assets (in millions). 
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5.4.6.3.2 Results for Model 5 (The Effects of AC Variables on Audit Fees) 
Panel A of Table 31 shows that the model has a high explanatory power. R
2 
= 0.772 explains 
that audit fees accounts for 77.2% of the variation in the model. Adjusted R
2 
= 0.755, F-ratio= 
30.147 and the model is low in autocorrelation (Durbin-Watson= 1.909) which is significant. 
Mutlicolinearity is not a concern as tolerance statistics is not below 0.5 and VIF is not above 
2 (shown in Panel B). 
 
In addition, results in Panel B of Table 31 present the regression coefficients. The coefficient 
for ACMEET (number of AC meetings held during the financial year) and AC SIZE (number 
of members serving on the AC during the financial year are positive and significant at 0.004 
and 0.039 respectively (t= 2.870 and 2.081, p< 0.05), indicating that audit fees are higher in 
companies where the AC has more number of meetings held and larger number of members 
serving on the committee. Whereas, the coefficients for ACCHAIRIND (ratio of scores 
assigned to each of the two criteria for AC chair independence), ACEXP (ratio of number of 
AC members with accounting/financial qualifications to total AC members.), ACINDUS 
(ratio of number of AC members who has worked in the same industry for a substantial 
number of years to total AC members) and ACCHAR (whether the firm has an AC charter) 
are positive but not significantly (p> 0.05) associated with the level of audit fees (t= 1.672, t= 
0.412, t= 0.609, t= 0.099, respectively). 
 
Considering these results, the only attributes of AC’s governance characteristics that 
significantly impacts on the effectiveness of AC in its role of facilitating the quality of 
external audit are size and frequency of meetings while other AC characteristics do not have 
an impact, namely, the independence of AC chair, financial and industry expertise of AC and 
whether AC has a charter Hence, hypothesis three is partially supported. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
157 
 
Table 31: Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results Model 5 (The Effects of AC 
Variables on Audit Fees) 
PANEL A: Model Summary 
R R Square Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
Durbin-
Watson 
F-ratio Sig. 
0.879 0.772 0.755 0.493 1.909 30.147 0.000 
 
PANEL B: Regression Coefficients 
Dependent 
Variable 
LNAUDFEES 
Unstandardized 
coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
  Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. 
Error 
Beta t-value Sig. Tolerance VIF 
Intercept 0.001 0.031  0.024 0.000   
 
Independent  
Variables  
ACCHAIRIND 0.065 0.039 0.059 1.672 0.096 0.779 1.284 
ACEXP 0.016 0.038 0.014 0.412 0.681 0.791 1.264 
ACINDUS 0.023 0.038 0.021 0.609 0.543 0.775 1.291 
ACMEET 0.116 0.040 0.111 2.870 0.004 0.640 1.562 
ACSIZE 0.092 0.044 0.078 2.081 0.039 0.683 1.464 
ACCHAR 
 
0.006 0.059 0.003 0.099 0.921 0.847 1.181 
Control  
Variables  
BODIND 0.006 0.036 0.006 0.173 0.863 0.754 1.327 
BODMEET 0.022 0.034 0.022 0.644 0.520 0.862 1.161 
BIG4 0.205 0.061 0.120 3.365 0.001 0.764 1.309 
MINING -0.006 0.057 -0.004 -0.111 0.912 0.733 1.364 
LOSS 0.061 0.057 0.042 1.080 0.281 0.646 1.548 
ROA -0.022 0.039 -0.022 -0.567 0.572 0.637 1.569 
INVENRATIO 0.032 0.041 0.029 0.764 0.445 0.663 1.508 
RECRATIO 0.076 0.045 0.073 1.688 0.093 0.521 1.918 
DEBTRATIO 0.069 0.036 0.067 1.931 0.050 0.807 1.240 
FORSUB 0.200 0.037 0.185 5.463 0.000 0.839 1.192 
SUB 0.085 0.050 0.085 1.703 0.009 0.591 1.560 
LNTA 0.548 0.055 0.548 9.951 0.000 0.518 1.143 
 
Note:  LNAUDFEES is total audit fees are collected from the company annual reports and are then transformed into natural log; 
ACCHAIRIND is ratio of total scores assigned to each of the two criteria for AC chair independence; ACEXP is ratio of number of AC 
members with accounting/financial qualifications to total AC members; ACINDUS is ratio of number of AC members who has worked in 
the same industry for a substantial number of years (at least 10 years) to total AC members; ACMEET is number of AC meetings held 
during the financial year; ACSIZE is number of members serving on the AC during the financial year; ACCHAR is equal to the value of “1” 
if AC has a charter and “0” otherwise;BODIND is ratio of non-executive directors on the board to total number board of directors; 
BODMEET is number of board meetings held during the year; BIG4 is equal to the value of “1” if a Big 4 auditor is used and “0” when a 
smaller audit firm is used; MINING is equal to the value of “1” when the company is in the mining industry, “0” otherwise; LOSS is equal 
to the value of “1” if the company has reported a loss in any of the three years prior to, “0” otherwise; ROA is ratio of earnings before 
interest and tax to total assets; INVENRATIO is ratio of inventory to total assets; RECRATIO is ratio of receivables to total assets; 
DEBTRATIO is ratio of non-current liabilities to total assets; FORSUB is ratio of number of foreign subsidiaries to total number of 
subsidiaries; SUB is square root of total number of subsidiaries; LNTA is natural log of total assets (in millions). 
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5.4.6.3.3 Discussion of Findings on Model 5 
Previous studies have shown that AC frequency of meetings and AC size are good measures 
of AC effectiveness in fulfilling its role. The findings in Table 31 support Carello et al. 
(2002), Goodwin and Kent (2006), Yatim et al. (2006) and Hoitash and Hoitash (2009) that 
found audit fees to be significantly related to frequency of meetings and size. The 
phenomenon underlying this result could be that ACs who meet frequently with the external 
auditors and management are more likely to be informed about the auditing issues and 
subsequently demand higher quality of external audits by increasing the audit fees. Moreover, 
larger AC has more power to increase the quality of external audit by discovering and solving 
potential risks in the financial reporting process. 
 
Goodwin and Kent (2006), Yatim et al. (2006) and Singh and Newby (2010) found that audit 
fees are not significantly associated with AC independence. These results are in contrast to 
Carello et al. (2002) and Abbott et al. (2003) that reported a significant positive association 
between higher external audit fees and AC independence.  These contrasting findings could 
be due to the regulatory corporate governance changes in the United States which have 
caused greater AC oversight and have increased the level of disclosure relating to AC roles 
and responsibilities. These regulatory changes could have instigated companies to reinforce 
AC independence in ensuring the quality of the external audit. 
 
Unlike other literature, this study examines the relationship between the independence of the 
AC chair to audit fees (instead of the members’ independence). The reason for not applying 
the latter is that all the top 300 ASX listed companies in Australia will display the same 
extent of non-executive director independence across the committee members. The chair of 
the AC plays an important role in influencing the agenda of the committee and the chair 
needs to have independence for the AC to have credibility. Therefore, it is important to 
examine this association. 
 
The result of this study shows that the independence of AC chair is positive but not 
significantly related with the level of audit fees. It can be argued that the enhanced 
requirement by the ASX CGC which requires the AC to be chaired by an independent chair 
that is not chair of the board of directors could probably cause a lack of association between 
AC chair independence and audit fees. Further, the measure of independence in this study 
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may not be a good indicator to capture the association between chair independence and audit 
fees because an AC chair is often a non-executive director of the firm but could still have a 
substantial relationship with the company that hinders their independence.  
 
The findings in Table 31 reveal that AC financial expertise and AC industry expertise are not 
significantly related to audit fees. However, Abbott et al. (2003), Yatim et al. (2006) and 
Hoitash and Hoitash (2009) reported a significant positive association between audit fees and 
AC expertise. It can be argued that the findings in the previous studies differ from this study 
due to sample size. Abbott et al. (2003) and Hoitash and Hoitash (2009) conducted their 
studies in the United States. The sample of this study is comprised of large Australian 
companies (ASX top 300) and even the large companies are considered small by the United 
States standards (Holland and Ramsay, 2003). Moreover, another possible argument might be 
that some Australian companies may have difficulty assigning independent directors with 
suitable expertise and industry experience to be the members of the AC. As a result, this 
could probably cause the relationship between AC expertise and industry with audit fees to be 
insignificant. 
 
Furthermore, the findings of this study show that AC charter is not significantly related to 
audit fees. The association between AC charter and audit fees is new to the literature and this 
study is the first to examine this association. According to ASX CGC (2007) 
Recommendations 4.3, a firm should have a formal AC charter. An AC charter shows the 
composition of the committee, responsibilities and its basic framework. The enhanced 
requirements could possibly cause a lack of relationship between the AC charter and audit 
fees. To balance this argument, it is found that out of 255 companies sampled in this study, 
only 34 companies do not have an AC formal charter. 
 
In conclusion, the results of this study only show that AC meetings and size are associated 
with audit fees while the rest of the four variables are insignificant. AC frequency of 
meetings and AC size definitely plays a larger role in facilitating the quality of external audit 
in Australian companies. 
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5.4.6.3.4 Results for Model 6 (The Effects of Control Variables on Non-Audit Fees) 
Table 32 shows the regression results for the effects of company-specific control variables on 
non-audit fees. Panel A of Table 32 shows that the model has a reasonable explanatory power. 
R
2
= 0.467 explains that non-audit fees accounts for 46.7% of the variation in the model. 
Adjusted R
2
= 0.440, F-ratio= 17.635 and the model is low in autocorrelation. 
Mutlicolinearity is not a concern as indicated by VIF and tolerance statistics presented in 
Table 32, Panel B (tolerance not below 0.5 and VIF not above 2).  
 
Results in Panel B of Table 32 present the regression coefficients. The coefficients for BIG4 
(whether a firm uses Big Four audit firms) and LNTA (natural log of total assets) are 
positively related to non-audit fees and are significant (p< 0.05). DEBTRATIO (ratio of non-
current liabilities to total assets), FORSUB (ratio of number of foreign subsidiaries to total 
number of subsidiaries), SUB (square root of number of subsidiaries), LOSS (whether a firm 
has reported a loss), INVENRATIO (ratio of inventory to total assets) and RECRATIO (ratio 
of receivables to total assets) are in the predicted direction but not significant in explaining 
non-audit fees. 
 
Alternatively, the remaining two coefficients estimate, MINING (whether a firm is in the 
mining industry) and ROA (ratio of earnings before interest and tax to total assets) is 
negatively related but not significant in explaining non-audit fees too. In terms of board 
characteristics, the coefficient estimates for BODIND (ratio of non-executive directors on the 
board to total number board of directors) and BODMEET (number of board meetings held 
during the year) are in predicted signs but not significantly related to non-audit fees.  
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Table 32: Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results Model 6 (The Effects of Control 
Variables on Non-Audit Fees) 
PANEL A: Model Summary 
R R Square Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
Durbin-
Watson 
F-ratio Sig. 
0.683 0.467 0.440 0.720 1.885 17.635 0.000 
 
PANEL B: Regression Coefficients 
Dependent 
Variable  
LNNON 
AUDFEES 
Unstandardized 
coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
  Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. 
Error 
Beta t-value Sig. Tolerance VIF 
Intercept 0.020 0.046  0.435 0.664   
 
Control  
Variables 
BODIND -0.029 0.052 -0.029 -0.551 0.582 0.785 1.274 
BODMEET -0.018 0.047 -0.018 -0.372 0.710 0.937 1.067 
BIG4 0.263 0.088 0.159 2.983 0.003 0.779 1.284 
MINING -0.069 0.083 -0.045 -0.828 0.408 0.751 1.332 
LOSS 0.000 0.082 0.000 0.004 0.997 0.664 1.506 
ROA -0.034 0.056 -0.035 -0.604 0.547 0.654 1.528 
INVENRATIO 0.005 0.057 0.005 0.086 0.932 0.733 1.363 
RECRATIO 0.110 0.066 0.108 1.677 0.095 0.529 1.889 
DEBTRATIO 0.014 0.051 0.014 0.276 0.783 0.844 1.185 
FORSUB 0.067 0.052 0.064 1.290 0.198 0.884 1.131 
SUB 0.008 0.073 0.008 0.108 0.914 0.500 1.499 
LNTA 0.549 0.072 0.567 7.625 0.000 0.598 1.512 
 
Note: LNNONAUDFEES is total fees paid for non-audit services divided by the total fees paid to the auditors and are then transformed into 
natural log; BODIND is ratio of non-executive directors on the board to total number board of directors; BODMEET is number of board 
meetings held during the year; BIG4 is equal to the value of “1” if a Big 4 auditor is used and “0” when a smaller audit firm is used; 
MINING is equal to the value of “1” when the company is in the mining industry, “0” otherwise; LOSS is equal to the value of “1” if the 
company has reported a loss in any of the three years prior to, “0” otherwise; ROA is ratio of earnings before interest and tax to total assets; 
INVENRATIO is ratio of inventory to total assets; RECRATIO is ratio of receivables to total assets; DEBTRATIO is ratio of non-current 
liabilities to total assets; FORSUB is ratio of number of foreign subsidiaries to total number of subsidiaries; SUB is square root of total 
number of subsidiaries; LNTA is natural log of total assets (in millions). 
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5.4.6.3.5 Results for Model 6 (The Effects of AC Variables on Non-Audit Fees) 
Panel A of Table 33 shows that the model has a reasonable explanatory power. R
2 
= 0.480 
explains that non-audit fees accounts for 48.0% of the variation in the model. Adjusted R
2 
= 
0.440, F-ratio= 8.287 and the model is low in autocorrelation (Durbin-Watson = 1.890) which 
is significant at p< 0.05. Mutlicolinearity is not a concern as indicated by VIF and tolerance 
statistics (tolerance not below 0.5 and VIF not above 2).  
Results in Panel B of Table 33 present the regression coefficients. The coefficient for 
ACMEET (number of AC meetings held during the financial year) and AC SIZE (number of 
members serving on the AC during the financial year) are negatively related to non-audit fees 
and are significant at 0.050 and 0.049 respectively (t= -0.599 and -1.983, p< 0.05), indicating 
that non-audit fees are lower in firms where the AC has more number of meetings held and 
larger number of members serving on the committee.  
 
By comparison, the coefficients for ACCHAIRIND (ratio of scores assigned to each of the 
two criteria for AC chair independence), ACEXP (ratio of number of AC members with 
accounting/financial qualifications to total AC members.), ACINDUS (ratio of number of AC 
members who has worked in the same industry for a substantial number of years to total AC 
members) and ACCHAR (whether the firm has an AC charter) are negative but not 
significantly (p> 0.05) associated with the level of non-audit fees (t= -0.491, t= -1.283, t= -
0.714, t= -0.0281, respectively).  
 
Of all the six AC’s governance characteristics that significantly impact on the effectiveness 
of ACs in their role of ensuring independence of the external auditors, only AC size and AC 
frequency of meetings have an impact. Hence, hypothesis four is also partially supported.  
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Table 33: Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results Model 6 (The Effects of AC 
Variables on Non-Audit Fees) 
PANEL A: Model Summary 
R R Square Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
Durbin-
Watson 
F-ratio Sig. 
0.693 0.480 0.440 0.720 1.890 8.287 0.000 
 
PANEL B: Regression Coefficients 
Dependent 
Variable  
LNNON 
AUDFEES 
Unstandardized 
coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
  Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. 
Error 
Beta t-value Sig. Tolerance VIF 
Constant 0.013 0.046  0.292 0.770   
 
Independent  
Variables  
ACCHAIRIND -0.028 0.057 -0.026 -0.491 0.624 0.779 1.284 
ACEXP -0.071 0.055 -0.068 -1.283 0.201 0.791 1.264 
ACINDUS -0.039 0.055 -0.038 -0.714 0.476 0.775 1.291 
ACMEET -0.035 0.059 -0.035 -0.599 0.050 0.640 1.562 
ACSIZE -0.128 0.065 -0.113 -1.983 0.049 0.683 1.464 
ACCHAR 
 
-0.024 0.087 -0.014 -0.0281 0.779 0.847 1.181 
Control  
Variables 
BODIND -0.029 0.053 -0.029 -0.543 0.588 0.754 1.327 
BODMEET -0.032 0.049 -0.033 -0.653 0.515 0.862 1.161 
BIG4 0.246 0.089 0.148 2.762 0.006 0.764 1.309 
MINING -0.079 0.084 -0.052 -0.945 0.346 0.733 1.364 
LOSS 0.017 0.083 0.012 0.200 0.842 0.646 1.548 
ROA -0.029 0.057 -0.030 -0.513 0.608 0.637 1.569 
INVENRATIO 0.013 0.060 0.013 0.222 0.824 0.663 1.508 
RECRATIO 0.111 0.066 0.109 1.671 0.096 0.521 1.918 
DEBTRATIO 0.020 0.052 0.020 0.381 0.704 0.807 1.240 
FORSUB 0.079 0.054 0.075 1.472 0.142 0.839 1.192 
SUB 0.017 0.073 0.017 0.227 0.821 0.591 1.560 
LNTA 0.471 0.081 0.486 5.843 0.000 0.518 1.143 
 
Note: LNNONAUDFEES is total fees paid for non-audit services divided by the total fees paid to the auditors and are then transformed into 
natural log; ACCHAIRIND is ratio of total scores assigned to each of the two criteria for AC chair independence; ACEXP is ratio of number 
of AC members with accounting/financial qualifications to total AC members; ACINDUS is ratio of number of AC members who has 
worked in the same industry for a substantial number of years (at least 10 years) to total AC members; ACMEET is number of AC meetings 
held during the financial year; ACSIZE is number of members serving on the AC during the financial year; ACCHAR is equal to the value 
of “1” if AC has a charter and “0” otherwise;BODIND is ratio of non-executive directors on the board to total number board of directors; 
BODMEET is number of board meetings held during the year; BIG4 is equal to the value of “1” if a Big 4 auditor is used and “0” when a 
smaller audit firm is used; MINING is equal to the value of “1” when the company is in the mining industry, “0” otherwise; LOSS is equal 
to the value of “1” if the company has reported a loss in any of the three years prior to, “0” otherwise; ROA is ratio of earnings before 
interest and tax to total assets; INVENRATIO is ratio of inventory to total assets; RECRATIO is ratio of receivables to total assets; 
DEBTRATIO is ratio of non-current liabilities to total assets; FORSUB is ratio of number of foreign subsidiaries to total number of 
subsidiaries; SUB is square root of total number of subsidiaries; LNTA is natural log of total assets (in millions). 
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5.4.6.3.6 Discussion of Findings on Model 6 
To this date only four studies examined the association between AC characteristics and non-
audit fees (Abbott et al., 2003; Hoitash and Hoitash, 2009; Lary and Taylor, 2011; Zaman et 
al., 2011). Abbott et al. (2003) found that ACs comprised solely of independent directors and 
meet at least four times annually, are significantly and negatively associated with the non-
audit service fees ratio. Similarly, in the post SOX period, Hoitash and Hoitash (2009) also 
found that strong ACs lead to a smaller proportion of non audit fess with respect to total fees.  
 
In summarizing the effects of AC characteristics on the independence of the external audit 
function, the findings of this study show that higher AC frequency of meetings and AC size 
significantly improve external auditor independence (as proxied by the lower non-audit fee 
ratio). These results are consistent with those observed by Abbott et al. (2003), Hoitash and 
Hoitash (2009) and Lary and Taylor (2011). It could be argued that ACs with more meetings 
and larger size are in a better position to demand higher quality of external auditors by 
ensuring a higher company budget allocated for audit service fees. Thus, higher audit service 
fees would be likely to drive the non-audit fees ratio down. Moreover, stronger ACs (more 
meetings and members) might be reluctant to authorize non-audit service fees provided by 
the external auditors to the management in an attempt to increase external auditors’ 
independence.  
 
In conclusion, the result of this study shows that AC frequency of meetings and AC size are 
associated with non-audit fees while the rest of the four variables are insignificant. AC 
frequency of meetings and AC size definitely play a larger role in ensuring the independence 
of external auditors in Australian companies. 
 
5.4.7 Model 6: Tests of Hypothesis Five 
5.4.7.1 Correlation Analysis 
Table 34 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients for the variables used in the Model 7 
(audit-related agency monitoring costs and total shareholders return). The correlation matrix 
table shows that total shareholders return (TSR) and AC fees ratio (ACFEESRATIO) has a 
reasonable strong positive correlation (0.328) and is significant at p< 0.05. By comparison, 
external audit fees ratio (AUDFEESRATIO) and internal audit function budget ratio 
(IAFBUDRATIO) have a weak negative relationship with the dependent variable of this 
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study (TSR). Further multivariate analysis need to be performed in order to test the strength 
and association of these relationships. 
 
 
Table 34: Correlation Analysis for Model 7 
 TSR 
 
ACFEES 
RATIO 
AUDFEES 
RATIO 
IAFBUD 
RATIO 
TSR 
 
1.00    
ACFEES 
RATIO 
0.328* 1.00   
AUDFEES 
RATIO 
-0.179 0.123 1.00  
IAFBUD 
RATIO 
 
-0.287* -0.049 0.821** 1.00 
                       Note: ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed); * Correlation is at the  
0.05 evel (1-tailed) 
 
 
5.4.7.2 Regression Analysis 
Ordinary least squares regression is used in Model 7 instead of stepwise regression. Although 
this model uses a sample size (n= 36), there are only three variables in the model. Thus, it is 
acceptable to run ordinary least squares regression to test hypothesis five of this study. 
 
5.4.7.2.1 Results for Model 7  
Table 35 shows regression results for the effects of audit-related agency monitoring costs on 
total shareholders return. The model has a low explanatory power. R
2 
= 0.181 shows that total 
shareholders return accounts for only 18.1% of the variation in the model. The model is low 
in autocorrelation (Durbin-Watson = 2.103, p< 0.05.) and mutlicolinearity is not a concern as 
indicated in Panel B where tolerance is not below 0.5 and VIF is not above 2.  
 
In Panel B of Table 35 the regression coefficients show that only ACFEESRATIO (AC fees 
ratio) is positive and significant at 0.041 (t= 1.867, p< 0.05), indicating that higher AC fees 
paid to the chair and the members of the AC will result in higher total return on equity to the 
shareholders of the company. Both independent variables AUDFEESRATIO (external audit 
fees ratio) and IAFBUDRATIO (internal audit function budget ratio) are not significantly 
associated to TSR (total shareholder returns) (p> 0.05). In summary, it can be seen that only 
166 
 
ACFEESRATIO (AC fees ratio) variable is significant. Hence, hypothesis five is also 
partially supported. 
 
 
Table 35: Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results Model 7 
PANEL A: Model Summary 
R R Square Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
Durbin-
Watson 
F-ratio Sig. 
0.426 0.181 0.105 3.242 2.103 2.364 0.090 
 
Panel B: Regression Coefficients 
Dependent 
Variable 
TSR 
Unstandardized 
coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
  Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. 
Error 
Beta t-value Sig. Tolerance VIF 
Intercept 3.59 1.210  2.970 0.006   
 
Independent  
Variables  
ACFEES 
RATIO 
0.000 0.000 0.312 1.867 0.041 0.916 1.092 
AUDFEES 
RATIO 
20.210 348.039 0.017 0.058 0.954 0.599 1.346 
IAFBUD 
RATIO 
 
-0.001 0.001 -0.286 -0.983 0.333 0.503 1.303 
Note: TSR is total shareholders return; ACFEESRATIO is ratio of total fees paid to the chair and AC members 
to total number of AC members; AUDFEESRATIO is ratio of total of external audit fees to total assets; 
IAFBUDRATIO is ratio of total internal audit budget to total assets. 
 
 
5.4.7.2.2 Discussion of Findings on Model 7 
The dependent variable, total shareholders return used in Model 7 captures whether higher 
audit-related agency monitoring costs (i.e., AC fees, external audit fees and internal audit 
function budget) have the effect of achieving higher total returns to the shareholders. The 
findings in Table 35 show that AC fees are significantly related to total shareholders return 
which leads to partial acceptance of hypothesis five. 
 
This result infers that shareholders tend to obtain an economically rational outcome from the 
board’s approval of relatively higher AC fees paid to the chair and members of the AC, 
because this impacts positively on total shareholders returns. This significant cost-benefit 
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result for the AC could reflect the fact that a larger AC that meets more frequently would 
incur relatively higher AC fees. Such larger and more active ACs are found to generate 
stronger internal and external auditing for the company. That is, in Models 1, 2, 5 and 6 in 
this study it is found that AC size, and in some cases AC meeting frequency, is significantly 
positively related to higher resourcing of the internal audit function, as well as higher external 
audit fees (indicating higher audit quality) and lower non-audit fees (indicating greater 
auditor independence). These internal and external audit improvements brought about by 
larger, more active and, presumably, more costly ACs, are found in Model 7 to translate into 
greater benefits in terms of returns to shareholders. 
 
However, Table 35 also reveals that no such economically rational outcome is achieved for 
the shareholders, at least in the short term, from relatively higher costs being incurred directly 
on external audit fees and internal audit function budget. These variables do not significantly 
affect shareholders return. This finding in Model 7 may be due to the simple fact that these 
higher costs do not outweigh the company benefits gained from the improved internal and 
external audit services, as perceived in the share-market. Alternatively, other short-term 
phenomena may have had a confounding effect on shareholders return in this study. In 
particular, this study is based on data from the 2009- 2010 financial years which was still 
under the effects of the global financial crisis. So relatively higher costs incurred on internal 
and external auditing services in that year could have been less sensitive to the determination 
of shareholders return in the Australian share-market in that year.  
  
In conclusion, this study suggests that higher audit-related agency monitoring costs incurred 
on the AC itself have economic benefits in terms of generating greater shareholder return, at 
least in the short-term in a climate of financial market downturn. Interestingly, no such short-
term economic benefits to the shareholders in a climate of financial market downturn are 
found from higher costs incurred on the companies’ internal and external audit services.  
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5.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the results of the data analysis (questionnaire-data based sample and 
secondary-data based sample) in relation to the effectiveness of ACs in performing their roles 
especially in the internal audit function and external audit is discussed in detail. In general, 
results of this study are mixed. 
 
Hypothesis one (a) is partially supported. Only AC size is positive and significantly 
associated with financial resources devoted to the internal audit function. Furthermore, 
hypothesis one (b) is also partially supported. The findings show that both AC financial 
expertise and AC size are positive and significantly related to internal audit function labour 
hours. Conversely, hypotheses two (a) and (b) are rejected as no results are generated from 
the stepwise regressions. This latter finding illustrates that no attributes of ACs governance 
characteristics have a significant impact on the effectiveness of ACs in their role of ensuring 
the internal audit function independence. Hypothesis three is partially supported too. AC size 
and AC frequency of meetings are positive and significantly related to external audit fees. In 
addition, hypothesis four is also partially accepted. Both AC size and frequency of meetings 
are negatively and significantly related to non-audit fees. Finally, hypothesis five is partially 
accepted as AC fees are positive and significantly related to total shareholders return.  
 
The following chapter, Chapter 6, presents a comparative case study analysis for four 
companies in the financials and materials industries, respectively. This next chapter will 
provide a more in-depth analysis on the key AC’s governance characteristics that are found to 
be significant in this chapter.  
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CHAPTER 6. COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
6.1 Introduction 
A more in-depth analysis is reported in this chapter on the key AC’s governance 
characteristics that are found to be significant in the regression analysis from the previous 
chapter (Chapter 5). To this end, comparative analysis of two companies from the financials 
industry and two companies from the materials industry is performed. Due to the issue of 
confidentiality, the four companies will not be named. The companies will be called 
Company A, Company B, Company C and Company D instead. Company A and Company B 
are in the financials industry while Company C and Company D are in the materials industry. 
 
First, the companies are compared according to the profile of each company and its audit 
committee. Then, a detailed descriptive analysis on the nature and activities of the internal 
audit function, the relationship between the AC and the internal audit function and the 
independence of the internal audit function of each company is contrasted and examined. A 
discussion and interpretation of the descriptive analysis of these companies are provided in 
the latter section of the chapter. 
 
6.2 Selection of the Companies  
The findings of the data analysis presented in Chapter 5 shows that AC size, AC expertise 
and AC frequency of meetings play a significant role in relation to the effectiveness of ACs 
in performing their roles, especially in the internal audit function. The test of hypothesis one 
(a) shows that AC size is significantly associated to financial resources devoted to the internal 
audit function, and the test of hypothesis one (b) shows that both AC expertise and AC size 
are significantly related to labour hours devoted to the internal audit function. Furthermore, 
for hypothesis three, the results reveal that AC size and AC frequency of meetings are 
significantly associated to external audit fees. Hypothesis four also shows that both AC size 
and AC frequency of meetings are negatively and significantly associated to non-audit fees.  
 
The results of significant AC characteristics are used as the criteria for selecting the 
companies for comparative case study analysis in this chapter. The case companies are drawn 
from the companies of 36 respondents collected from the questionnaire. Four companies are 
selected (two companies from the financials industry and two companies from the materials 
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industry). In the financials industry, Company A and Company B are chosen because these 
two companies have the largest and the smallest AC size, respectively, in the financials 
industry. Company A has the largest AC size with a total of nine members while Company B 
has the smallest AC size with a total of three members. Both companies have the same level 
of AC expertise but a different AC frequency of meetings per year. 
 
For the second pair of companies, drawn from the materials industry, the selection criterion is 
the characteristics of AC frequency of meetings. Company C and Company D are selected 
because these two companies have the highest and lowest AC frequency of meetings in a year. 
Company C has the highest AC frequency of meetings with a total of nine meetings per year 
while Company D has the lowest AC frequency of meetings with a total of two meetings per 
year. Both companies have the same AC size but different level of AC expertise.  
 
In summary, by comparing two companies in the same industry at the low and high end of the 
scale for AC size and AC frequency of meetings, a detailed picture can be provided, whether 
a company with a larger AC size or higher AC frequency of meetings is better at ensuring the 
effectiveness of its internal audit function compared to a company with a smaller AC size and 
lower AC frequency of meetings.  
 
6.3 Comparative Case Study in the Financials Industry 
A comparison is made between Company A and Company B in the financials industry. The 
data used are secondary data collected from the annual reports, various financial data 
collected from the online databases and also information extracted from extra questions in the 
questionnaire (not used in the statistical analysis in Chapter 4). 
 
6.3.1 Profile of the Companies 
Company A is a banking and financial services provider in Australia while Company B is a 
general insurance group with operations in Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and 
Asia. Both companies are categorised in the ASX GICS financials industry. In terms of 
company size, Company A is a much larger public listed company with a total asset of 
$618.28 billion while Company B has a total asset of $20.45 billion. Based on market 
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capitalisation, Company A is listed on the ASX top 20 whereas Company B is listed on the 
ASX top 21-100. 
 
For growth comparison between these two companies, Company A has a higher percentage 
of three years sales growth, 23.3% compared to Company B with only 1.6%. However, 
Company A has a lower percentage of operating cash flow ratio with only 1.0% of ability to 
convert assets into cash whereas Company B has 5.5% of ability to convert assets into cash. 
For current ratio, every $1.00 owed by Company A in current liabilities, it has $0.01 of 
current assets whereas every $1.00 owed by Company B in current liabilities, it has $0.64 of 
current assets. This suggests that Company B has a better ability than Company A to meet its 
short-term obligations.  
 
Alternatively, Company A has higher overall return generated for its shareholders with a total 
shareholders return of 526.2% compared to Company B with a total shareholders return of 
56.3%. When comparing business performance, Company B has a slightly higher return on 
assets (0.99%) than Company A (0.95%). For firm complexity, Company A has a total 
number of 264 subsidiaries, more than Company B that has 107 subsidiaries. However, 
Company A has less number of foreign subsidiaries (62) compared to Company B (66). 
 
For external audit comparison, both companies engaged big 4 audit firm for their external 
audit services. Since Company A is a bigger company they paid more audit fees to their 
external auditors, $16.38 million compared to Company B that paid $9.5 million audit fees to 
their external auditor (half of Company A’s audit fees). Furthermore, Company A paid a total 
of $2.9 million to their external auditors for non-audit service engagement whereas Company 
B paid a total of $1.2million. 
 
6.3.2 Profile of the ACs 
As mentioned above, the condition of selection being that these companies has the biggest 
and the smallest AC size. Company A has a bigger AC (9 members) compared to Company B 
(3 members). Both companies have the same level of expertise among their AC members 
where 66.7% of their members have accounting or financial qualifications. However, 
Company B has higher percentage of members that have worked in the financials industry for 
at least 10 years (100%) compared to Company A (66.7%). In terms of AC frequency of 
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meetings, Company B has more AC meetings than Company A with a total of 6 meetings and 
4 meetings per year respectively. Both companies have a formal AC charter published on 
their company website. On the other hand, Company A has higher AC chair independence 
(100%) in contrast to Company B (75%). Last but not least, Company A paid $75,000 AC 
fees per annum to its chair and members whereas Company B paid $21,000 less. 
 
6.3.3 Questionnaire Comparison  
6.3.3.1 Introduction 
Findings from Chapter 5 illustrates that AC size plays a significant role in relation to the 
effectiveness of AC in performing their roles especially in overseeing the quality of the 
internal audit function. A larger AC size in a company would ensure higher quality of internal 
audit function by allocating more budget and labour hours to internal audit activities. Thus, 
using information collected from the questionnaire, this section will compare Company A 
(largest AC size) with Company B (smallest AC size). 
 
6.3.3.2 Profile of the Internal Audit Function 
Since Company A is a much bigger company, it has a very large internal audit function in 
contrast to Company B. Company A employed 100 professional staff in their internal audit 
function with 76 full- time equivalent staff whereas Company B employed only 22 
professional staff with 17 full- time equivalent staff. Both companies have the same 
approximate total budget allocated to their internal audit function (approximately $1,000,000 
and above). On average, 2600 hours per person are devoted to internal audit services by 
Company B’s professional staff for the financial year ending in 2010. However, Company A 
allocated less labour hours to their internal audit function. On average, 1500 hours per person 
are devoted to internal audit services by Company A’s professional staff during the same 
financial year. 
 
Moreover, Company A reported that sometimes its internal audit function provide a training 
ground as part of its employees’ career path in the company and often has internal audit 
function staff moving to other management functions within the organization. In contrast, 
Company B reported that its internal audit function sometimes provide a training ground as 
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part of the employees’ career paths and sometimes having internal audit function staff 
moving to other management functions within the organization. 
 
6.3.3.3 Internal Audit Function Activities 
Proportion of total labour hours allocated to internal audit function activities differ slightly 
between Company A and Company B. Company A has the most percentage of labour hours 
allocated to maintaining the efficacy of management control systems (50%), evaluating the 
effectiveness of risk management (30%), and both at 10% for financial statement auditing 
and engaging in board and other corporate governance support work. Conversely, Company 
B has the most percentage of labour hours allocated to evaluating the effectiveness of risk 
management (47%), maintaining the efficacy of management control systems (46%), 
financial statement auditing (5%) and deterring and investigating fraud (2%). No total hours 
are assigned to engaging in board and other corporate governance support work. 
 
6.3.3.4 Internal Audit Function Authority 
Good AC practices in overseeing the internal audit function include: 1) making 
recommendations to the board on the appointment and dismissal of CIA; 2) ensuring that 
internal audit activity reports to the AC for functional purposes and reports to the CEO for 
administrative purposes and 3) reviewing internal audit resources and budget setting 
(AUASB, AICD and IIA, 2008).  
 
Both companies strongly agree that their internal audit function reports to the AC, CEO and 
CFO. Company A strongly agrees that AC and CEO in their company are responsible for 
setting and approving the internal audit budget compared to CFO. However, the situation is 
totally different for Company B. Both CEO and CFO play the most important role in 
Company B’s internal budget setting compared to AC. Moreover, for Company A, AC, CEO, 
and CFO share the same responsibility in appointing and replacing the CIA of internal audit 
function whereas for Company B, CEO plays the most important role in appointing and 
replacing the CIA. 
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6.3.3.5 Internal Audit Function and External Auditors 
For coordination of  internal audit function with the external auditors, both companies’ 
internal audit function often work together with their external auditors in the areas of internal 
audit coverage. Company A’s internal audit function also coordinate internal audit work 
schedule with their external auditors but Company B’s internal audit function only 
occasionally coordinate internal audit work schedule with their external auditors. On the 
other hand, the external auditors of Company A always have access to the working papers 
and most management reports of the internal audit function but the external auditors of 
Company B has limited access. 
 
6.3.3.6 AC and Internal Audit Function 
The internal audit function of Company A and Company B have the same number of 
meetings (4 meetings per year) with their AC but Company A has longer length of meetings 
(on average 180 minutes per meeting) compared to Company B (on average 30 minutes per 
meeting). In terms of privacy of the internal audit function meetings with the AC, all 
Company A’s meetings are partially private while all Company B’s meetings are totally 
private.  
 
The internal audit function of each company is asked to rate the overall expertise of their AC 
members in regards to accounting, auditing and internal control matters. Both Company A 
and Company B rated the expertise of its AC being good. Furthermore, there is a huge 
comparison between the two companies in relation to AC reviewing the plans of the internal 
audit function. Company A’s AC often reviews the plans of the internal audit function in 
terms of its scheduling of work projects and co-coordinating with the external auditors but 
Company B’s AC never does so.  
 
Moreover, Company A’s AC receives more reports from its internal audit function compared 
to Company B. Company A’s AC receives more than 6 reports per year regarding routine 
internal audit activities and receives 3 to 5 reports per year regarding special investigations. 
In contrast, Company B’s AC receives 3 to 5 reports per year relating to routine internal audit 
activities and receives only 1 to 2 reports per year relating to special investigations from its 
internal audit function. 
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6.3.3.7 Internal Audit Function Independence  
Company A’s internal audit function has a better existing relationship with its AC and 
Company A’s internal auditors also provide a strong backing for the maintenance of their 
internal audit function’s independence in contrast to Company B. In addition, the 
independence of both companies’ internal audit function is strongly upheld because of their 
AC members have strong collective independence. The AC of Company A and Company B 
would be prepared to take action to maintain the independence of their internal audit function 
if it is threatened by the management of the company. 
 
6.3.3.8 Discussion 
The relationship between the internal audit function and the AC in an organization is deemed 
to be a critical one. The goals of these two functions are closely related to each another and a 
good relationship between them can enhance the overall quality of corporate governance. An 
effective AC can enhance the status of the internal audit function and in turn the internal audit 
function can help the AC in detecting financial misstatements (McHugh and Raghunandan, 
1994). From the comparison of questionnaire data provided by the CIA of Company A 
(largest AC size) and Company B (smallest AC size), it can be seen that there are several 
differences between these two companies.  
 
Firstly, substantial differences are found in the distribution of total labour hours allocated to 
different internal audit function activities. Company A’s total labour hours are dominated by 
maintaining the efficacy of management control systems, evaluating the effectiveness of risk 
management, financial statement auditing and engaging in board and other corporate 
governance support work. By comparison, Company B allocated its total hours more 
narrowly on maintaining the efficacy of management control systems and evaluating the 
effectiveness of risk management. This shows that Company A devotes a consideration 
portion of internal audit hours to more internal control activities compared to Company B. It 
can be argued that Company A, having a larger AC, has a more diverse set of skills and 
knowledge to oversee and support the internal audit function’s development and execution of 
its internal control systems. A larger AC will put a stronger emphasis on preventing material 
control weaknesses, reacting proactively to increase internal controls, upholding corporate 
governance support work and increasing financial statement auditing. 
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The second main difference is Company A’s AC has more authority than the CEO and CFO 
in internal audit budget setting, compared to Company B where the AC has no authority to 
override the CEO and CFO. It can be argued that Company A’s larger AC size gives it more 
authority and voice in internal audit budget setting than Company B’s small AC size. Larger 
ACs should command relatively more internal audit function oversight and be able to demand 
relatively greater resources and internal audit focus allocated to internal controls. Carcello et 
al. (2005) found a positive association between ACs that reviewed the internal audit’s budget 
and the size of the budget.  
 
To ensure an effective internal control system is implemented within an organization, the AC 
is responsible to review the internal audit proposals related to plans, programs and 
coordination with external auditors (Raghunandan et al., 2001). From the comparison 
between these two companies, it can be seen that Company A’s AC often reviews or assesses 
the plans of the internal audit function in terms of scheduling of work projects and 
coordinating with the external auditors, but Company B’s AC never does so. This implies that 
Company B’s larger AC has more members with technical expertise collectively have a better 
understanding of the internal audit function’s work and have the ability to review all the work 
and plans done by the internal audit function. According to Carcello et al. (2005), the review 
of the internal audit plans by the AC suggests a greater commitment to internal audit 
monitoring and risk oversight and is likely to manifest itself in greater resources being 
provided to internal audit. 
 
Also, Company A’s AC receives more reports from its internal audit function regarding 
routine internal audit activities and special investigations compared to Company B’s AC. It 
can be argued that more members in the AC will ensure better quality of the internal audit 
function by demanding that internal auditors to provide more reports related to internal audit 
activities. Felo et al. (2003) argued that a larger AC increases financial reporting quality as it 
is more likely to discover and solve potential risks in the financial reporting process. This 
may be possible if the resources available to the AC are increased to improve the oversight of 
financial reporting.  
 
The next main difference reported is that Company A’s internal audit employees have a 
longer length of meetings with their AC (on average 150 minutes per meetings longer) 
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compared to Company B. To improve the effectiveness of the internal audit function, 
conducting regular meetings between the AC and the internal audit function is vital 
(Scarbrough et al., 1998). Thus, this shows that Company A’s larger AC is more efficient in 
organizing meetings with its internal audit employees and ensures that longer meetings are 
conducted. More hours spent on conducting a meeting will better enable the needs of the 
organization to be met by ensuring the planned scope of internal auditing issues are discussed 
and reviewed during the meeting.  
 
For internal audit function independence, it is found that Company A’s internal audit function 
has a better existing relationship with its AC. Also Company A’s internal auditors provide a 
strong backing for the maintenance of their internal audit function’s independence in contrast 
to Company B. Moreover, it is likely that the strong internal audit function of Company A 
(i.e., the internal auditors provide a strong backing for the maintenance of their internal audit 
function’s independence) can enhance the effectiveness of the AC; an effective AC (i.e., 
larger size) in turn can strengthen the position of the internal audit function. Goodwin and 
Yeo (2001) found that an effective AC can strengthen the position of the internal audit 
function by acting as an independent forum in which internal auditors may raise matters 
affecting management.  
 
Based on the assessment above of the main differences found in the comparative case study 
analysis between Company A (largest AC size) and Company B (smallest AC size), the 
findings are compatible with the results from the hypotheses test in Chapter 5. AC size does 
play a significant role in relation to the effectiveness of an AC in performing its role in 
overseeing the quality of the internal audit function. This case assessment re-enforces the 
results of regression models 1 and 2. However, this conclusion needs to be qualified by the 
fact that other variables such as the complexity of business arrangement could also affect the 
effectiveness of an AC in performing its role in overseeing the quality of the internal audit 
function. 
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6.4 Comparative Case Study in the Materials Industry 
A comparison is made between Company C and Company D in the materials industry. The 
data used in the comparative case study are secondary data and also data collected from the 
questionnaire for financial year ending in 2010. 
 
6.4.1 Profile of the Companies 
Company C is a global corporation and among the world’s largest producers of commodities. 
Activities involve mining, exploration, production and distribution of minerals, petroleum 
and uranium. Conversely, Company D is an Australian-based nickel sulphide explorer and 
producer. In terms of company size, Company C is a large public listed company in Australia 
with a total asset of $122.32 billion while Company D has a total asset of $0.52 billion. Based 
on market capitalisation, Company C is listed on the ASX top 20 whereas Company D is 
listed on the ASX top 101- 300. 
 
For growth comparison between these two companies, Company D has a very much higher 
percentage of three years sales growth, 113.9% than Company C with only 9.7% of three 
years sales growth rate. However, Company D has a lower percentage of operating cash flow 
ratio, 16.7% of ability to convert assets into cash compared to Company C, 3.5% more ability 
to convert assets into cash. For current ratio, every $1.00 owed by Company C in current 
liabilities, it has $1.96 of current assets whereas every $1.00 owed by Company D in current 
liabilities, it $2.22 of current assets. This proved that Company D has a better capacity than 
company C to pay short-term obligations. For total shareholders return, Company C has a 
really excellent and high overall return generated for its shareholders with a total 
shareholders return of 304.9% compared to Company D with a total shareholders return of 
72.2%. 
 
Furthermore, 56.7% of Company D’s total assets are financed through long term debt 
whereas only 15.3% of Company C’s total assets are financed through long term debt. When 
comparing business performance, Company C has a higher return on assets (14.7%) than 
Company D (6.9%). For company complexity, Company C has a total of 77 subsidiaries (39 
foreign subsidiaries) more than Company D which has a total of 4 subsidiaries (no foreign 
subsidiaries). For external audit comparison, Company C employs big 4 audit firm for its 
external audit services while Company D employs a smaller audit firm. Since Company C is 
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a much bigger company they paid more audit fees to their external auditors, $15.70 million 
compared to Company D that paid only $132,000 audit fees to its external auditors. Moreover, 
Company C paid a total of $10.36 million to its external auditors for non-audit service 
engagements whereas Company D paid a total of $26,000. 
 
6.4.2 Profile of the ACs 
As mentioned above, the condition of selection being that these companies have the most and 
least frequency of AC meetings in a year. Company C has the most frequency of AC 
meetings, 9 meetings in a year compared to Company D with only 2 meetings in a year. 
Although Company C is a much larger company than Company D, both companies have the 
same number of members on the AC (4 members) and both companies also have the same 
level of AC chair independence (50%). 
  
Company C has a higher level of expertise among its members where 75% of its AC 
members have accounting or financial qualifications whereas only 50% of Company D’s AC 
members have accounting or financial qualifications. However, Company D has higher 
percentage of members that has worked in the materials industry for at least 10 years (50%) 
compared to Company C (25%). Both companies have a formal AC charter published on 
their company website.  On the other hand, Company C paid a total of $ 75,000 AC fees per 
annum to its chair and members whereas Company D paid $47,000 less. 
 
6.4.3 Questionnaire Comparison  
6.4.3.1  Introduction 
Results from previous chapter (Chapter 5) shows that AC frequency of meetings is significant 
in relation to the effectiveness of AC in performing roles of overseeing the quality of the 
internal audit function. ACs who meet frequently are more likely to be informed about the 
internal auditing issues and subsequently demand higher quality of internal audits. Hence, 
using information collected from the questionnaire, this section will compare Company C 
which has the most frequency of AC meetings in a year with Company D which has the least 
frequency of AC meetings in a year. 
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6.4.3.2 Profile of the Internal Audit Function 
Given that Company C is a huge company in Australia, it has a very large internal audit 
function compared to Company D. Company C hired 54 professional staff in its internal audit 
function with 36 full-time equivalent staff whereas Company D just has one professional staff. 
There is also a huge comparison between the total budgets allocated to internal audit function 
by each company. Company C has approximately $1,000,000 and above total budget 
allocated to its internal audit function while Company D only has approximately $20,000 and 
below total budget allocated to its internal audit function. On average, 1300 hours per person 
are devoted to internal audit services by Company C’s professional staff for financial year 
ending in 2010. Company D allocated 800 less labour hours per person to its internal audit 
function. 
 
Furthermore, Company C reported that its internal audit function always provide a training 
ground as part of its employees’ career path in the company and always has internal audit 
function staff moving to other management functions within the organization. In contrast, 
Company D reported that its internal audit function only occasionally provide a training 
ground as part of the employees’ career path and never has staff moving to other management 
functions within the organization. 
 
6.4.3.3 Internal Audit Function Activities 
The proportion of total labour hours allocated to internal audit function activities differ 
between Company C and Company D. Company C has the most percentage of labour hours 
allocated to maintaining the efficacy of management control systems (45%), evaluating the 
effectiveness of risk management (25%), financial statement auditing and engaging in board 
and other corporate governance support work (both at 10%) and deterring and investigating 
fraud (5%). On the other hand, Company D has the most percentage of labour hours allocated 
to maintaining the efficacy of management control systems (50%), evaluating the 
effectiveness of risk management (40%) and engaging in board and other corporate 
governance support work (10%). No total hours are allocated to deterring and investigating 
fraud and financial statement auditing. 
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6.4.3.4 Internal Audit Function Authority 
Both companies have their internal audit function reports to the AC and CFO. Company C 
strongly agrees that AC and CFO in the company are responsible for setting and approving 
the internal audit budget compared to the CEO. However, the situation is totally different for 
Company D. CFO plays the most important role in Company D’s internal audit budget setting 
compared to AC and CEO. Moreover, for Company C, AC and CFO share the same 
responsibility in appointing and replacing the CIA of the internal audit function whereas for 
Company D, the CFO plays the most important role in appointing and replacing the CIA. 
 
6.4.3.5 Internal Audit Function and External Auditors 
Company C’s internal audit function has a very much better coordination with its external 
auditors compared to Company D. Company C’s internal audit function always work together 
with their external auditors in the areas of internal audit coverage and internal audit work 
schedule but the situation is totally opposite for Company D. In addition, the external auditors 
of Company C always have access to the working papers and most management reports of 
the internal audit function compared to the external auditors of Company D that has no access 
at all. 
 
6.4.3.6 AC and Internal Audit Function 
The internal audit function of Company C has more meetings (8 meetings per year) with its 
AC in contrast to Company D (4 meetings per year). Also Company C has longer length of 
meetings (on average 120 minutes per meeting) compared to Company D (on average 30 
minutes per meeting). In terms of privacy of the meetings with the AC, some of Company 
C’s meetings in a year have private time while Company D has no private meetings at all.  
 
The internal audit functions of each company are asked to rate the overall expertise of their 
AC members in regards to accounting, auditing and internal control matters. There is a huge 
comparison between these two companies. Company C rated the expertise of its AC being 
excellent while Company D rated the expertise of its AC being poor. Moreover, Company 
C’s AC often review the plans of the internal audit function in terms of its scheduling of work 
projects and co-coordinating with the external auditors. Conversely, Company D’s AC only 
occasionally reviews the plans of the internal audit function in terms of its scheduling of 
work projects and co-coordinating with the external auditors. In addition, Company C’s AC 
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also receives more reports from their internal audit function compared to Company D. 
Company C’s AC receives 3 to 5 reports per year regarding routine internal audit activities 
and special investigations. In contrast, Company D’s AC receives only 1 to 2 reports per year. 
 
6.4.3.7 Internal Audit Function Independence  
Company C’s internal audit function has a very much better existing relationship with its AC 
and its internal auditors provide a strong backing for the maintenance of their internal audit 
function’s independence compared to Company D. In addition, the independence of 
Company C’s internal audit function is strongly upheld because of its AC members have 
strong collective independence in contrast to Company D. The AC of both companies would 
be prepared to take action to maintain the independence of their internal audit function if it is 
threatened by the management of the company. 
 
6.4.3.8 Discussion 
From the comparison of questionnaire data provided by the CIA of Company C which has the 
most AC frequency of meetings and Company D which has the least AC frequency of 
meetings, it can be seen that there are several distinguish differences between these two 
companies. First and foremost, Company C has a huge amount of total internal audit budget 
and labour hours allocated to the internal audit function. It also has more professional internal 
audit staff employed in the company compared to Company D.  
 
It is found that Company C’s AC that meets more often than Company D’s AC in a year is 
more likely to discuss issues faced by the internal audit function and to review the planned 
scope of the internal auditing. Thus, Company C’s AC is more likely to be up to date about 
the current internal auditing issues faced by the company and is more attentive in discharging 
its responsibilities by allocating more resources (budget, staff and total labour hours) to the 
internal audit function. Carcello et al. (2005) found that the internal audit budget is higher 
when the AC reviews the internal audit budget. Also, Raghunandan et al. (2001) found that 
ACs that meet at least four times annually are more likely to review and approve the internal 
audit’s plans and budget. 
 
Additionally, this study finds substantial differences in the allocation of total labour hours to 
the internal audit function activities. Company C’s total labour hours are dominated by 
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maintaining the efficacy of management control systems, evaluating the effectiveness of risk 
management, financial statement auditing, engaging in board and other corporate governance 
support work and deterring and investigating fraud. In contrast, Company D’s internal audit 
function allocated its total hours more on maintaining the efficacy of management control 
systems, evaluating the effectiveness of risk management and engaging in board and other 
corporate governance support work.  
 
It can be seen that Company C allocates a larger portion of internal audit hours to more 
internal control activities compared to Company D. Company C‘s AC whom meet more 
frequently is likely to demand a higher quality from the internal audit function by ensuring 
that the internal auditors engage in performing more testing on controls, evaluating risk 
management, investigating fraud, performing financial statement audits and providing 
corporate governance support work. Abbott et al. (2010) argued that an effective AC wants to 
heighten the quality of the internal audit function and wishes to have the internal audit 
function allocate relatively more of its resources towards internal control evaluation.  
 
The next main difference is that Company C‘s AC and CFO share authority in internal audit 
function budget setting compared to Company D where only the CFO has authority in budget 
setting. It is likely that, with more frequent meetings in a year, Company C‘s AC is more 
informed and knowledgeable about the internal audit function and would demand more 
resources for the internal audit function when setting the budget. Christopher et al. (2009) 
argued that giving the CEO or CFO sole responsibility for setting approving the internal audit 
budget may be considered a serious threat to the independence of the internal audit function 
as the imposing of budget constraints is a powerful tool with which management can reduce 
the scope and impact of the internal audit function.  
 
Moreover, Company C‘s AC and CFO have the most substantial influence in any decisions to 
appoint or replace the CIA compared to Company D where the CFO has the most authority. 
McHugh and Raghunandan (1994) found that a large majority of internal auditors indicated 
that giving vesting or firing authority to the AC would enhance the independence of the 
internal audit function, reduce oversight by the AC and improve the ability of internal 
auditors to generate action on audit findings. Also, Scarbrough et al. (1998) found that when 
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an AC is involved in decisions to dismiss the CIA, the CIA is more likely to have private 
access to the AC.  
 
A further notable difference is that Company C’s internal audit function has more frequent 
meetings and also has a longer length of meetings with its AC in contrast to Company D. 
According to Scarbrough et al. (1998), conducting regular meetings between the AC and 
internal audit function is widely recognized as an important vehicle of improving the 
effectiveness of internal audit in the company. In reference to Company C, its AC which has 
more frequent meetings would be more attentive to issues faced by the internal audit function. 
In addition, some meetings of Company C’s internal audit function with their AC have 
private time while there are no private meetings between Company D’s internal audit 
function and its AC. Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) argued that the meetings between the CIA 
and the AC should be conducted in private without the presence of members of company 
management, since private meetings serve the purpose of enhancing and protecting the 
independence of internal auditors. 
 
In terms of the expertise of AC members, Company C’s internal audit function rated the 
overall expertise of its AC members in regards to accounting, auditing and internal control 
matters as excellent while the scenario is totally different for Company D. Company D’s 
internal audit function rated the overall expertise of its AC members in as poor. This indicates 
that effective ACs where Company C has more frequent AC meetings and higher AC 
expertise than Company D are seen by their internal audit function as knowledgeable. 
Raghunandan et al. (1998) found that ACs which granted private access to the CIA, and 
reviewed both the program and results of the internal auditing, are perceived as 
knowledgeable about accounting and auditing issues by the company’s CIA. 
 
From the comparison of responses between Company C and Company D, Company C’s AC 
often reviews or assesses the plans of the internal audit function in terms of scheduling of 
work projects in contrast to Company D’s AC. A possible argument might be that Company 
C’s AC that meets frequently, is more likely to be up to date about the current internal 
auditing issues faced by the company and is more diligent in discharging its responsibility of 
reviewing the internal audit function’s plan. Goodwin and Yeo (2001) found that almost 70% 
of ACs in Singapore reviewed all plans, budget and results relating to financial reporting, 
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internal control and compliance. Furthermore, Company C’s AC receives more reports from 
its internal audit function regarding routine internal audit activities and special investigations 
as compared to Company D’s AC. It can be argued that with more frequent meetings, AC is 
more knowledgeable about the internal audit function and will ensure better quality of the 
internal audit function by demanding the internal auditors provide more reports related to 
internal audit activities.  
 
Turning to the issue of ensuring the independence of the internal audit function, it is found 
that Company C’s internal audit function has a better existing relationship with its AC. 
Moreover, the internal auditors at Company C provide a strong backing for the maintenance 
of its internal audit function’s independence in contrast to Company D. Moreover, the 
independence of Company C’s internal audit function is strongly upheld because AC 
members have strong collective independence compared to Company D. Scarborough et al. 
(1998) suggested that effective ACs are associated with objective and independent internal 
audit functions. This upholding of independence suggests that Company C’s AC has a good 
working relationship with its internal audit function. Company C’s more effective AC can 
strengthen the position of the internal audit function by acting as an independent forum for 
internal auditors to raise matters affecting the internal audit function (Goodwin and Yeo, 
2001). Simultaneously, Company C’s internal audit function can assist its AC fulfilling its 
oversight role regarding reporting, risk management and control. This, in turn implies a 
higher quality of internal audit function. 
 
Based on the assessment of the main differences found in the comparative case study between 
Company C (most AC frequency of meetings) and Company D (least AC frequency of 
meetings), strong evidence is found to support findings in Chapter 5. AC frequency of 
meetings plays an important part in relation to the effectiveness of an AC in performing its 
role of overseeing the quality of the internal audit function. The results of regression models 
1 and 2 are confirmed by this comparative case study analysis. However, this conclusion 
needs to be qualified by the fact that other variables such as the complexity of business 
arrangement could also affect the effectiveness of an AC in performing its role in overseeing 
the quality of the internal audit function. 
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6.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, a comparative case study analysis between two different companies in the 
financials and materials industry is discussed in detail. The results are generally supportive 
where AC size and frequency of meetings play a significant role in relation to the 
effectiveness of AC in performing their roles especially in the internal audit function and are 
consistent with results of the regression models in Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS,  
IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
7.1 Introduction 
This concluding chapter is structured into four sections. The first section will reiterate the 
purpose, rationale and approach taken in this study and summarise conclusions from the 
findings. The second section discusses the limitations of the study. In the third section, the 
practical implications of the study are considered. The final section contains some 
suggestions for future research. 
 
7.2 Summary of the Study 
The main aim of this study is to contribute to existing literature on AC effectiveness in 
fulfilling its audit oversight role, as assessed through its corporate governance characteristics.  
No prior empirical evidence has been provided from the viewpoint of testing the 
effectiveness of AC’s governance characteristics in fulfilling their dual roles of overseeing 
the internal and external audit functions. Moreover, previous studies have been limited in 
measuring the effectiveness of ACs and this study will provide a more comprehensive 
empirical design.  
 
This study also has practical motivation. It examines AC effectiveness under the ASX CGC 
revised 2007 edition best practice recommendations. The Australian context lends itself to 
research as this 2007 regulatory change relating to ACs, enables the findings of this study to 
give an assessment of whether regulatory changes have strengthened the AC roles or not. A 
further practical consequence of this research is to assess whether higher agency costs (i.e., 
AC fees, external audit fees and internal audit budget) can better protect the interest of the 
shareholders. 
 
This study is based on economic perspectives embodied in agency theory. The premise is that 
the AC, through its monitoring roles, will reduce agency problems associated with 
information asymmetry and moral hazard. The concept of AC effectiveness can be 
benchmarked against the roles outlined for ACs by the ASX CGC. Four of these AC roles are 
examined in this study: 1) AC overseeing the quality of the internal audit function, 2) AC 
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ensuring the independence of the internal audit function, 3) AC facilitating the quality of the 
external audit and 4) AC ensuring the independence of the external auditors. Five hypotheses 
are developed from AC studies and this study has identified five factors that impact on the 
role of effectiveness of an AC (i.e., independence of AC chair, financial and industry 
expertise of AC members, frequency of meetings of AC, size of AC and AC formal charter). 
 
Mixed methods are used to gather both primary and secondary data. There are two stages of 
data collection employed- the questionnaire data collection stage and the secondary data 
collection stage. In the first stage of data collection, a questionnaire is developed and 
administered to the CIA of the sampled companies. In the second stage of data collection, 
secondary data (financial and non-financial) of top 300 ASX listed companies listed during 
the 2010 financial year is hand collected from annual reports and financial databases. The 
five hypotheses of this study are tested using ordinary least squares and stepwise regression 
models. A comparative case study analysis is also performed for four specific companies, two 
from the financials industry and two from the materials industry. Comparative case study 
analysis provides a more in-depth analysis on the key AC’s governance characteristics found 
to be significant in the regression analysis. 
 
7.3 Findings of the Study 
The findings of this study are obtained from the analysis of both primary and secondary data. 
First, data collected from the questionnaire sent to CIA are used to test hypothesis one (a), 
hypothesis one (b), hypothesis two (a) and hypothesis two (b). Hypothesis one (a) is partially 
supported. Only AC size is positive and significantly associated with financial resources 
devoted to the internal audit function. Furthermore, hypothesis one (b) is also partially 
supported. The findings show that both AC financial expertise and AC size are positive and 
significantly related to internal audit function labour hours. Conversely, hypotheses two (a) 
and (b) are rejected as no results are generated from the stepwise regressions. This latter 
finding illustrates that no attributes of ACs governance characteristics have a significant 
impact on the effectiveness of ACs in their role of ensuring the internal audit function 
independence.  
 
Second, data collected from the annual reports and financial databases are used to test 
hypothesis three and hypothesis four. Hypothesis three is partially supported too. AC size and 
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AC frequency of meetings are positive and significantly related to external audit fees. This 
proves that AC size and AC frequency of meetings are effective in facilitating the quality of 
the external audit. In addition, hypothesis four is also partially accepted. Both AC size and 
frequency of meetings are negatively and significantly related to non-audit fees. ACs 
governance characteristics of size and frequency of meetings are effective in their role of 
ensuring the independence of the external auditors. 
 
Finally, in the agency costs-benefit analysis, overall data (combination of questionnaire and 
secondary data) are used to test hypothesis five. Hypothesis five is partially accepted as AC 
fees are positive and significantly related to total shareholders return. However both 
independent variables, external audit fees and internal audit function budget are not 
significantly associated with total shareholders return. These results reveal that audit-related 
agency monitoring costs are only rationally incurred to generate returns to the shareholders, 
at least in the short-term, when those costs relate to the members of the AC itself.  
 
Furthermore, results from the comparative case study analysis between two different 
companies in the financials and materials industry are generally supportive where AC size 
and frequency of meetings play a significant role in relation to the effectiveness of AC in 
performing their roles especially in the internal audit function and are consistent with results 
of the regression models in. A summary of these findings is given in Table 36. Highlights of 
similarities and differences between these findings and prior empirical studies have been 
discussed in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 of the thesis (Refer to Section 5.4.4.3, Section 5.4.5.3, 
Section 5.4.6.3.3, Section  5.4.6.3.6,  Section 5.4.7.2.2, Section 6.3.3.8 and Section 6.4.3.8). 
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Table 36: Summary of Findings 
 Findings Summary 
Hypothesis One (a) 
 
Partially 
supported 
AC size is positive and significantly associated with 
financial resources devoted to the internal audit 
function. 
 
Hypothesis One (b) 
 
Partially 
supported 
AC financial expertise and AC size are positive and 
significantly related to internal audit function labour 
hours. 
 
Hypothesis Two (a) 
 
Rejected No attributes of ACs governance characteristics have 
a significant impact on the effectiveness of ACs in 
their role of ensuring the internal audit function 
independence.  
 
Hypothesis Two (b) 
 
Rejected No attributes of ACs governance characteristics have 
a significant impact on the effectiveness of ACs in 
their role of ensuring the internal audit function 
independence.  
 
Hypothesis Three 
 
Partially 
supported 
AC size and AC frequency of meetings are positive 
and significantly related to external audit fees. 
 
Hypothesis Four 
 
Partially 
supported  
AC size and frequency of meetings are negatively and 
significantly related to non-audit fees. 
 
Hypothesis Five 
 
Partially 
supported  
AC fees are positive and significantly related to total 
shareholders return. 
 
Comparative  
Case Study: 
Company A (largest 
AC Size) vs. 
Company B 
(smallest AC Size) 
 
Support 
hypotheses 
findings 
AC size does play a significant role in relation to the 
effectiveness of an AC in performing its role in 
overseeing the quality of the internal audit function. 
Comparative Case 
Study: 
Company C (most 
AC frequency of 
meetings) vs. 
Company D (least 
AC frequency of 
meetings) 
 
Support 
hypotheses 
findings  
AC frequency of meetings plays an important part in 
relation to the effectiveness of an AC in performing 
its role of overseeing the quality of the internal audit 
function. 
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7.4 Limitations of the Study 
This study has several limitations. There are limitations with the data, the model specification 
and the scope for generalizing the results.  
 
First, the data in this study are collected from the use of a questionnaire instrument and from 
hand-extracted secondary data in the company annual reports. This data could be subjected to 
error and bias. In terms of the primary data obtained using the questionnaire, limitations are 
embodied in the design and administration of any field surveys. Because several questions in 
the questionnaire are new to this study, their lack of prior testing does present a limitation for 
internal validity. However, the questions have been drawn from various literature sources and 
pre-tested for their meaningfulness and understandability.  
 
Nevertheless, respondent biases could be present due to problems of acquiescence (i.e., 
second-guessing the responses that the researcher might view as favourable), partitioning (i.e., 
not giving any responses at the extremes of the Likert scales) and ‘halo effect’ (i.e., giving 
self-ratings that are inflated). Turning to the administration of the questionnaire, the study 
faced practical difficulties in fully identifying and accessing the target population of CIAs. 
There is a possibility of lack of control on who completed the questionnaire since it is mailed 
to the CFOs of top 300 ASX listed companies, whose names are publicly available, for 
forwarding to the company’s CIA. This increased the probability that some responses are the 
delegate of the CIA.  
 
Second, the model specification might use variables that do not directly measure the concept 
of ‘role effectiveness’ of ACs. Instead various governance characteristics of the AC are 
measured. The effectiveness of the AC in fulfilling its roles is inferred from the strength of 
the association between these governance characteristics and specific proxy measures on the 
quality and independence of the internal audit function and external audit services. The six 
AC governance characteristics used to measure AC effectiveness (chair independence, 
financial and industry expertise, size, frequency of meetings and charter) are likely to be built 
from behavioural and organisational aspects that are not reflected in the proxy measures.  
 
Third, the scope to generalization of the results is limited. The results can be generalized only 
to the population from which the sample is drawn. The sample is limited to the top 300 ASX 
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listed companies and to the 2009- 2010 financial year. The year is representative of a period 
of financial market downturn. Further, the low response rate to the questionnaire survey 
means that sample used in this study may not be representative of the population of CIAs in 
the top 300 ASX listed companies.  
 
7.5 Implications of the Study 
The findings of this study have important implications for the shareholders and the board of 
directors. Other interested parties for which the findings would have implications would 
include regulators of corporate governance practices, accounting professional bodies and 
academics.  
 
The findings of the study have implications for regulators of corporate governance practices 
in terms of the composition and functioning of ACs in Australia. Currently, the formation, 
structure and operation of ACs in Australia are regulated by ASX listing rules and ASX CGC 
best practice recommendations. The findings of this study will help standard setters and 
policy makers to review the success or otherwise of ACs in Australia in fulfilling their roles 
especially in the internal and external audit functions. The findings may support the ASX 
CGC recommendations to strengthen the internal, external audit and corporate mechanisms 
for listed companies in Australia. For example, this appears to be a need for the ASX to 
consider special regulations concerning the adequacy of the budget for operating an AC that 
listed companies maintain during economic downturn. Also, the findings of the study are 
important as they provide new evidence on the extent of effectiveness of ACs in fulfilling 
their primary roles. The fact ACs are less effective in areas such as maintaining internal audit 
function independence should be a signal to management and regulators. 
 
More generally, the results of this study should provide the accounting professional bodies in 
Australia such as the Institute of Internal Auditors Australia (IIA), Institute of Chartered 
Accountants Australia (CA) and Certified Practicing Accountant Australia (CPA) with better 
understanding regarding the effective practice of ACs in overseeing the quality of internal 
and external audit and also ensuring the independence of internal and external auditors. This 
improved understanding can lead to accounting professional bodies providing 
recommendations to their members on improving the relationship between the ACs, internal 
auditors and external auditors. 
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Furthermore, this study has implications to the user of the annual reports especially the 
shareholders. To reduce shareholders-managers agency conflicts, an AC that consists of 
independent non-executive directors without a day-to-day management responsibility is in a 
good position to perform a monitoring function for the shareholders (Goddard and Masters, 
2000). The quality of AC members is important because of the significant agency benefit and 
costs incurred in operating an AC.  
 
Lastly, the findings of this study can help the board of directors choose the best AC members 
in ensuring that AC is at its best in performing its roles as a key corporate governance 
mechanism in the company. Moreover, there are implications to the academics of this study 
as that it can enrich the literature on AC effectiveness and operations. The findings should not 
only benefit readers in understanding the effectiveness of ACs in Australia in performing 
their roles but also produce some policy implications that may be applicable to other 
countries as well. 
 
7.6 Suggestions for Future Research 
This study leaves open a number of opportunities for future research. First, future quantitative 
studies may consider using a more refined measure of independence, expertise, diligence and 
authority of ACs. A direct measure of role fulfilment effectiveness of ACs could also be 
developed. Moreover, this study could extend its database to include an investigation of 
smaller companies listed on the ASX or for privately owned companies, or companies 
operating in countries with differing regulatory requirements. 
 
Second, the study uses quantitative data (questionnaire data-based sample and secondary 
data-based sample) which serves to highlight statistical average relationships between 
formally measured variables. This quantitative positivist approach does not reveal the 
informal arrangements that exist within ACs and between ACs, the board, the controlling 
shareholders, the internal and external auditors, and the top management. A complementary 
research approach would be to undertake interpretative qualitative methods, particularly case-
based interviews and observations that could give deeper understanding of behaviours 
amongst key organizational players.  
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Third, the theoretical perspective taken in the study is restricted to an economic rationalist, 
agency view of shareholders-management relationships. It is beyond the scope of this study 
to examine AC effectiveness under institutional theory perspectives, particularly the 
perspectives of legitimization and loose coupling. For example, future research could 
consider whether the reporting in annual reports of an AC having good governance 
characteristics, is only loosely coupled to the real behaviours of members of an AC. 
Additionally, future research could consider whether the impacts of behavioural relationships 
between the AC and the board, and between the AC and management, are linked to the notion 
of the AC’s effectiveness in fulfilling its roles. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix A: List of Sampled Companies 
No ASX Code Company Name 
1 ABP Abacus Property Group 
2 ACR Acrux Ltd 
3 ADU Adamus Resources Ltd 
4 ABC Adelaide Brighton Ltd 
5 ABY Aditya Birla Minerals Ltd 
6 AGK AGL Energy Ltd 
7 ALS Alesco Corporation Ltd 
8 AWC Alumina Ltd 
9 AMC Amcor Ltd 
10 AMP AMP Ltd 
11 AMX Ampella Mining Ltd 
12 ANN Ansell Ltd 
13 ANZ ANZ Banking Group Ltd 
14 APA APA Group 
15 APN APN News & Media Ltd 
16 AQA Aquila Resources Ltd 
17 ARU Arafura Resources Ltd 
18 AAD Ardent Leisure Group 
19 ALL Aristocrat Leisure Ltd 
20 AIO Asciano Ltd 
21 ASZ ASG Group Ltd 
22 APZ Aspen Group 
23 AZT Aston Resources Ltd 
24 AJA Astro Japan Property Group 
25 ASX ASX Ltd 
26 AGO Atlas Iron Ltd 
27 AUT Aurora Oil & Gas Ltd 
28 ASL Ausdrill Ltd 
29 AAX Ausenco Ltd 
30 AAC Australian Agricultural Company Ltd 
31 API Australian Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd 
32 ASB Austal Ltd 
33 AUN Austar United Communications Ltd 
34 ANG Austin Engineering Ltd 
35 ALZ Australand Property Group 
36 AWE AWE Ltd 
37 BND Bandanna Energy Ltd 
38 BOQ Bank of Queensland Ltd 
39 BPT Beach Energy Ltd 
40 BDR Beadell Resources Ltd 
41 BEN Bendigo & Adelaide Bank Ltd 
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No ASX Code Company Name 
42 BHP BHP Billiton Ltd 
43 BBG Billabong International Ltd 
44 BTA Biota Holdings Ltd  
45 BSL BlueScope Steel Ltd 
46 BLY Boart Longyear Ltd 
47 BLD Boral Ltd 
48 BOW Bow Energy Ltd 
49 BKN Bradken Ltd 
50 BXB Brambles Ltd 
51 BRM Brockman Resources Ltd 
52 CAB Cabcharge Australia Ltd 
53 CTX Caltex Australia Ltd 
54 CPB Campbell Brothers Ltd 
55 CFE Cape Lambert Resources Ltd 
56 CNX Carbon Energy Ltd 
57 CVN Carnarvon Petroleum Ltd 
58 CRZ Carsales.com Ltd 
59 CCV Cash Converters International Ltd 
60 CAH Catalpa Resources Ltd 
61 CNP Centro Properties Group 
62 CER Centro Retail Group 
63 CFU Ceramic Fuel Cells Ltd 
64 CDI Challenger Diversified Property Group 
65 CIF Challenger Infrastructure Fund 
66 CGF Challenger Ltd 
67 CHC Charter Hall Group 
68 CQO Charter Hall Office REIT 
69 CQR Charter Hall Retail REIT 
70 CLO Clough Ltd 
71 CCL Coca-Cola Amatil Ltd 
72 COH Cochlear Ltd 
73 COK Cockatoo Coal Ltd 
74 CBA Commonwealth Bank of Australia 
75 CPU Computershare Ltd 
76 CEU ConnectEast Group 
77 CQT Conquest Mining Ltd 
78 CWN Crown Ltd 
79 CSV CSG Ltd 
80 CSL CSL Ltd 
81 CSR CSR Ltd 
82 CUS Customers Ltd 
83 DTE Dart Energy Ltd 
84 DJS David Jones Ltd 
85 DXS DEXUS Property Group 
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No ASX Code Company Name 
86 DML Discovery Metals Ltd 
87 DOW Downer EDI Ltd 
88 DUE DUET Group 
89 DLX DuluxGroup Ltd 
90 ESG Eastern Star Gas Ltd 
91 ELD Elders Ltd 
92 EHL Emeco Holdings Ltd 
93 ERA Energy Resources of Australia Ltd 
94 EWC Energy World Corporation Ltd 
95 ENV Envestra Ltd 
96 EXT Extract Resources Ltd 
97 FXJ Fairfax Media Ltd 
98 FKP FKP Property Group 
99 FWD Fleetwood Corporation Ltd 
100 FXL FlexiGroup Ltd 
101 FLT Flight Centre Ltd 
102 FMS Flinders Mines Ltd 
103 FGE Forge Group Ltd 
104 FMG Fortescue Metals Group Ltd 
105 FGL Fosters Group Ltd 
106 GXY Galaxy Resources Ltd 
107 GBG Gindalbie Metals Ltd 
108 GCL Gloucester Coal Ltd 
109 GFF Goodman Fielder Ltd 
110 GMG Goodman Group 
111 GPT GPT Group 
112 GNC GrainCorp Ltd 
113 GRR Grange Resources Ltd 
114 GRY Gryphon Minerals Ltd 
115 GUD GUD Holdings Ltd 
116 GWA GWA Group Ltd 
117 HVN Harvey Norman Holdings Ltd 
118 HIL Hills Holdings Ltd 
119 HZN Horizon Oil Ltd 
120 IIN iiNet Ltd 
121 ILU Iluka Resources Ltd 
122 IMD Imdex Ltd 
123 IMF IMF (Australia) Ltd 
124 IPL Incitec Pivot Ltd 
125 IRN Indophil Resources NL 
126 IDL Industrea Ltd 
127 IFN Infigen Energy stp 
128 IOF Investa Office Fund 
129 IAG Insurance Australia Group Ltd 
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No ASX Code Company Name 
130 IAU Intrepid Mines Ltd 
131 IVC InvoCare Ltd 
132 IFL IOOF Holdings Ltd 
133 IRE IRESS Market Technology Ltd 
134 IVA Ivanhoe Aust 
135 JBH JB Hi-Fi 
136 KZL Kagara Ltd 
137 KAR Karoon Gas Australia Ltd 
138 KCN Kingsgate Consolidated Ltd 
139 LEI Leighton Holdings Ltd 
140 LLC Lend Lease Group 
141 LNC Linc Energy 
142 LYC Lynas Corporation Ltd 
143 MCC Macarthur Coal Ltd 
144 MAH Macmahon Holdings Ltd 
145 MQA Macquarie Atlas Roads Group 
146 MQG Macquarie Group Ltd 
147 MAP MAp Group 
148 MCE Matrix Composites & Engineering Ltd 
149 MMS McMillan Shakespeare Ltd 
150 MCP McPhersons Ltd 
151 MML Medusa Mining Ltd 
152 MEO MEO Australia Ltd 
153 MRM Mermaid Marine Australia Ltd 
154 MSB Mesoblast Ltd 
155 MTS Metcash Ltd 
156 MNC Metminco Ltd 
157 MIO Miclyn Express Offshore Ltd 
158 MRE Minara Resources Ltd 
159 MCR Mincor Resources NL 
160 MDL Mineral Deposits Ltd 
161 MIN Mineral Resources Ltd 
162 MBN Mirabela Nickel Ltd 
163 MGR Mirvac Group 
164 MPO Molopo Energy Ltd 
165 MND Monadelphous Group Ltd 
166 MGX Mount Gibson Iron Ltd 
167 MMX Murchison Metals Ltd 
168 MYR Myer Holdings Ltd 
169 NAB National Australia Bank Ltd 
170 NVT Navitas Ltd 
171 NCM Newcrest Mining Ltd 
172 NXS Nexus Energy Ltd 
173 NDO Nido Petroleum Ltd 
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No ASX Code Company Name 
174 NFE Northern Iron Ltd 
175 NUF Nufarm Ltd 
176 OKN Oakton Ltd 
177 OST OneSteel Ltd 
178 ORI Orica Ltd 
179 ORG Origin Energy 
180 OZL OZ Minerals Ltd 
181 PBG Pacific Brands Ltd 
182 PDN Paladin Energy Ltd 
183 PNA PanAust Ltd 
184 PAN Panoramic Resources Ltd 
185 PPX PaperlinX Ltd 
186 PPT Perpetual Ltd 
187 PRU Perseus Mining Ltd 
188 PXS Pharmaxis Ltd 
189 PLA Platinum Australia Ltd 
190 PMV Premier Investments Ltd 
191 PRY Primary Health Care Ltd 
192 PRG Programmed Maintenance Services Ltd 
193 QAN Qantas Airways Ltd 
194 QBE QBE Insurance Group Ltd 
195 RMS Ramelius Resources Ltd 
196 RHC Ramsay Health Care Ltd 
197 REA REA Group Ltd 
198 RRL Regis Resources Ltd 
199 RXM Rex Minerals Ltd 
200 RHG RHG Ltd 
201 RIO Rio Tinto Ltd 
202 RIV Riversdale Mining Ltd 
203 ROC Roc Oil Company Ltd 
204 SAI SAI Global Ltd 
205 SFR Sandfire Resources NL 
206 STO Santos Ltd 
207 SAR Saracen Mineral Holdings Ltd 
208 SDM Sedgman Ltd 
209 SEK SEEK Ltd 
210 SVW Seven Group Holdings Ltd 
211 SIP Sigma Pharmaceuticals Ltd 
212 SLR Silver Lake Resources Ltd 
213 SGM SIMS Metal Management Ltd 
214 SKE Skilled Group Ltd 
215 SMX SMS Management & Technology Ltd 
216 SHL Sonic Healthcare Ltd 
217 SPN SP AusNet 
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No ASX Code Company Name 
218 SKI Spark Infrastructure Group 
219 SFH Specialty Fashion Group Ltd 
220 SPT Spotless Group Ltd 
221 SBM St Barbara Ltd 
222 SXL Southern Cross Media Group Ltd 
223 SGP Stockland 
224 SRQ Straits Resources Ltd 
225 SGN STW Communications Group Ltd 
226 SUN Suncorp Group Ltd 
227 SDL Sundance Resources Ltd 
228 SUL Super Retail Group Ltd 
229 TAH Tabcorp Holdings Ltd 
230 TAP Tap Oil Ltd 
231 TGR Tassal Group Ltd 
232 TTS Tatts Group Ltd 
233 TLS Telstra Corporation Ltd 
234 TEN Ten Network Holdings Ltd 
235 TRS The Reject Shop Ltd 
236 TOL Toll Holdings Ltd 
237 TOX Tox Free Solutions Ltd 
238 TPM TPG Telecom Ltd 
239 TSE Transfield Services Ltd 
240 TPI Transpacific Industries Group Ltd 
241 TCL Transurban Group 
242 TRY Troy Resources NL 
243 UGL UGL Ltd 
244 VBA Virgin Blue Holdings Ltd 
245 WTP Watpac Ltd 
246 WES Wesfarmers Ltd 
247 WSA Western Areas NL 
248 WDC Westfield Group 
249 WBC Westpac Banking Corporation 
250 WEC White Energy Company Ltd 
251 WHC Whitehaven Coal 
252 WPL Woodside Petroleum 
253 WOW Woolworths Ltd 
254 WOR WorleyParsons Ltd 
255 WTF Wotif.com Holdings Ltd 
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Appendix D: Questionnaire 
The Internal Audit Function and the Audit Committee 
General Instructions 
Dear Sir or Madam,  
This questionnaire is organised in five sections. It should take you approximately 8 to 10 
minutes to complete. Your insight is vital to this research. Please be assured that all responses 
will be kept strictly confidential. Thank you. 
 
Option 1: 
Complete the questionnaire below and send it back to us in the enclosed postage-paid 
envelope. 
OR 
Option 2: 
Complete and submit the questionnaire online. To open and start this survey, please go to this 
website: https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/RMIT_IIASurveyInhouse 
 
Section 1: Background 
 
1. Your age group: (Please tick) 
 BELOW 35 
 35 TO 44 
 45 TO 54 
     55 TO 64 
 65 OR OLDER 
 
2. Gender:  
MALE  FEMALE 
 
3. How long have you worked in the internal audit field over your career? 
______ Years 
 
4. What is your current job position? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. What is the name of your company? (Optional) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
(Note: We seek your company name only for purposes of linking data from your 
responses with that company’s publicly available published governance data. Please be 
assured that you and your company will remain anonymous and not be mentioned by 
name in any future published research.) 
 
6. Size of your company based on market capitalization:  
 ASX TOP 20  
 ASX 21- 100  
 ASX 101- 300  
 ASX 301- 500 
 ASX BELOW 500 
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7. Industry of your company:  
 CONSUMER DISCRETIONARY 
 CONSUMER STAPLES 
 ENERGY 
 FINANCIALS 
 HEALTH CARE 
 INDUSTRIALS 
 INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
 MATERIALS 
 TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES 
 UTILITIES  
 OTHERS 
 
8.  How many professional internal audit staff is employed in your company? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. What is the total annual internal audit budget? (Approximately dollar) 
 $20,000 AND BELOW 
 $21,000 TO $50,000 
 $51,000 TO $100,000 
 $101,000 TO $200,000 
 $201,000 TO $500,000 
 $501,000 TO $1,000,000 
 $1,001,000 AND ABOVE 
 
Section 2: Internal Audit Function Activities 
10. How many total hours per employee (approximately) were devoted to internal audit 
services during your company’s most recent financial year? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. For the total hours indicated in Question 10, what proportion was allocated to each of the 
following activities? (Please note that the percentage of hours should add up to 100%): 
 
Activity Description 
 
% of Hours 
Deterring and investigating fraud 
 
 
Maintaining the efficacy of management control systems 
 
 
Financial statement auditing in collaboration with the external auditors  
Evaluating the effectiveness of risk management, including safe 
guarding assets 
 
Engaging in board and other corporate governance support work  
Other activities   
(please specify:_____________________________________) 
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12. To what extent, does your internal audit function: (Please tick) 
 
 Never Seldom Sometimes Often Almost Always 
 
Provide a training 
ground as part of 
employees’ career paths 
in the company 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Have turnover of staff 
moving to other areas of 
the company 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13. Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements:  
(Please tick and answer in all three columns) 
 
Statement Audit Committee Chief Executive Officer Chief Financial Officer 
 
Your internal audit 
function regularly 
reports to: 
 
 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neutral 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
 
 
 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neutral 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
 
 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neutral 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
 
 
In setting the 
internal audit’s 
annual budget, there 
is substantial 
involvement by: 
 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neutral 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
 
 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neutral 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
 
 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neutral 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
 
 
In any decisions to 
appoint or replace 
the Chief/ Director 
of Internal Audit, 
substantial influence 
would be expected 
to come from: 
 
 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neutral 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
 
 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neutral 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
 
 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neutral 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
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14. To what extent, does your internal audit function coordinate with the external auditors in 
respect of: 
 
 Never Seldom Sometimes Often Almost Always 
 
Areas of internal 
audit coverage, other 
than financial 
statements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Internal audit work 
schedule 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15. To what extent, does the external auditors have access to: 
 
 Never Seldom Sometimes Often Almost Always 
 
Working papers of 
your internal audit 
function 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Most management 
reports of your 
internal audit 
function 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 3: Audit Committee and the Internal Audit Function 
 
16. How many times a year does you/ your internal audit function meet with the Audit 
Committee and how long is the length of the meeting? 
 
Number of meetings a year : _______________________________________ 
Length of the meetings  
(On average, minutes)  : _______________________________________ 
 
17. In terms of privacy of your meetings with the Audit Committee (chair, individual 
members or committee):  
 All meetings are totally private 
 All meetings are partially private 
 Some meetings in a year have private time 
 No private meetings 
 
18. How do you rate the overall expertise of the Audit Committee members in regards to 
accounting, auditing and internal control matters? (Please tick one) 
 Excellent 
 Good 
 Moderate 
 Poor 
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19. How often does the Audit Committee review or assess the plans of the internal audit 
function in terms of its: 
 
 Never Seldom Sometimes Often Almost Always 
 
Scheduling of work 
projects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Co-ordinating with 
the external auditors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20. How often per year does the Audit Committee receive reports from your internal audit 
function related to: 
 
 None per year 1- 2 per year 3- 5 per year 6 or more per year 
 
Routine internal 
audit activities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Special 
investigations 
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Section 4: Internal Audit Function Independence 
 
21. Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements:  
 
Statement Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree 
 
Your internal audit function puts a 
great deal of effort beyond that 
normally expected in order to 
ensure dedication to independence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Your internal audit function would 
resist almost any type of pressure 
and threat in order to maintain 
independence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When your internal audit function is 
required to work under both an 
‘audit’ role and ‘advisory service’ 
role by the management this will 
never compromise independence in 
the audit role 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The existing relationship between 
the Audit Committee (or its chair) 
and the internal auditor provides a 
strong backing for the maintenance 
of your internal audit function’s 
independence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The independence of your internal 
audit function is strongly upheld 
because of Audit Committee 
members have strong collective 
independence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Audit Committee would be 
prepared to take action to maintain 
the independence of your internal 
audit function if it is threatened by 
management 
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22. Do you have any comments about your internal audit function, the Audit Committee or 
the external auditors in your organisation? 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Thank you for your participation. Your assistance is greatly appreciated. 
  
 
Please return the questionnaire using the enclosed postage-paid envelope. 
Confidentiality will be strictly assured. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SUMMARY REPORT: If you wish to receive a summary of the research findings, kindly 
provide your details below or attach your business card: 
 
Name:  ________________________________________________________ 
Email:  _________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
